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I'
Since the L'SDA Forest Service began managing public lands nearly one hundred years
ago the agency's mission and methods have shifted in accordance with public desires
numerous times. In this dissertation I suggest that in addition to being responsive to
changes in social values and economic and ecological conditions, the Forest Service (and
forestry education) must also be responsive to the shifts in our understandings o f
language, knowledge, power, and authority. These shifts, many o f which are documented
and expounded upon in the humanities, have profound implications for the praxis o f
forestry generally and on the discourse o f forest health in particular.
In this paper. I outline some o f the dominant strains in continental philosophy
(K ierkegaard's theory o f being, de Saussure's semiotics. Derridean deconstruction.
Lyotard's analysis o f knowledge in the post modem worid. Foucault's archeology o f
power and knowledge) and use them to "reread" the FS discourse on forest health. In
addition to deconstructing the FS discourse on forest health. I also exam ine the medical
establishm ent's discourse on human health. The comparison is enlightening: the medical
community and the Forest Service are facing similar critiques and challenges to their
know ledge and power structures, but their responses have been som ewhat different. Even
as the Forest Service is seeking to establish and strengthen objective, biophysical criteria
for the determination o f forest conditions, the medical community— or at least part o f it—
is slowly moving away from its exclusive commitment to a narrowly biophysical
definition o f health and the medicine-as-science model o f health care toward a
biopsychosocial model that demands the use o f multiple sources o f knowledge, some of
which are distinctly non-scientific.
1 conclude with a suggestion that in order to be more responsive not only to the shifts in
understandings o f knowledge noted above, but also to those brought about by forestry's
ow n reconceptualization o f the forest as an ecosystem, forestry education might consider
introducing forestry students to alternative ways o f knowing. In short. I suggest that
forestry become aware o f its own situatedness and educate its students to the everchanging cultural context in which the discourse and practice o f forestry is carried out.
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When I use a w ord, it m eans ju s t w h at I ch oose it to m ean — n eith er m ore nor less.

-H u m p ty Dumpty

The c o n tra sts a n d con tradiction s that can p erm a n en tly live p e a c e fu lly sid e hy side in a
sku ll m ake a ll the system s o f p o litic a l o p tim ists a n d p e s sim ists illusory.

--Albert Einstein
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Chapter One
Introduction

Words and magic were in the beginning one and the same thing, and even today
words retain much o f their magical power. ... Words call fo rth emotions a n d are
universally the means by which we influence our fello w creatures. Therefore let us
not despise the use o f words ...
-Sigmund Freud

This is an essay about words, about the problems o f interpretation and those o f meaning,
and how those words ultimately affect what we do in the forest. It accepts (with
qualifications which will become clear) the premise that for humans, the word, logos,
language, is fundamental: “ In the beginning was the word,” John tells us. The essay
tentatively assents to the presumption (and one could say, arrogance) o f the generative,
creative power o f language, o f the ability o f humans to “speak the world into being”
without, however, naively assenting to the oft heard assertion that there is nothing other
than words. Just as the god o f the Old Testament did to the world in Genesis— “And God
said let there be ..." , so we do on a daily basis. Out o f chaos and formlessness, god— and
we— speak identity and difference into being— and thereby establish in some
sense, the possibility o f being itself. The question then o f who gets to speak and to
interpret, to establish the criteria by which knowledge is deemed knowledge, is not
negligible: the one who defines the terms o f the discourse is the one who ultimately
controls the discourse and the actions that follow therefrom. This dissertation is about
coming to terms in forestry.
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In the management o f public lands and natural resources, control o f the terms o f the
discourse is hotly contested. That portion o f the general public that is concerned or
interested is no longer content (if ever it was) to accede to professional authority, to leave
interpretation and establishment o f meaning to the Forest Service. Today, there are
multiple contenders for the job o f speaker and “high interpreter:” interested individuals,
environmental groups (a heterogeneous lot that does not speak with one voice), user
groups (also heterogeneous), affected land owners, individuals whose livelihoods depend
upon using the forest in some fashion or another, corporations, etc. They question
everything from the commodity production orientation o f forest practice (or the lack
thereof), the production o f knowledge that legitimates and dictates those practices to the
discursive traditions that are used to construct nature itself. “Salvage.” “forest health."
"roadless area." “wilderness.” “ecosystem” to name but a very few. are examples o f
words or phrases that lead to radically different actions depending on how they are
interpreted.

In this dissertation I examine the discourse o f “forest health.” I look at its defmition(s),
the meanings and values ascribed to it (or concealed within it), how the discourse
constructs or understands its object (the ecosystem or forest), and the knowledge
frameworks that are brought to bear in articulating it, with the objective being to
deconstruct forest health as a term— by which I mean to better understand how the term
functions (or fails to function) in the continuing debate over forestry praxis on Forest
Service lands.
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As my research proceeded, ambiguity increased. Definitions were unable to resolve
problems of interpretation in key terms; they only provided more key term s that needed to
be unpacked. The ambiguities inherent in the terminology (inherent, one begins to
suspect, in language itself) revealed potentially irresolvable internal contradictions
between stated objects and objectives and epistemological commitments.

In an effort to get a better fix on the “health” term itself, to understand how it might be
used and understood in other areas o f practice and discourse, I performed the same
analysis on the medical discourse on human health. This second task, however,
fragmented into two distinct parts upon closer examination: the medical community or
discourse is deeply divided along ontological and epistemological lines. O n the one hand
are those who conceive o f medicine as a natural science, treatment as a technical
endeavor, and health as a strictly biophysical condition; they are concerned only with the
body and the bodily manifestations and biological vectors o f disease. On the other hand
are those who are com mitted to an “ecological theory” o f health; they see medicine as a
social science (science understood broadly in its Latin sense o f “know ledge”) and health
as a culturally mediated condition o f the real (body); their focus is on persons, as beings
who exist in the cultural or symbolic and the real.

My third task in the discussion on health (Chapter Five) is a cross-discursive com parison
or "rereading” o f forest health through the (refocused) lens o f the medical discourse on
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health. The inconsistencies that arise in forest health between object, objective, and
epistemology begin to yield when reevaluated in light o f the insights gained in
articulating the distinction between ''medicine as a natural science and health as a valueneutral biophysical condition” and "medicine as a social science and health as an
ecological condition that involves the whole person.” The specter o f contradictions
concerning what is and what we think is and what we want to be continues to loom: but
contradiction is. as Kierkegaard would say, the fundamental condition o f being a
concrete, actually existing being, that lives in the real as well as the symbolic, in the past,
present, and future, in the world that is and the world that it wants to be. In other words,
life itself is possible precisely because o f the irreducible tension between the simultaneity
o f either-or. The re-reading does not reduce ambiguity either— if the linguists are right, it
never will— but the ecological model o f health internalizes ambiguity, treating it not as
something to be gotten over, disregarded, or dispelled by reduction and isolation, but as
an essential and ineluctable attribute that makes agreement possible.

Forestry, like medicine, is one o f those endeavors that straddles the divide between the
symbolic and the real; it rides what N. Kathryn Hayles calls the "cusp”— the "selforganizing, transformative process” by which we make sense o f the chaotic "unmediated
flux" o f the "out there” (Hayles, in Soule 1995, 49). These transformative processes
*

include "sensory, contextual, and cognitive com ponents;” we see and experience what we
do (conceptualized as observations and experiences or events) because o f our peculiar
physiology and anatomy (i.e., as a species), our individual histories, our cultural history.
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and our particular situation within time and space. That is, what we know o f the world is
the result o f an ongoing negotiation between what is out there and who or what we are.
Because forestry. like medicine, rides the cusp foresters and physicians must open the
epistemological portals wider to include multiple sources o f knowledge qua knowledge,
not as opinions or expressions o f ‘"desires” that are somehow inferior or secondary to the
"hard data" o f scientific knowledge. Foresters and physicians must make an effort not
only to "interrogate the referent” but to interrogate themselves interrogating— to examine
the conditions under which one might know the forest or the body, but also those under
which one might know what one thinks one knows about the forest or the body, and this
means accessing knowledge produced in other disciplines and by other people. The
forester, like the physician, must learn to "speak in tongues;” to try to understand not only
what is "out there.” but to understand the stories that we all have about what is out there.

This dissertation is a step in that direction; it is an effort to come to terms, in all their
ambiguity and contradiction, with the ineluctably “fissured” and open nature o f the USFS
discourse on forest health by looking at the terms themselves and following where they
lead. Hal Salwasser (then director o f the USFS' N ew Perspectives Program) understood
the need to come to terms, and in his case, the need to try to control them. In 1992, in an
effort to convince Dale Robertson, then C hief o f the USFS, to adopt Ecosystem
Management as Forest Service policy sooner rather than later, Salwasser argued that “it's
time that the Forest Service adopt Ecosystem Management terminology ..., and that we
shape it. rather than let somebody else define what it is and then us having to live with
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that definition... we should embrace the terminology and at least play a part in shaping
what it comes to mean” (Salwasser, reported in Freeman 1998 , 205). He worried that the
USFS would lose control o f the terms o f the discourse, and by association, control o f the
referent. Salwasser’s understanding o f the peculiar relationship between words or
discourse, power, and management o f the ‘‘out there” is distinctly at odds with the
understanding articulated by a team o f USFS researchers in a General Technical Report
on forest health in the Southwest. In what begins as a promising foray into semiotics and
its impacts on forestry, the authors close with this assertion:

Science, environmentalism, wise-use. conservation, and popular culture all
interpret nature according to the mythologies o f its own interest group. Behind all
these mythologies lies the physical reality o f wildlands. Agencies concerned with
forest ecosystem health must sift through the cultural constructs to find core
reality. The Forest Service cannot manage mythological wildlands (USDA FS
TDahms and G eilsl997, online).

Apparently, they think the Forest Service alone can directly access the “core reality,” the
"flux" behind all the stories; the rest o f us are stuck with myths. (I am reminded o f one o f
Einstein's aphorisms “W hoever undertakes to set him self up as judge in the field o f Truth
and Knowledge is shipwrecked by the laughter o f the gods.” The FS is perilously close!)
Salw asser's position and that o f the team o f USFS researchers delineate the two radically
different approaches to understanding the relationship between knowledge and language.
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us and the "out there," the symbolic and the real that characterize the field o f
investigation in this dissertation. My argument is that the USFS is in no better position to
define the terms o f engagement on the grounds o f some privileged access to the real than
the rest o f us are; for all its outward looking, it (and its researchers) are as bound by the
constraints o f culture, history, language, and physiology as any other human or human
discourse.

This project is prompted by Derrida’s insight into the ineluctably ’‘fissured" or open
nature o f discourse; thus forestry, as a discursively generated or language-based practice
is eminently vulnerable to critique from without and deconstruction from within. It also
accepts his insistence that this fissure, this openness, demands from each o f us the utmost
vigilance: because we can’t know the Truth (which might serve to check or restrain our
discourse and our discursively based actions), we have a responsibility to avoid
foreclosing our disourse in such a way as to exclude other voices (Derrida, in Caputo
1997). "Health" is the fissure in the discourse on which I have focused; it provides a way
in as well as a way out. By this I mean that unpacking the USFS' understanding o f the
term health leads one to investigate other terms in the USFS health discourse, and
because the term health is also used in other discourses, because it is dispersed, it also
invites comparison to non-forestry discourses.

Much o f the theory (theories, really) that informs this project comes out o f a field o f
thought (or better y e t, an approach to thinking about being, knowledge, and language)
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that is known as continental philosophy. In this work, I am indebted to Kierkegaard’s
understandings o f being, Saussure’s work in linguistics, Derrida’s insights into text and
his rereadings o f Saussure’s work, Foucault’s analysis o f the relationship between
knowledge and power, and to Lyotard’s (following W ittgenstein) examination o f the
state o f knowledge in a postmodern world. I am also indebted to what N. Kathryn Hayles
calls ‘'constrained constructivism,” an eclectic approach that seems to normalize
contradiction and ambiguity by insisting upon the retention o f the simultaneity o f the
either-or/neither-nor (in other words, be refusing to choose). All o f these will be more
fully elaborated in Chapter Two.

The analysis itself is done on written texts. I chose to limit my attention to those texts on
forest health produced by the USFS, most o f which have been produced in the last
decade. With respect to the texts used in Chapter Four (on medicine) I limit m yself to
those produced by medical practitioners or those involved in the education o f future
practitioners. It is a convenience, one that artificially limits the interpretive possibilities,
but this is true o f all critical analyses. I settled upon USFS literature because in the final
analysis, it is the USFS who manages for forest health on public lands; if they are
incorporating meanings o f forest health generated in external discourses, then it should
show up somewhere in their literature.

In selecting particular USFS texts that might be “representative,” I solicited the advice o f
two individuals who have been instrum ental in the USFS and in framing the USFS
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discourse on ecosystem management, o f which forest health is a key ( if not the key)
objective. In response, Dr. Hal Salwasser suggested that there was not much o f value
coming out o f the FS on forest health these days and he could offer no titles that might
serv e my purposes (Pers. com., 10-1-00, e-mail). Dr. Jack Ward Thom as responded to my
enquiry with a list o f his publications, none o f which took up with the issue o f forest
health per se (Pers. com., 10-6-00, e-mail). So, I did what most researchers with a field
study do: I did some general reading to find out in which locations the “species” o f
interest had been sighted (USFS literature) and to narrow down a time frame (Q: When
did the term forest health come into serious play in FS policy and practice? A: About
1990.): 1 then marked out my “plots" (USFS documents on forest health published in the
last 10 years). I chose works with "forest health” in the titles and followed the citations. I
looked at policy statements (particularly those at the national level) as well as regulatory
and planning documents because they establish the USFS objectives. I also looked at the
technical reports produced at the regional and individual forest level because they told me
something o f how the objectives were being interpreted and “reified” at the level o f
practice. Eventually, the documents begin to repeat themselves, to quote and requote the
national objectives, and then to expound on the minutiae o f pathogens and
"pathoecologies,” or to take the stock definitions, criteria, and techniques and map them
out onto individual forest landscapes in order to determine “present conditions” or to
aather baseline data.
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For the texts used to construct the medical view o f health, I used the same methodology: I
queried a few professionals (two clinical physicians and a public health administrator) for
suggestions, and I foraged among the voluminous technical and scientific publications in
search o f the more rare treatises on health itself. In the process I discovered the broad
schism mentioned earlier and so directed my subsequent searching to finding texts that
seemed to "represent" both sides o f the health debate. Thus, the sampling may not be
exhaustive, but it is nonetheless illustrative o f the Forest Service position on forest health
and the medical com m unities’ changing understandings o f human health.

With respect to methods. I take my cue from Karl Popper who declares him self
uninterested in questions o f method except insofar as the method permits o f or inhibits
the clear statement o f an interesting problem and the critical exam ination o f the various
proposed solutions (Popper 1997, 16). In other words. Popper is an advocate o f rational
discussion, o f logical argument, produced and sustained by whatever means one may
bring to bear in sincerely looking for a solution. Like Popper’s inquisitive and unfettered
philosophers, we are here interested in a multi-faceted problem (the problem o f forest
health and how it m ight compare to that o f human health), and because our problem is
complex, we may have to "philosophize in many different ways.” We will not "pledge
ourselves in advance" to any one method, but rather welcome any method that may help
us to see our problem more clearly (Popper 1997, 20, 22). Thus, though I make no claims
to being "without method,” I do submit that the complexity o f the problem (the meaning
o f forest health) adm its o f multiple methods.
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As noted above, I limited my attention to USDA FS publications and did not venture out
into the rich body o f text on these issues produced outside o f the USFS. I did this for two
reasons (other than the obvious one o f pragmatics). First, the FS is a public agency
responsible for managing vast public lands and their management is hotly contested.
Second, if the FS is aware o f and responsive to ideas generated in extra-forestry
disciplines or venues, it should show up in their publications. It may very well be that the
FS is carrying on an internal dialogue about problem s o f method, alternative knowledges,
the role and/or limitations o f science, the changing role o f authority and expertise, the
connection o f knowledge and power, and the "heterogeneous multiplicity” o f the concept
o f health. But if this dialogue does not appear in the publications, and if it is thus
concealed from the general public, then the general public will make its assessment o f the
FS motives and programs based on what it does put “out there” for public consumption.
The fact remains, however, that the words are the FS’ own and thus presumably represent
the FS' position on forest health, they are in print and published for public consumption,
and are thus available for deconstruction and critique. Again, the dissertation does not
pretend to be exhaustive. It is however, the result, as Stuart Kauffman says in his book At
Home in the Universe, o f “one mind’s transect” through the forest o f literature on human
and forest health (Kauffman 1995).

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
Chapter Two
‘Words and Things’
4 task that consists o f not— o f no longer— treating discourses as groups o f signs
(signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that
system atically fo rm the objects o f which they speak. O f course, discourses are composed
o f signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things.
-Foucault
An Archeology o f Knowledge

My task in this chapter is to sketch out the broad themes or features o f the field o f inquiry
known as continental philosophy (CP). Having delimited the space. I will then identify
and elaborate more fully on those features or approaches that are pertinent to this
project— an approach that might (over-simply) be called textual analysis by way o f
Saussure. Derrida. Foucault, and Lyotard, among others. Selectivity is necessary (though
dangerous) because even though continental philosophers share some fundamental
epistemological and ontological commitments, these com mitments are elaborated and
articulated in sometimes conflicting methodological and theoretical frameworks. As one
editor ironically notes in his Introduction to a volume bearing the impressively
comprehensive title o f Continental Philosophy: An Anthology, the ambiguity and
instability o f the field o f inquiry designated by the name is a “sign o f the tim es” (McNeill
and Feldman 1998, 2). CP is not a homogenous, monolithic philosophy organized around
one central theme with a single, obligatory methodology, but an approach to knowledge
and language that fosters dispersion and eclecticism. I f there is a connecting thread that
runs through all o f CP. it is woven from the proposition that words, signs, tend to be
inexact— or less exact than philosophy had assumed them to be; that ambiguity is
therefore inherent, ubiquitous, and ultimately irreducible; that there is no necessary

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13
connection between a sign and a referent— that is, the mind is not a mirror o f reality, and
structures o f knowledge or logoi bear no essential, obligatory, ineluctable connection to
"structures'' in the real. Thus knowledge (as a function o f language) is always contingent,
partial, situated. Different continental philosophers tease this thread out in different ways;
they make different inferences from this basic insight about words; they apply it to
different philosophical, social, political, and economic institutions and knowledge
frameworks with different results; they draw different conclusions about what we can
know and how we know it. about the relationship between “mind and m atter’ and who
we are.

Despite these radical internal differences. CP is sufficiently coherent that we can say that
its way o f thinking about knowledge and language is radically different from the way o f
thinking that has informed Western scientific practice (and by association, land
management) to date, i.e., logical positivism. Suffice it to say that even though logical
positivism is generally acknowledged as passe in many fields, forestry remains largely
committed to the project o f objective knowledge, or radical empiricism, and the
correspondence notion o f truth. My thesis questions that implicit commitment and
reexamines the praxis o f forestry from the perspective o f CP in an effort to open it up to
the possibility o f its own future (Derrida).

But we need a more elaborate, detailed articulation o f this overly-general characterization
of CP that takes into account its differences. The editors o f the above mentioned
anthology struggle to articulate a “definition” o f CP— a near Herculean task given its
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eclecticism and internal resistance to reduction under a singular name or title.
Nonetheless, they suggest that

Continental philosophy broadly accepts and shares a fundamental insight o f
H egel's thinking: namely, that reason, rationality, thought, i.e. logos in general,
are constituted in an intrinsically historical manner; that their mode o f being is the
same as that o f human existence itself, and in this sense guarantees no eternal
truths or certainties. ... [T]he desire for scientific truth is no less historically
contingent and questionable than any other purely “logical” truth, and offers no
eternal or ultimate solutions to fundamental questions o f human existence. ...
[This] awareness o f the intrinsic historicality o f its own undertaking thus tends to
be a distinctive hallmark o f continental philosophy (McNeill and Feldman 1998.
1- 2 ).

What is distinctive about CP then is that it is a “style o f philosophizing in which the
practitioners put their own traditions, cultures, histories, and languages into question and
into dialogue with one another;” i.e., it is self-conscious (McNeill and Feldm an 1998. 2).
It philosophizes about philosophy, it interrogates itself interrogating; every thought,
statement, or discourse is subject to “deconstruction” (an internal critique), as well as
contest from without. “Doing” continental philosophy is like thinking yourself thinking,
seeing yourself seeing— it is an endlessly iterative, reflexive and reflective language game
that is both inwardly and outwardly directed; that is, it questions the possibility o f thought
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and conditions for knowledge that obtain both within the system or particular discourse
and without it.1

CP has abandoned the search for ultimate truth and certainty since no person can
legitimately claim a universal position above and beyond his own bodily existence; in
fact, it is bodily existence that is the condition for knowledge (cf. Kierkegaard and
Lyotard). In reestablishing the universality o f doubt (an Enlightenment project that logical
positivism sought to abandon), CP focuses instead on the problem s o f signification,
interpretation and meaning, and knowledge as well as on power, author-ity. and
responsibility in a world in which signifiers are acknowledged as floating free o f the
signified and signs o f referents; it rejects the ontological primacy o f an objective
obligatory unifying logos; it decenters and fragments the •‘know ing'’ presence or subject;
and it posits a world in which the structures o f logos cannot be shown to be a perfect
analogue o f the structures o f reality, thereby foreclosing/precluding the possibility o f any
knowledge being known to be eternally or universally true. O f course, we cannot know
that we d o n 't have the truth. Knowledge is reflexive— we know, and through
corroboration we know that we know. But this is the knowledge that we can’t have. All
we can have is that “we know and we think that we know,” corroboration is never perfect
and complete and the truth remains always in doubt.

' "Games" here should not be understood as trivializing or mere fun. Word games, in the way that Lyotard
and Wittgenstein mean them to be understood, are deadly serious. Word games are how we broker
power/knowledge, and in practices like forestry and medicine, control o f the words means control o f the
knowledge, which means (ideally) control o f the forest or the body. My argument, however, is also that
control o f the words is fleeting and illusory— which assertion does not stop us from speaking!
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For our purposes, it is especially important to note that this way o f doing philosophy is
not restricted to philosophy; this method, if you will, o f openness, o f reflexivity or
criticalitv is increasingly an integral part o f such diverse fields o f inquiry as the social
sciences, science studies, cultural studies, anthropology, medicine, psychology, art and
literature, political studies, economics, and even (eventually perhaps) the “hard” sciences
like biology, physics, chemistry, and all their various permutations into specialties, sub
specialties. and sub-sub specialties (see Haraway, Harding, Levins and Lewontin, Sorrell,
Prigogine and Stengers etc.). Forestry- is an (unacknowledged and unwilling, I think)
irreducibly cultural and interdisciplinary praxis, not just because it has political, social,
economic, ethical, philosophical, ecological, and scientific facets or components, but
because each "facet" is inextricably intertwined with and intimately informed by all the
others.2 As such, it cannot escape the radical effects o f continental philosophy on our
perceptions and/or constructions o f ourselves and the world, on knowledge and ways o f
knowing. Nor. for that matter, can any other praxis (including CP itself).

Over the decades, continental philosophy has gone through many incarnations; the traces
of these "incarnations” remain: CP has not so much moved on as added on. Each new
articulation or application incorporates and grows out o f some earlier theoretical
orientation. At one point, it was virtually “synonymous” with Husserl’s phenomenology
and H eidegger's ontological expositions; at another with the existentialism o f Sartre and

■ As nearly as I can tell, what the FS means by “interdisciplinary” !<=that we must consider all the sciences
when managing ecosystems. To that end, they have diversified their staffs to include researchers from a
variety o f scientific disciplines, including the social sciences.
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de Beauvoir, and at yet another, it was almost indistinguishable from semiology a la
Saussure. CP was at one time characterized by structuralism a la Levi-Strauss, Marx,
Freud. Barthes, and Foucault among othersJ and, after the revolutionary May o f 1968 in
Paris, it took on the guise o f poststructuralism— whose most notable proponents are
perhaps Deleuze. Lyotard, Irigaray, and Kristeva. At present, continental philosophy is
closely associated with the philosophic approach known as deconstruction— which may
or may not be a particular style o f thought within poststructuralism — and whose
progenitor and foremost practitioner is Derrida (Audi 1995, 158). Yet another persistent
strain o f continental philosophy is known as critical theory, a style o f philosophizing that
permits— and in fact requires— the critique o f social, economic, and political institutions
and practices and the construction o f an alternative theoretical construct. Present day
critical theory has its roots in Marxism, the Frankfurt School, and in H aberm as's theory
of communicative action. Contemporary discourses such as feminism, ecofeminism. gay
studies, deep ecology, environmentalism, cultural studies, etc. are considered by some to
be potential candidates for inclusion either under continental philosophy in general or
critical theory in particular (McNeill and Feldman 1998).

Rather than establishing particular theoretical or methodological guidelines, continental
philosophy fosters a critical environment based on the premise that we are all living,
existing, situated, becoming beings who thus cannot know everything, (but who also

' As an example o f the fuzziness o f the divisions between “movements” or themes in Continental
philosophy, it is worth pointing out that Levi-Strauss and Foucault are sometimes also considered as
poststructuralists. ( Conley 1997, 3-5)
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cannot know what we don't know). In other words, no one can make a claim to know the
Truth nor, conversely, can we claim that what we think we know is not the truth. We are
linguistic beings, a “symbolic species," and it is through our categories o f thought, our
signs, that we know the world; that is, knowledge o f the “out there” is knowledge because
it is expressible in language.

This elaborate premise establishes the grounds for challenging structures o f power
(political, social, economic, ethical, etc. institutions) that are inextricably tied to
structures o f knowledge that have “forgotten” their own contingency and constructed
themselves as "unsurpassable a priori limits”(Foucault). Challenges to the current power
and knowledge structures are ubiquitous: race relations (cultural studies, post
colonialism). gender relations (feminism and ecofeminism and gay studies), economic
relations (Marxism, developmentalism. Cobb and Daly, Schumacher. Escobar), politics
(Foucault. Derrida. Conley. Marx, etc.), medicine (Sacks. Weil, homeopathy,
naturopathy, chiropractic, etc.), academia, human-nature relations (deep-ecology,
ecofeminism. environmentalism, etc.), a r t , ... Just about every institution that is
established upon some sort o f knowledge or way o f knowing is contestable by often wellarticulated and persuasive alternative narratives that privilege different ways o f knowing
and being. Continental philosophy thus demands o f its “practitioners” extreme vigilance
and profound responsibility: the Truth is not out there; we are ultimately responsible for
discourses that we produce and thus must take care that the words we loose do not
destroy the other. Incidentally, this criticality, if you will, is not merely an affect o f
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academics with nothing better to do than quibble over semantics. Its roots may arguably
be in academia, but it has escaped the narrow bounds o f the ivory tow er (some might
point to the student revolts in May o f 1968 in Paris (V. A. Conley and J.-F. Lyotard)
while others would point to the tree hugger’s embrace o f positions like deep ecology) to
permeate and flourish in the culture at large.

But we have gotten ahead o f ourselves— or more precisely, we have gone “ large”— when
we need to go small. What we need to do is to articulate some o f the details or specific
features that constitute the backbone o f CP and inform its many permutations (and the
theoretical and methodological orientations o f this dissertation). That is, we need to look
at how it "constructs" or understands self (and other— both other persons and forests),
how it understands language, how these understandings relate to knowledge, how that
knowledge affects and effects forest policy, and how policy affects and effects forest
health. Much o f continental philosophy hinges on what Derrida calls the never-ending
task o f "reading and rereading” Hegel, and so we will begin here, with Hegelian
metaphysics' presumed closure o f knowledge and the end o f philosophy (quoted in
Taylor 1986. 1). The speculative, metaphysical unity o f Hegelian philosophy upon which
much o f modernity (and logical positivism) is founded, is achieved only by willfully
forgetting what Kierkegaard calls the concrete, empirical, living subject; that is. Hegel’s
perfect closure o f knowledge is effected by the identity o f thought and being, an identity
which comes at the cost o f the “particular existing human being,” or at the cost o f
difference, o f existence and life them selves (Kierkegaard in Taylor 1986, 170). For
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continental philosophers like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Lyotard, this cost is too high. If
knowledge depends upon abstraction, upon the transcendental unification (identity) o f
self and other . a unification and abstraction which necessitates rejection o f the
particularity o f the circumstances o f lived experience then we may perhaps need to
rethink knowledge. For them, Hegelian philosophy’s speculative unity is an interesting
and provocative thought experiment, but not a very useful one if what we are looking for
is a way for us as living beings to know the world we live in: the actually existing world
in which we are actually existing beings. This, o f course, is the world that forestry praxis
inhabits. O f what value is abstract knowledge if one doesn’t actually live in an abstract
world'? What is the point o f positing some “perfect” unity o f thought and being
(omnipresence) when we so clearly are not omnipresent? We don’t experience ourselves,
or know ourselves, as identical with all o f existence (the arguments o f deep ecologists
notwithstanding). In fact, our knowledge o f the world and o f self appears to be both
differential and deferred. that is, it is predicated upon perspective, on mediation: we
know, and we know this because we think that we know. Absolute knowledge o f some
abstract reality that is predicated on some abstract self is not likely to be very useful when
it comes to living in the here and now. It is more useful to figure out the conditions o f
knowledge that obtain in a world in which there is always an outside; a world in which
there is always something that is not known; and a world in which as limited, situated,
embodied beings we cannot know the extent o f what we don’t know.
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This is the ineluctable tension inherent in human existence: we abstract in order to know
(language, naming, is an abstraction, a violence,4 an objectification, a stepping back from
the particular thing to the general category o f things that fall under that name: tree,
ecosystem, forest) and in order to survive, but our abstractions as abstractions leave out
features whose importance we cannot even pretend to estimate, and the loss o f which may
prove fatal. For Kierkegaard, the tension o f lived experience and its urgency is located in
the paradoxical nature o f the simultaneity o f either-or (like answering yes to a question o f
"either... or...?"’). The contradiction cannot be overcome except at the expense o f life
itself. For Kierkegaard the one inescapable condition o f knowledge is the temporality o f
the lived subject and this one fact determines everything else:

not for a single moment is it forgotten that the subject is an existing individual,
and that existence is a process o f becoming, and that therefore the notion o f the
truth as identity o f thought and being is a chimera o f abstraction, in its truth only
an expectation o f the creature; not because truth is not such an identity, but
because the knower is an existing individual for whom the truth cannot be such an
identity as long as he lives in time (Kierkegaard in Taylor 1986. 174).

As knowing subjects that are always becoming, our knowledge is inevitably incomplete.
There is always an outside, a “not-known," a gap— even an other person or an other

* This notion o f violence is attributable to Derrida; see ‘‘The Violence o f the Letter” in O f Grammatology.
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moment— that fosters ambiguity. The job taken on by (neo-Kantian) continental
philosophers is to acknowledge the possibility o f that which cannot be thought, to
apprehend the outside, the other; to refuse the comfort o f “forgetting” that Hegelian
abstraction offers; to reject the conservatism that permits closure; to renounce the illusion
o f full (spiritual) presence (a task aided by the Freudian conjecture o f an “unconscious”
that forecloses the possibility o f full self-awareness or presence); to refuse the retreat to
some ideal timeless unity or identity (or transcendental logos or law) that collapses
difference thereby "dissolving the tensions inherent in concrete human existence”— a
Romantic unity upon which knowledge was predicated in the logical positivist project
(Taylor 1986. 15). Simply put. the job o f continental philosophy is to figure out as best
we can how we as concrete, particular, contingent, dijfered and deferred living beings
can know anything at all about a world that is also always in the process o f becoming. We
are biophysical, embodied beings, or minds: we are existing subjects in an existing world.
We live in the out there and we have ideas about it; we call it a world, a planet, a forest,
or an ecosystem. Continental philosophy's discursive critique o f knowledge is helpful
insofar as thinking about the problem o f knowledge helps us to live in that world, that
forest, that ecosystem, or that planet. CP does not deny the possibility o f empirical
knowledge o f the world (which is not to say the “out there”), but it refuses to permit those
with a particular agenda (basically all o f us) to use empiricism as an evasion o f critique or
an exclusionary strategy.
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Continental philosophers next take up with the problem o f language because it is central
to knowledge— o f self and other. This project owes much to Saussure’s critical analysis
or "science” o f language, semiology. Mark Taylor, a professor o f Humanities at Williams
College, and author and editor o f several books on postmodernism, continental
philosophy, and deconstruction suggests that there are several key themes that com e out
o f Saussure's structural approach to linguistics that are important for us. First, to
Saussure we owe the now prevalent notion that signs are “arbitrary conventions” whose
meanings are fixed by conventional association rather than by any necessary or obligatory
connection between signifier (“sound image”) and signified (concept) (Saussure 1972.
67-8). Moreover, the signifiers themselves are only “differentially” identified: that is.
each signifier is a unique entity by virtue o f its difference from other signifiers within the
language system (the difference between “for” and “form” consists in one letter) and this
unique signifier is meant to convey (to signify) a particular meaning or concept (a
signified) (Saussure 1972, 118-9). The connection between the signifier and the signified
is also purely conventional. Meaning is determined by the position o f a sign within a
network o f shifting signs— an economy o f signs that is itself always shifting, rather than
by some obligatory correspondence to a preexisting, prelinguistic, essential reality; there
is no transcendental signified that stands outside o f the sign system, no catalogue o f
catalogues that does not include itself (Saussure 1972, 65-66). M eaning is relative and
differential— that is, “identity” is a function o f difference between signs within a closed
system, in short, o f non-identitv. Derrida, incidentally, complicates this system o f differed
signs by reintroducing time (the problem o f always becoming, o f always opening to the

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24
future ) and distance (in writing) thereby also deferring meaning and thus reinstating the
polvsemic nature o f language as central and irreducible.

Yet another important point that arises out o f Saussure’s linguistics is that the speaking
subject, in addition to constituting the world through language is itself constituted by its
position within the sign system (Taylor 1986, 14). That is, we speak our selves, as selves,
into being in the same way we do the world. This insight

reverses the modem philosophy o f subjectivity by suggesting what later is
described as the ‘decentering.' ‘dissolution.’ or ‘deconstruction’ o f the subject. ...
Subject is a function o f system rather than system a function o f subjects (Taylor
1986. 14-5).

This has important implications for the autonomous speaking, creative, atomistic,
individualistic subject upon which much o f the project o f modem philosophy and science
is predicated. According to this reading o f the subject, o f self, we as subjects are an
artifact o f our language system. To become (self-conscious subjects?), we think, speak (or
write) and are thought, spoken or written about. To bring the world into conscious being
for us we do the same. We are an artifact, a manifestation, o f an infinite number o f
discursive formations. Who we are is a function o f our (not always known or intended)
positioning within these discursive formations; the self is constituted and reconstituted at
the ever-shifting nexus o f diverse discourses.
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To bring it down to earth a bit: we define ourselves (and are defined by others) by
reference to many different conceptual categories. Imagine Tom. He identifies him self
simultaneously as Chinese, male, an accountant, a student, father, brother, son, rich, tall,
guilty- o f peijury, a poor writer, a heavy drinker, a good driver, a bad m athematician, a
soccer player, a hiker, a lover o f nature, a consumer o f wood products and fossil fuels,
etc. etc. The same sort o f (only vastly more complex) constructive multi-discursive
positioning holds true for the constitution o f the forest (or ecosystem) (think o f the forest
that produces pulp, that participates in the hydrological and the carbon cycles, that is
home to wildlife (and “pests"), that offers spiritual renewal, income, aesthetic pleasure,
etc.) — the critical difference, however, is that the ecosystem only gets to be spoken into
being through the words we speak for it. and the “speaking we," like the thing(s) spoken
about, do not speak with one voice.

In building his science o f language, in seeking the systematic in the midst o f the
accidental and the incidental, Saussure focuses his attention on the synchronic (timeless,
as in "always in the present") aspects o f language (la langue). For Saussure, time is
anathema to system and to structure (Saussure 1972, 79-80, 84-89 ). In order to get at the
true structure o f language, one must extrapolate from the temporality o f the living, spoken
language because this language is constantly changing in sometimes unexpected ways.
This experiential language is highly volatile, because each time a word is used, it appears
in different contexts, with a different network o f associations that are both historical
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(going backward and pointing forward in time, deferred} and current (participating
simultaneously in the construction o f multiple (or sometimes binary (light/dark)), non
coincident discursive realities, differedI5); that is, we look for
meaning in historical usages o f a word, its immediate context, and in the ways it is being
used around the same time in other discourses or venues. From this view, meaning, like
existence and knowledge, is emergent, contingent, always becoming; it is never self
present. never simultaneous, it is both differed and deferred.
Things that change unexpectedly tend to resist systematization; in science, as well as
traditional philosophy, the point is to get beyond the constant flax to discover the
principles, the laws, the structures or frameworks that govern that flux; in other words, to
abstract from the many to get to the one. Thus, in order to build a science or a philosophy
the usual approach is to reduce, to step out o f the flux, to ignore or control for time. For
the structuralist Saussure time is inherently disruptive and thus antithetical to systembuilding. while for many post-structuralist continental philosophers time and its passage
are the unavoidable conditions o f lived experience (Derrida. Lyotard). The challenge after
Saussure is to explore the conditions under which meaning is possible in a language that
is differed and deferred, that is. in a language that is no longer closed, but open or
fissured.

5 My use o f differed here is slightly different, although not contradictory to, Saussure’s use. By differed.
Saussure means that each word is a unique word in that it is different from all the other words (or signs)
around it; i.e.. language is relative and terms receive their identities by virtue o f their difference from other
terms in the system.
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Thus, we have a subject who is "decentered.” who is always in the process o f becoming,
and never fully present either to itself or to the world. This fragmented subject constitutes
itself and its world through a language in which meaning is differential and presence is
always deferred, self-referential (“circular'" or tautological, but imperfectly so (Derrida"s
fissure)), and relative. And it is only through this fissured language and this fragmented
subject that we come to have knowledge. We know nothing except in so far as we know it
through language, through logos; all knowledge— whether it is o f self or other— is
mediated or constituted through language. We know nothing immediately because to do
so would mean that we have full and perfect cognitive presence (identity), and to say that
we are fully present is to ignore the undeniable fact o f our self-conscious experience o f
ourselves as particular, concrete, existing beings that are always becoming in time, in a
present-ing that never arrives (Kierkegaard).6

Know ledge requires both consciousness and cognitive process; it is mediate and never
immediate. We know of things through language, through a sign system that though it
bears no essential connection to the “out there,” nonetheless seems to enable us to make
sense o f and to organize the sensory data that bombards us. We are a species that is not
content just "to be;” instead we must also think about being and about what it means to
be. (This idea, incidentally, is not new: Locke wrestled with this problem o f the dual
nature o f man. In Lockean terms, knowledge consists o f complex ideas, unlike simple
ideas (sensations) that can be “immediate.” Kant agreed with this distinction.)

’ Kant proposes that the only time that we experience ourselves as fully present is in the act o f creation, in
artistic activity. Kierkegaard holds that we experience ourselves as fully present only momentarily.
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Knowledge, then, is never just personal, but always social— via language. Foucault's
analysis o f discourse and its relationship to power is also applicable here. In his
Archeology o f Knowledge Foucault develops the thesis that systems o f thought are
"discursive formations" that function and evolve independently o f the ’’beliefs and
intentions o f those who use them.” In theorizing thusly, Foucault builds upon and further
reifies Saussure's idea o f a "decentered” (no longer intentional, transcendental, fully
present, or "titular”) subject:

Discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation o f a thinking, knowing,
speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the
dispersion o f the subject and his discontinuity with him self may be determined. It
is a space o f exteriority in which a network o f distinct sites is deployed (Foucault.
1972. 55).

In order to account for change— from one formation to another, or one system to another,
Foucault introduces a "genealogical” approach that incorporates the "non-discursive
practices" o f social, political, and economic power structures— vaguely reminiscent o f
N ietzsche's will in his "will to power.’’ In doing so he rejects the M arxist and Hegelian
teleological interpretation o f inexorable "historical progress.” and instead insists that the
resultant discursive formations are merely temporary, contingent structures based on

fleetingly. in passion. Arguably, these two com e together in Kant’s treatment o f the sublime and genius.
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epistemes— ways o f knowing— that provide paradigms for understanding phenomena.
These formations are the result of the culmination o f small, undirected, unrelated, and
often unintended acts and events that are dis-integrating even as they are becoming:

A discursive formation, then, does not play the role o f a figure that arrests time
and freezes it for decades or centuries; ... it presents the principle o f articulation
between a series o f discursive events and other series o f events, transformations,
mutations, and processes. It is ... a schema o f correspondence between several
temporal sites (Foucault, 1972, 74).

For Foucault, knowledge and power are inextricably intertwined. Knowledge is a form o f
control, and control (or power) creates the conditions under which knowledge is
recognized or constituted as knowledge. In this sense, knowledge is not "a tool”
employed by powerful interests, but “precisely as bodies o f knowledge, they are tied (but
not reducible ) to systems o f social control;” the knowing, powerful subject is not itself
outside of knowledge (recall our catalogue o f catalogues that perforce includes itself) (in
Audi 1995. 276).

There is a strong ethical motive to Foucault’s philosophizing that becomes increasingly
apparent in much o f his later work, which sought “the liberation o f human beings from
contingent conceptual constraints masked as unsurpassable a priori limits and
adumbration o f alternative forms o f existence” (Gutting, in Audi 1995,276, and Foucault.
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1972. 13. 24-25). For Foucault (as with later Derrida) we have a responsibility to the
future (more accurately, if awkwardly stated as 'th e becoming") w hich obligates us to
critically examine the assumptions that inform our statements, statements that are
themselves designed to evade or m ask their own origins, limitations, and contingencies in
hopes o f establishing themselves as True. However, we are not here doing a strict
hermeneutics (looking for the M eaning that stands beyond the text, the extradiscursive."TranscendentaI signified"). Neither Foucault’s nor D errida’s “excavation" o f
the heterogeneous multiplicity o f discursive formations or systems is intended to lead one
to a "prediscursive" truth or a “presystematic" reality o f objects. For Foucault, “behind
the completed system, what is discovered ... is not the bubbling source o f life itself, life
in an as yet uncaptured state." but rather behind, beyond, before the systems under
investigation, one can expect to find more systems, more networks, more discourses o f
the prediscursive (Foucault, 1972. 76).'

No one is free from discourse, including the Forest Service. It’s discourse on forest health
seeks to assert Forest Service authority based upon a variety o f im plicit claims to pre
discursive certainty (by virtue o f its use o f the scientific methodology, for instance, and
its access to "specialists” or “authorities”). And it is this authority-seeking discourse— in
so far as it seeks to foreclose other discourses— that we have a moral obligation (if
Foucault and Derrida are to be believed) to challenge.

O f course, not every discourse is a discourse on the prediscursive. And there are other ways to assume
authority (brute force, for example; or deception).
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Given the disjunct, the gaps, between mind and matter, between structures o f thought and
structures o f reality, between signifier and signified, sign and referent, that CP seems not
only to recognize but to revel in and exploit, one might conclude that we can never know
anything at all. All we have is words, and even those are slippery at the best o f times—
even, perish the thought, scientific words. This would appear to leave us in the absurd and
indefensible position o f asserting that nothing is real, there is no “out there,” at least not
one that we can access. Experience, however, indicates otherwise— if for no other reason
than that something seems to slap back, to intrude, to irrupt into our thoughts, our
seamless narratives, and into our biophysical existence. Indeed, it is at those moments
when the "out there" does something unexpected (contrary to our ongoing narration), that
we are most forcefully reminded that our words haven’t quite got a grip on it. (Illness, as
we shall see. is one o f those unexpected irruptions that leaves us scrambling for words
and for an identity.) There are those who wish to find a way to live in a world that is both
real and linguistically constructed—a way that acknowledges but does not succumb to the

illusions or comforts o f either— a world that is real and ideal, "knowable” empirically
and rationally. N. Kathryn Hayles, among others, suggests an approach that she calls
"constrained constructivism” in which one rides “the cusp,” or crest o f the wave that
delineates the edge, the surface where the flux o f the real meets and conditions, and is in
turn conditioned by. our ideas about it (see Hayles “ Searching for Com m on Ground,” in
Soule Reinventing Nature). In other words, constrained constructivists seek to live on that
verge where the brain meets the mind— in full recognition that the brain is a creation o f
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the mind and the mind a creation o f itself that (we surmise) would not exist in the absence
o f (our created or imagined) brain.

Under this view. Elizabeth Ann Bird (following Foucault) argues that scientific
knowledge o f the "out there’*or the flux is not considered a representation o f nature, but
is instead thought o f as a "socially constructed interpretation with an already socially
constructed natural technical object of inquiry” (Bird 1987. 255). Constrained
constructivists are. however, keen to differentiate themselves from thoroughgoing social
constructivists (Latour and W oolgar. among others) who contend that scientists, for
example, do nothing other than negotiate for meaning and interpretation in an endless
power struggle to see whose theory, whose paradigm will win out (Bird 1987. 259).
Hayles and Bird both suggest that "we need to go beyond the [extreme constructivists']
notions that scientific negotiation takes place only among people and assert that science is
engaged with nature in negotiating reality itself* (Bird 1987, 259). Thus.

Reality is being negotiated at the same time as its theoretical construction. And
both o f those, the reality and the interpretation, are not merely social
constructions, but at both levels negotiations with nature. N ature’s role in that
negotiation takes the form o f actively creating something materially new and o f
resisting or accommodating the range o f metaphorical and theoretical imaginings
with which it is approached (Bird 1987, 259).
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Under this rubric o f knowledge, we m ight surmise that '‘forest health” is something that is
both constructed and constructing; the forest, the ecosystem (understood non-essentially
and non-mystically) participates in our definition o f health by doing whatever it does
often in spite o f our words. To some extent, we can intervene, act, so as to alter what the
forest does, but at other times it is clearly our ideas or words that must yield to the
imponderable force (nonmystical) o f the out there. The forest is not infinitely plastic or
biddable to the forester’s or consumer’s demands any more than the hum an body or
patient is to the physician’s interventions or advice. “Health” is no more fo u n d out there
in the forest than it is freely created in the human mind in the absence o f external
constraints.

A Word About Science
Before closing, it is necessary to broach the issue o f science and its treatm ent or use in
this dissertation. As my research and writing progressed, “science” kept cropping up; as
we shall see. it is the FS’ preferred knowledge framework or methodology as well as that
o f the medical “establishment.” One cannot escape confrontation. Then too, some sort o f
discussion on science was necessary in an effort to resolve (or if that is too ambitious, to
at least acknowledge) the growing contradictions and ambiguities that pervade my use o f
that term in this essay. My discussion o f science appears late in the paper (p. 142) for
several reasons. First, a critique o f science p er se is not the theme o f this paper; in fact,
the same criticisms that I make o f science might be made o f any discourse that attempts
to conceal its origins and establish itself as an “unsurpassable a priori limit.” Second, I do
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not wish to convey the sense that I am quibbling with the FS’ or the medical
com m unities' use o f science. I simply wish to point out (following philosophers o f
science and sociologists) that the Forest Service, like many institutions, organizations, or
individuals, tends to use science uncritically with little or no examination o f its origins or
legitimating grounds; to assert its findings as objective Truths; to invoke its name as if to
thereby foreclose critique; and to use science and scientific language as a means to
establish authority and exclude or devalue other forms o f knowledge and other voices.
Third, because I wish to retain my focus on the project at hand (forest health), I limit my
treatment o f science to the FS' use o f it in identifying or defining forest health and in
framing the discourse on it. To that end, my discussion o f science (admittedly superficial)
incorporates much o f the work that is done in Chapters Three, Four, and Five and would
be out o f place if moved forward. And finally, although I do not disagree with the use of
science in the management o f public lands, for reasons which will become clear. I feel
somewhat less sanguine about accepting forestry as just a science— even an applied one.

Thus, my enquiry into the philosophy o f science is brief, limited only to a few key
insights made by scientists themselves, about the relationship between human knowledge
systems and language and the extent to which they affect our ability to engage with the
world. I also note scientists’ own observations about the limits o f science, particularly
with respect to such large, complex, amorphous “things” as ecosystems. Ultimately, they
conclude that what we think o f the world— scientifically or otherwise— is as much a
function o f who we are and how our minds work as o f what the “real” is really like. And
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further, that the bigger and more complex and unbounded the object under exam ination,
and the more variables included in the “experiment," the less likely one is to achieve a
high level o f certainty.

Concluding Remarks
In summation, we can say that continental philosophy rejects the unifying “grand
o

narratives” o f traditional philosophy and science. It refuses to abstract from the
multiplicity and contingency o f lived experience to some hypothetical eternal, objective,
stable position. Continental philosophy also accepts the paradoxical nature o f language:
language is the condition that makes knowledge o f the self and knowledge o f the other
possible, but it is that which makes the immediate experience o f self and other (as pure
existence or identity) impossible precisely because it constitutes the se lf and the other by
way o f signs that are differed and deferred. It accepts, without reserve, the ineluctably
fissured nature o f knowledge (as discourse), which as a product o f a language that is
differential and deferred and a subject that is also always becoming, is always partial,
incomplete, imperfect, situated. In short, it refuses to extrapolate, to presume to stand
outside o f itself and its milieu, to simplify or reduce in an effort to better comprehend,
what is not in the end either simple or com prehensible except by an act o f inconceivable
violence— violence because such a sim plification subjects the subject to a hegem ony o f
improperly-assumed knowledge in the name o f authority, an authority that cannot justify
its existence except through further violence.

3 The term "grand narrative" is attributed to Frederic Jameson; see his Postmodernism, or, the Cultural
Logic o f Late Capitalism, for his excavation o f the term.
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There are several important implications that follow from these “confessions” that are
pertinent to this project. Due to the situated, fragmented, fissured nature
o f the discursively knowing subject, no one discourse can lay claim to an objective
truth( including this one— a point which must remain unproven in accordance with
G odel's theorem).9 We can only have a perspective. This assertion, far from leading to
unbridled relativism as some assume, instead forces upon us the utm ost responsibility.
According to Derrida, the inherent limitations o f our knowledge obligate us to be ever
vigilant, to be excruciatingly aware and critical o f our presumptions, to be open to the
future and to the possibility o f change.10

Second, because language is slippery and discursive systems are independent and
contingent, meaning is never fully or perfectly controlled or controllable by any one party
or a singular discourse (although the desire for perfect control does persist). Thus— and
this is perhaps the most important point— “language games” (Lyotard and Wittgenstein)
become the means by which power and knowledge (Foucault) are brokered in the
political economy o f signs and in social life. According to Lyotard (following
Wittgenstein) in his book The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Know ledge, language
games, like all games, are a struggle for supremacy, a fight or a contest. But also like

QFor an elaboration o f the Theorem (paraphrased by Douglas Hofstadter as “All consistent axiomatic
formulations o f number theory include undecidable propositions” (p. 17)) see H ofstadtefs Godel, Escher,
Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid.
10 See Derrida’s Politics o f Friendship and Caputo’s Deconstruction in a Nutshell: C om ’ersations withJ.
Derrida for an elaboration o f his notion o f responsibility.
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other games, they are governed by a set o f rules— rules which are not internally generated
or legitimated by the game itself, but rather are the object o f an explicit or implied
contract between participants. These rules determine and specify the properties and the
uses to which the various categories o f utterances can be put. If there are no rules, there is
no game (Lyotard 1984, 10). One sometimes plays the game, makes some language move
(an utterance) for the “sheer pleasure o f the invention,” for the joy to be had “in the
endless invention o f turns o f phrase, or words and meaning.” (Lyotard 1984, 10). At
others, the point is to “w in.” to know that one's connotation, one's language, is the
accepted one. the one that will be acted upon (this is the sort o f language game that the FS
is currently engaged in with the public). Despite these "agonistics" however, the bottom
line for Lyotard is that language is social, and the moves in the game are the bonds that
hold us all together (Lyotard, 11). Language games are about sharing knowledge (of
whatever sort ). Knowledge, then, is a function o f talking across discourses
as well as within them: it's all about coming to terms— o f constantly triangulating from
one (or more) position(s) onto another (and back again) and grappling with what Foucault
calls the "heterogeneous multiplicity o f concepts.”

Far from being some esoteric, obscure, unreal (and anti-real, some would argue)
fantastical mental brain child o f a bunch o f “armchair or coffeehouse” philosophers who
have about them “no glimmer o f earth, o f leaves and soil” (cf. Shepard, Soule. Sokal,
Koertge. etc. (the quote is from Shepard, in Soule, 20)), Continental philosophy, albeit in
an odd way. gives voice to that earth in all its infinite complexity and irreducible
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difference. It categorically refuses the com fort o f a presumed objective knowledge
(yielding Baconian “secrets” o f nature) gained at the expense o f abstraction from the
actually lived existence o f the em bodied hum an being (and the Baconian torture o f
nature). It allows that we are a symbolic species, one that lives in a world o f thought and
signification, a species that is as much a product as a producer o f “webs o f meaning,” but
also insists that we are a biological species, a species that is as much a product o f this
time and this place as it is a producer thereof.

For some, continental philosophy requires a philosophy o f the flesh, but one that is not
reduced to it. It permits that one might “theorize” a rule, a law, a logos, but insists that
one never fo rg et that it is an abstraction that comes at the expense o f the concrete
particular, a unification that comes at the expense o f difference, a thought that com es at
the expense o f life. Traditionally, the object o f deconstruction and o f critique or analysis
has been philosophy itself. But as we noted above, the insights and “intuitions” o f
continental philosophy about language and knowledge permeate the wider culture. Forest
management, o f course, “happens” in that wider culture, as does the construction or
identification o f the object (forest or ecosystem), the articulation o f the objective (for our
purposes, forest health), and the establishm ent o f the methods and theoretical constructs
by which both will be known (science). Forestry, (and science) as a fundam entally and
ineluctably linguistic and social— even public— enterprise cannot escape the impacts o f
continental philosophy on our understandings o f language and culture.
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Prelude to Health
Which brings us to our topic: forest health, and its comparison to health as it is
understood in the medical community. Use o f the external landscape or geography o f
nature as a m etaphor for that o f the internal geography o f the body is not new; nor is its
converse. It is also not uncontested. The tendency to conceptually equate the inner and
outer landscapes, the body and nature, and then to use this conceptual framework in
conjunction with a hierarchical value system that justifies control and dominance o f both
internal and external nature has been thoroughly critiqued and deconstructed by
environmentalists, feminists, and ecofeminists among others. W ithout assenting to any
necessary or essential connection between body and nature, I am nonetheless interested in
the following chapters in investigating the possibility o f similarities between the
discursive traditions associated with the health o f each. M odem W estern medicine is an
attempt to manage and control the bewildering “wilderness o f our ... inner nature” by
locating the sources o f both health and disease in the biophysicality o f the body; diagnosis
and treatment are articulated in the language o f pathophysiology and pathoanatomy. and
are highly technical affairs; knowledge is objective and ideally the knowing physician is
disinterested (M archessault 2000, 11 and Cassell 1997, 10). M odem Western forestry
attempts to manage and control the bewildering wilderness o f nature by casting forest
health and disease in equally narrow biophysical terms; forest disease and health are
generally defined in terms o f pathologies; diagnosis and treatment are left to disinterested
and objective experts or professionals. In both instances, the result is that science
(medical sciences in the one instance and natural sciences in the other) is the privileged

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

theoretical and methodological knowledge system, and in each case diagnosis and
treatment become matters for experts rather than laypersons. The impetus for the
comparison does not depend upon an essential connection between body and nature; it
depends only on the existence o f shared terminology, structures o f knowledge and
legitimation, and shared roots in the modernist tradition that give rise to particular
practices.

The most obvious example o f shared terminology is the use o f the terms health and
disease. Nearly sixty years ago Aldo Leopold wrote that conservation was the ‘‘effort to
understand and preserve" the “health” o f the land. By health he meant “the capacity o f the
land for self-renewal.” He may not have been the first to speak o f land management in
terms o f health maintenance, and certainly his notion o f health as a primary goal o f
management did not catch on until the late 1980s-early 1990s, but forest health, as an
unquestioned good is now the dom inant theme in forestry discourse. In fact, in the USDA
Forest Serxice Strategic Plan (2000 Revision): Integrity and Accountability: A
Framework fo r National Resource M anagement the Forest Service states that its mission
is “To Sustain the Health, Diversity, and Productivity o f the N ation’s Forests and
Grasslands to Meet the Needs o f Present and Future Generations.” The Plan lists
ecosystem health as its number one goal, while the objectives o f the three other goals—
multiple benefits to people, scientific and technical assistance, and effective public
service— are generally framed in term s o f how they fit in with the first and, what appears
to be. overriding goal o f ecosystem health (USDA FS 2000). Given the shared
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terminology, it seems unlikely that a discourse on health in the environmental field can
escape the traces o f meanings o f health produced and circulated in the medical discourse
on human health. It is thus also unlikely that a forest discourse on health would be
immune to critiques being leveled against the medical discourse regarding health and
disease.

Another reason for a cross-discursive comparison arises from shared roots in the
modernist, positivist tradition that tends to favor science and scientific methodology as
the standard o f knowledge and legitimacy. In both instances, but even more so in the
medical sciences than in the environmental field (at least thus far), the assumptions that
underlie this traditional commitment to science, as well as the role o f science itself, are
being challenged by alternative conceptual frameworks and value systems. Furthermore,
the practices that concern themselves with health— medicine and forest management—
share similar organizational and institutional commitments. Both are professional fields,
dominated by experts trained or certified in the esoteric knowledges and sophisticated
technologies that delineate their fields (again perhaps more so in medicine than in
forestry). As we shall see. both fields face similar threats to these knowledge and power
structures from a variety o f sources. '‘Consumers’’ (of nature or the body) can access
information directly, even scientific information, from a wider variety o f sources;
palpable (if not pervasive) public dissatisfaction with the results o f professional
management (or care) coupled with a growing distrust o f professionals’ motives make
people reluctant to leave decision-making to the experts; proliferation o f non-traditional
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organizations and institutions that deal with both nature and the body (N G O 's, HM O's)
can som etim es mount credible and appealing alternatives to traditional institutional
programs and policies; and finally, the appropriation and dispersion o f both bioscience
and ecology through all facets o f public and personal life (what social scientists and
medical anthropologists call the “medicalization," and what I call the “ecologization,” of
modem society) makes it nearly impossible for one entity— the Forest Service or the
American Medical Association— to successfully control the terms o f the discourse.

But perhaps the strongest incentive to compare the two fields is that the forestry discourse
itself explicitly invites comparison by occasionally invoking the human-medical analogy
of health as an explanatory model. Leopold invokes the medical analogy when, in
elaborating on his notion o f land health, he compares the body to the land, and land
‘doctoring" to the doctoring o f the human body:

In general, the trend o f evidence indicates that in land, just as in the human body,
the symptoms may lie in one organ and the cause in another. The practices we
now call conservation are. to a large extent, local alleviations o f biotic pain. They
are necessary but they must not be confused with cures. The art o f land doctoring
is being practiced with vigor, but the science o f land health is yet to be bom
(Leopold 1991.274).
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He speaks o f ‘'pains'’ and “cures,” two concepts we don’t often associate with forests or
forest management, but which are two major foci o f medical practice. The power o f the
analogy persists today. In a 1996 USDA Forest Service publication devoted to assessing
forest health, the authors compare the evaluative and interpretive w ork o f a team o f
researchers (ecologists, entemologists, hydrologists, pathologists, silviculturists, and
others ) to that o f “heart, kidney, lung, and other medical experts who are asked to
diagnose blood and chemistry results that fall outside normal values or that result from
traum atic injury” (USDA/FS Dale 1996. (web site)).11 Again, my point is not to seek
ontological convergence o f the objects o f medicine and forestry but to provoke a
reflective, cognitive dissonance at the epistemic level within the forestry community by
juxtaposing forestry discourse on health with an extra-forestry discourse that finds itself
grappling with similar dilemmas and confronting similar critiques (and with whom the
term health is most readily identified).

Given the health cult in .America, it seems plausible that people would be as enthusiastic
about healthy forests as they profess to be about healthy bodies— or about all those other
entities, states, or functions to which we apply the health signifier: economies, markets,
diets, appetites, choices, relationships, communities, families, bodies, minds, businesses,
societies, etc.. Thus, as a rhetorical trope, a political mantra, a persuasive theoretical
concept that gamers almost unanimous public support, the adoption o f “health”— with all

" There are those in the USFS who resist the analogy o f forest health to human health, and by association,
the comparison o f forest management to the management o f human health; nonetheless, it is impossible for
the USFS discourse on health to escape the meanings o f health produced and contested in that o f human
health if for no other reason than they share the same terms.
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its attendant positive affective values and connotations— as the ultimate goal o f all land
and resource management is strategically brilliant. Or perhaps not.... Because, as it turns
out. even though we all generally agree that healthy forests, like healthy bodies, healthy
economies, and healthy relationships are generally good things to have or be, there is
considerably less agreement on how to achieve it, and even more importantly, in what it
consists. Then too. as is the case w ith human health, it is by no means clear how willing
we are to alter our lifestyles in order to achieve health. This is true in regards to discrete
organisms, but even more true in regard to the multi-organismal structures like societies,
forests, and ecosystems. That is, there doesn't seem to be a universally acceptable, clear
and unambiguous understanding o f health that leads inexorably to definitive and
incontestable management actions. Incidentally, as we shall see, the same lack o f
consensus plagues medicine and medical practices with similar effect. This fact— the
dispersion and ambiguity o f the health signifier— is not lost on the USFS (e.g., Forest
Health Science Panel 1997; USFS/Dahm s and Geils, 1997), but while the medical
community appears to be accepting (more or less gracefully) its loss o f control o f the
signifier "health" in the human realm, as we shall see, the Forest Service appears to still
be committed to a program in which health and disease are defined as objective and
scientifically by experts trained to interrogate the biological “real" and to interpret the
"signs" correctly.12

i: “Signs" is used here in the conventional, unexamined medical sense o f the word: a doctor (as objective
observer) examines a patient looking for signs— objectively knowable conditions or indicators ( a cut. a
fever, a fracture, an amputation, etc.) -a n d interrogates the patient for symptoms— subjective descriptions
o f unknowable indicators (pain, nausea, dizziness, etc.). The distinction between signs and symptoms
reproduces an increasingly criticized duality between body and mind and is “falling out o f favor” in more
recent medical discourses.
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In the next chapter I am not so much interested in exhaustively cataloging and then
deconstructing the whole o f the USFS discourse on forest (or ecosystem) health or in
minutely examining and critiquing the programmatic activities that follow from this
discourse (the articulation o f which takes up the bulk o f the USFS literature on health).
Rather. I am interested in exploring how the USFS and the medical com munity define
their terms (health and disease); what sorts o f knowledge (and technologies) they bring to
bear on the definition o f the problem and the identification o f solutions; how their
knowledge or epistemic commitments necessitate and reify particular pow er structures;
and finally, how the forestry discourse on health might be '‘reread” in light o f some o f the
ongoing developments in the medical and meta-medical practice and discourse.

I am working from the premise developed most fully by Michel Foucault in his
Archeology o f Knowledge, which in turn is derived -w ith significant changes — from
Saussure's work in semiology, that words receive meaning and value by virtue not o f
their connection to an objectively given referent but rather from their relative and
constantly changing positions within a language network that consists o f open ended
discursive practices, each o f which deploys a particular term in sometimes radically
different ways.

I am also engaging in textual analysis, (or to a lesser extent deconstruction a la Derrida),
to whom we owe the notion that all texts are “necessarily fissured;” that they carry within
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them the possibility o f their own impossibility by virtue o f inherent contradictions
em bedded within all language. If one takes a strictly deconstructive approach one could
tentatively accept, for example, the '‘closure” o f the USFS discourse on health, and then
“pull it apart” from the inside. That is, one could undermine the certainty o f the terms by
showing how the discourse itself is internally fissured by ambiguity. My approach
includes elements o f deconstruction, but is primarily textual analysis, focusing to a larger
degree on the relational nature o f discourse that invites comparison across ultimately
arbitrary' discursive boundaries. Thus, under this reading, '‘forest health” is not a “closed”
signifier that can be unambiguously defined exclusively within the confines o f USFS
discourse with reference to a specific physical entity, function, or state, and then
unproblematically applied, but is instead a term that designates a constantly shifting
(emergent) nexus o f numerous discursive practices with a similarly numerous and varied
field o f possible empirical referents.
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Chapter Three
Forest Health:
The Undiscovered Country

In the 1997 Report on Forest Health o f the United States written by the Forest Health
Science Panel, the authors state at the outset that, contrary to the custom ary scientific
methodology, they are not going to define “health.” lj The problem, according to the
authors, is that forest health has become a catch-all term, one often '"defined and
redefined" in order to meet different objectives and to cover a wide range o f different,
often conflicting “immediate concems"’(Forest Health Science Panel (FHSP) 1997.
Appendix C. unpaginated). In defense o f such an unprecedented action (“science usually
deals with ambiguities o f definition by defining a term at the beginning o f a report
..."(1)). they simply concede that the term is imprecise and then go on to say that they
will "discuss the present and potential ability o f the forest to provide the various values
that different people want from the foresfl’(FHSP 1991 1). They add that “ ’Forest Health"
conveys various concerns that people have o f the forest’s ability to provide a range o f
values." These values, they contend, are o f two sorts: those that a forest provides (has?)
by virtue o f its condition and function, and those that it provides fo r humans, that is, those
features o f the forest that contribute in some way to the quality o f hum an life (FHSP

L' The report was commissioned by the Honorable Charles H. Taylor, USC. 1 Ith District o f NC. The panel
is composed almost exclusively o f scientists in academia. The goal o f the congressman is “to educate
himself and others on the forest science basis o f the issues” (FHSP 1997, Appendix D, unpaginated). The
report is important because it is a “scientific” analysis o f the environmental, econom ic, and social effects o f
8 different policy options, as well as an analysis o f present forest conditions. Its purpose is to provide
members o f Congress with a scientific basis for decision-making at the national level.
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1997, 1.2 ). The report itself consists o f an exhaustive catalogue and survey o f these two
different sorts o f values.

Essentially, then, what we have is a scientific report on forest health that categorically
refuses to deal with health per se -th a t is, it refuses to tackle the problem o f what health
is and what it means (as we shall see, the medical and meta-medical discourses suffer
from a similar •'reluctance” to engage directly with the term “health”). A strange beast
indeed, since if the authors can’t identify in any clear way what it is they are reporting on,
one wonders how they decided upon what to report about it. As noted above, the authors
concede at the outset that it is nearly impossible to define such an ambiguous value-laden
term, and further add that “a term with multiple definitions” (and definitions that are
constantly changing) is not useful to scientists; that, in fact, such a vague, “ambiguous"
term does nothing but “obfuscate analvses”(FHSP 1997, 1). And since “science deals
with specifics, and terms with multiple definitions” are not specific, one might gather,
from their own admission, that health is not a topic for the scientists”(FHSP 1997, 1). In
this deduction, however, one would be mistaken since the Forest Health Science Panel
proceeds to com pile a several-hundred page scientific document ostensibly on the topic o f
forest health.14

14 In Appendix D, the authors state that they have taken a “management science” approach in the analysis o f
policy. Their intent is to separate the “analysis o f conditions and alternatives from value judgments”;
"conditions” then are understood as real, and their analysis and identification as objective, while the choice
between management strategies that will promote or negate certain conditions is conceded to be subjective,
and hence best left to policy makers.
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Despite their refusal to define their key term, the authors do provide a list o f ten
definitions o f forest health in their appendix (Appendix A). These are definitions offered
by different organizations and the definitions are often revised or updated as professional
opinion changes and public opinion warrants; the USFS, for example is responsible for
three different definitions, the Society o f .American Foresters for yet another three. For
our purposes, the USFS definitions are o f most interest, but I also include Aldo Leopold's
definition since it is oft cited by foresters and because his essays have informed much o f
contemporary FS discourse on forest health. For Leopold, “health is the capacity o f the
land for self-renewal" (Leopold 1991. 258). In 1993. the USFS' preferred definition o f
forest health was “the ability o f a forest to recover from natural and human-caused
stressors" (FHSP 1997. Appendix A. unpaginated). By 1997, the preferred definition o f
forest health was:

A desired state o f forest health is a condition where biotic and abiotic influences
on the forest (for example, pests, atmospheric deposition, silvicultural treatments,
and harvesting practices) do not threaten resource management objectives now or
in the future (Forest Health Science Panel 1997, Appendix A, unpaginated)
(Definition # 1).

The Panel notes that, at o f the time o f publication o f the report (1997), the USFS was
contemplating a change in definition to the following (a change which has since been
effected):
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A condition wherein a forest has the capacity across the landscape for renewal, for
recovery from a wide range o f disturbances, and for retention o f its ecological
resiliency while meeting current and future needs o f people for desired levels o f
values, uses, products, and services (Forest Health Science Panel 1997, Appendix
A. unpaginated) (Definition #2).

And finally, just to further confuse matters, the current (2001) USDA Forest Service
National Headquarters web site defines forest health as

a measure o f the robustness o f forest ecosystems. Aspects o f forest health include
biological diversity; soil. air. and water productivity; natural disturbances: and the
capacity o f the forest to provide a sustaining flow o f goods and services for people
(USDA FS National. HQ web site: www.fs.fed.us/land/em term s.htm l) (Defintion
*

3).

The one thing that every one o f these definitions shares (excepting the pre-1993
definition) is that forest health is connected in some way— either essentially or
accidentally (a critical difference, as we shall see)— to peoples’ desires. That is.
according to the definitions, forest health seems to have a dual nature: one biological
(understood as "real”) and one cultural.
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But let's back up a moment and look at the definitions themselves. The context in which
Leopold articulates his definition is instructive. Despite his (earlier quoted) desire to
develop a “science o f land health”, Leopold gets to the concept o f land health by way o f
the ecological conscience, that is, by way o f ethics.

A land ethic, then, reflects the existence o f an ecological conscience, and this in
turn reflects a conviction o f individual responsibility for the health o f the land.
Health is the capacity o f the land for self-renewal. Conservation is our effort to
understand and preserve this capacity (Leopold 1991, 258).

Health, for Leopold, is clearly not a value-neutral term that can be defined by a valueneutral. objective science. It is a normative concept, one that is inextricably linked to a
normative conceptual framework called a land ethic which, in turn, is based upon an
"ecological conscience.” For Leopold, the land ethic is the natural extension o f human
ethics, and human ethical systems and frameworks are cultural products (arguments from
sociobiologv notwithstanding) with deep roots in philosophical and metaphysical
discourses. We generally agree, following Hume, that one cannot move logically and
necessarily from an “is” to an “ought”— that is, from a particular condition or state o f
affairs to a particular action or judgem ent— unless or until we insert a normative
judgem ent which enables us to interpret the condition as something that means
something affectively (producing a positive or negative emotional response), something
that necessitates a this response and not that response. In fact, Leopold's conception o f
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health is not ju st normative or affective, but carries the force o f a moral imperative: our
ecological conscience requires us to sustain land health. Thus, land health is not just "a
good" that we should work toward, but is itself “Good." It is not, then, strictly speaking a
science o f land health that he is after— at least not one o f the disinterested sort to which
we became accustomed under logical positivism.

On a more "practical” side. Leopold’s conception o f health is historical in the sense that a
healthy forest (or an ecosystem) is one that can reproduce itself (as historically
constructed) in the future. Therefore he is correct to use the term s conservation and
preservation since his notion o f health is not so much innovative as it is conservative.
Health is more a function o f sameness or permanence, o f iteration and identity, o f the
ability o f the land to re produce itself as it was. rather than o f difference or change. The
implication is that this historical (usually understood as "pre-European” or “precontact"(— the apparent arbitrariness o f this choice will be discussed later)) forest (or
ecosystem) was (objectively, self-referentially) healthy in the first instance.

The 1993 Forest Service definition (Definition #1) is quite provocative and is fraught
with danger for any organization that is overwhelmingly com m itted to a positivist
tradition that values certainty, abhors ambiguity, shuns even the specter o f “subjectivity."
and privileges scientific theory and methodology. The 1993 USFS definition states
(somewhat tautologically and thus uninformatively) that forest health is a “desired state."
which state is a “condition where biotic and abiotic influences on the forest ...do not

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53

threaten resource management objectives now or in the future/' This “desired state" (o f
forest health) is simply not a category that is amenable to any sort o f reductive or
abstractive approach; that is, desire resists rationalization, quantification, abstraction, and
rigorous scientific testing precisely because it is essentially irrational (beyond reason, or
more precisely, before reason). This, o f course, is not to say that desire resists articulation
(admitting o f a bit o f slipperiness here in conflating desire with dem ands....): social
scientists use survey techniques to catalog and rate them; economists assume given tastes
and preferences become evident through “demand curves;” etc.. Ironically, forest health
itself is actually left undefined because all we are concerned with is a desired state— a
telling omission, as we shall see. But the single-most remarkable thing about this
definition is that it defines health in terms o f already established or agreed upon
management objectives: we first decide what we want a forest to do or have or be. both
now and in the future, then we retroactively define forest health so as to fit (“not
threaten") those desires. (And ironically, almost inevitably these desired present and
future conditions are for the romanticized past (historical) conditions.) That forest health
is somehow tied in to a future condition, or with an ability to reproduce itself, to maintain
its identity, into the future, and that that future state is linked to human desires, implies
that health is somehow inextricably bound up with human expectations or hopes (my
inclusion o f this particular feature becomes more clear in the discussion o f human health).
The upshot is: if it can’t deliver what we want today and tomorrow, it isn’t healthy.
Clearly, then, under this definition, health is not an objective condition that is found in a
forest, but is instead first articulated and then looked for or created. This o f course, begs
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the (huge) question o f the acceptability or desirability o f the management objectives— an
open-ended question if ever there was one, not to mention the question o f sustainability.
Such a definition is virtually impossible to defend on the grounds o f science. (Consider
this: A perfectly healthy though lightweight siave would be defined as “unhealthy” if
unable to lift the building blocks o f the Egyptian pyramids; a forest that produces a fine
crop o f aspen is unhealthy if it is unable to produce its quota o f desired wood fiber, etc..)

In anticipation o f these dangers o f trying to frame health and develop criteria by reference
to management objectives, (some o f which the FS admits have actually been responsible
for the alleged unhealthy conditions15 ...) a 1992 USFS report entitled Forest Health and
E co lo g ica l Integrity in the Northern Rockies recommends that criteria for forest health

be derived not from management objectives but from ecological conditions. The authors
suggest that ”ecosystem function” provides a suitable base from which to develop
objective criteria and state that “a forest in good health is a fully functioning community
o f plants and animals and their physical environm ent.” and further, that “a healthy forest
is an ecosystem in balance” (USDA FS/M onnig and Byler 1992. unpaginated.). In order
to determine what a "fully functioning” “balanced” and thus healthy forest might look
like, the report suggests that we look, once again, to the forests and ecosystems o f the preEuropean era as models; that is. that we look into the past for the meaning o f today's
signs.

'■ See USDA FS Blue Mountains Forest H ealth Report ( 1991) Section II, page 2.
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It is worth taking a moment here to note that this focus on the past, particularly on
“European'' settlement as the defining moment between health and its decline is a
persistent theme in American forestry (and meta-forestry or environmental) discussions of
forest/ecosystem health, integrity, and restoration. Both health and integrity are conditions
(or measures) that are identified by reference to ‘‘pre-European” (the Salish-Kootenai
foresters use the term "pre-contact”) conditions; restoration is something we do in order
to get back to those conditions. In fact, it is even codified (and presently contested by the
Bush administration) in several sections o f the planning regulations. Section 219.2 o f the
Code o f Federal Regulations concerns how we might go about achieving and maintaining
ecological sustainability. Sub section 219.2(a)(4) states that "Current conditions must be
compared to the distribution o f historical conditions prior to European settlement to
develop insights about the current status and integrity o f ecosystem com ponents” (Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR), vol. 64. No. 192. §219.20 (4)) and further that we must
evaluate "the effects o f human activities.” taking care to distinguish between "activities
prior to European settlement, which had an integral role in the landscape for a long period
of time, from activities after European settlement, many o f which are o f a type, size and
rate that were not typical o f disturbances under which native plant and animal species and
ecosystems developed” (CFR, Vol. 64. No. 192, §219.20(a)(3)). The references to "preEuropean settlem ent” as the (sometimes implied, but often explicit) definition o f "the
norm" or o f "health" are ubiquitous throughout the literature; the choice o f this point in
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time as the norm has not escaped considerable attention and criticism, but the USFS
seems to have accepted it.16

The present USFS definitions (#’s 2 and 3), not surprisingly retreat from the unmitigated
subjectivity o f its predecessor by identifying the term “health” with some condition in the
presumed real. We will look first at Definition #2 (this is the definition that seems to
appear most often in print...). Definition 2 retains a social or cultural component, but the
relation between these two components— culture and nature— is not entirely clear. The
language and structure o f the definition establish an uneasy tension between people's
desires and the objective conditions on which those desires depend. It begins with a
statement o f the objective conditions o f the forest that would classify it as healthy -"th e
capacity across the landscape for renewal, for recovery from a wide range o f disturbances,
and for retention o f its ecological resiliency” (see, for example, Clark and Munn (1986)
for a discussion of resilience and disturbance). These conditions must be achieved or
maintained "while meeting the current and future needs o f people for desired levels o f
values, uses, products and services.” Grammatically, the establishment o f certain
ecological conditions stands alone as a complete thought (or sentence). To this already
complete thought is appended a dependent clause that establishes a secondary role for
human desires. Thus the structural arrangem ent o f the two components o f the definition
conveys a slightly different message than that which one might read on the face o f it. The

16See for example, M.R. Wagner, etal. "Restoration Ecology” in Journal o f Forestry (2000) 98(10):22-27:
W. Cronon (ed.) Uncommon Ground; and, Guha, Cronon, Noss, Rolston, in J.B. Callicott (ed) The G reat
Veif Wilderness Debate ( 1998).
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establishment and maintenance o f ecological conditions appears to be on a par with
("while") meeting people’s desires. However, because people’s desires and needs are cast
(grammatically) as dependent upon ecological conditions, one could get the idea that
desires are subordinate to ecology. This interpretation is bome out in both the U SFS’
Strategic Plan 2000 and the planning regulations (see CFR §219.19, §219.20, and
§219.21). In fact, the Bush adm inistration is-challenging the regulations on precisely
these grounds (elevating "natural” ecology above "human" ecology, if you wall). I am not
really interested in arguing the truth value o f this statement (whether people's desire are
and should be subordinated), but only in pointing out how this construction treats health
as a culturally independent condition— as if people's desires did not have some
fundamental effect in defining health at the outset. The "objective" conditions appear to
be the foreground, the prerequisite for meeting the "needs o f people for desired"
conditions: it is clear that these conditions are considered to be outside of, beyond, before,
or other than culture and that they are knowable and this knowledge itself is not cultural.
By defining health in this way the FS establishes a schism that entails a dichotomous
framew ork that effectively (or so it hopes) permits it to retain control o f the discourse o f
the objective conditions— the ecology— o f the forest while simultaneously allow ing for
the inclusion o f public discourses that express desires. By separating out forest conditions
from public desires, and by retaining for itself (as we shall see) the power to define those
conditions through a scientific discourse, the FS attempts to retain control o f the terms of
forest management; desires are included and considered— not as essential qualities o f
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health, but as adjuncts or qualifiers— , and must be pursued within the parameters o f
ecological limits as established by science.

That people's desires are subordinate to and separate from forest health is not
immediately obvious in the definition itself (despite the grammatical structure o f the
sentence), and is thus open to argument and interpretation. However, I believe that other
FS literature supports this primacy and independence o f ecosystem or forest health— at
least with respect to its own responsibilities and authorities. For example, as noted earlier
in this paper. Goal 1 in the Forest Service’s Strategic Plan 2000— the plan that is ilthe
keystone o f the FS management system, providing the context and purpose for [all future]
agency actions"— is ecosystem health. The mission statement (again) is "to sustain the
health, diversity, and productivity o f the nation's fo rests...." Goal 2 is to “provide a
variety o f uses, values, products and services for present and future generations by
managing within the capabilities o f sustainable ecosystems" (USDA Forest Service 2000.
iii): and later, "domestic and international activities are directed at developing values,
products, and services in such a way as to maintain ecosystem health'1'' (USDA Forest
Serv ice 2000. 4). The value o f each o f the four goals and each o f the individual objectives
is framed in terms o f its contribution to or impact on forest health (USDA Forest Service
2000 . 11 ).

In another USFS document. The Committee o f Scientists Report, the Committee states
that sustainability is “the overarching objective o f National Forest stewardship"
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(Committee o f Scientists (COS) 1998, xiv).17 It admits that sustainability can be difficult
to define, but that it is composed o f interdependent ecological, economic, and social
components (COS 1998. xiv). The Committee then goes on to clarify the relationship
between the components: sustainability "calls for integrating the management o f
biological and ecological systems with their social and economic contexts, while
acknowledging that management should not compromise the basic functioning o f these
system s' (my emphasis. COS 1998, xiv). And further, “ecological sustainability
[maintaining the composition, structure, and processes o f a system] lays a necessary
foundation [is a “key goaf’ in fact] for national forests and grasslands to contribute to the
economic and social components o f sustainability'’ (COS 1998, xvi). Management must
"operate within a baseline level o f ensuring the sustainability o f ecological
system s..."(C O S 1998, xvi). Health and sustainability are not synonymous, but they are
inextricably bound to one another in FS literature: forest (or ecosystem) health seems to
be a prerequisite for sustainability and at the same time, health is one o f those things that
we must sustain (see above). However, my point is neither dependent upon their
coincidence, nor on the determination o f whether ecology or people should come first;
instead. 1 am only interested in pointing out that in both instances, ecological
sustainability and/or forest health, each is considered to be a condition o f the "out there ”
that stands outside o f beyond, and even over and against the needs and desires o f people.

1 This Committee was convened in December o f ! 997 by the United States Department o f Agriculture to
‘provide the Secretary with scientific and technical recommendations on the FS land management planning
process" (Society o f American Foresters December 1998, web site). It consists o f 13 members from such
disciplines as forest and range ecology, fish and wildlife biology, silviculture, hydrology, sociology, land
management planning, and natural resources law.
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I interpret this deliberate juxtaposition to mean that forest health is not only not a function
o f people's desires, but that it is also not an artifact o f culture or language. Since 1997, at
least, the FS has been careful to maintain a distinction between the ecology o f forest
health and the desires and needs o f people because in the end it believes that forest health
(and/or ecological sustainability) is an objective condition that exists altogether
independently o f the culture through which it is constructed and known.

This definition, like Leopold's, is also inherently conservative: a state o f health is one that
is premised upon renewal, recovery, retention, and resiliency. In every instance, health is
function o f going back, o f re production o f its historical self in perpetuity: going forward
into the future means returning to the past. Heaith, as we have seen, is almost invariably
defined by historical (pre-European) conditions. This definition sanctions and validates
the collection o f data on historical conditions because if health is indeed understood as an
ability to return to some preexisting historical state (which implies a sustainable cycle)
then one must know what that state is in order to return health to it [like getting back on
the rails o f a toy train set!]. This eternal return is reminiscent o f Hegelian conservatism in
which knowledge, in search o f certainty and closure, turned back upon itself when
confronted with the irreducible ignorance at its limits. Just as Hegel retreated to the safety
and comfort o f a knowledge that always already contains not-knowledge, so forestry
retreats to a definition o f health that is self-referential, identical with itself—that consists
largely in what is already known as (reconstructed) historical fact.

tS

13 The choice o f date may be arbitrary but it is not unmotivated or capricious. We choose this date because
it is close enough for us to have some idea (not to say knowledge) o f it and o f the conditions that obtained.
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And finally, the definition o f health (#3) that appears in the glossary o f terms for EM on
the USFS Headquarters web site offers some interesting contrasts: ”a measure o f the
robustness o f forest ecosystems; soil, air, and w ater productivity; natural disturbances;
and the capacity o f the forest to provide a sustaining flow o f goods and services for
people." The first thing that pops out is that previously health was defined as a condition
or a state, but here it is a measure. The next difference to leap out is that we have
exchanged all the "re-’s” for '‘robustness.” According to W ebster’s, robust comes from
the Latin meaning oaken, hard, or strong. We no longer seem to be looking backward into
history or pre-history for our health, but instead are looking for “strong and healthy;
hardy: vigorous" forests (health is a measure o f the health o f a forest....!). Robust forests
or ecosystems are “strongly or stoutly built.” they are “rich and full-bodied.” Then too. in
what appears to be a radical departure, this definition normalizes “natural disturbances”
making them a quality o f health itself rather than defining health as the capacity to
recover from them (c/H olling (1992) and Holling, in Clark and M unn (1986)). This
opens the door to normalizing insects, wildfires, weather “events,” geophysical “events.”
and all sorts o f other hitherto “unhealthy” pathogenic critters and processes. And finally,
the sentence structure (a series o f grammatically equal clauses separated by semi-colons,
joined by a final “and”) implies that all o f the listed “aspects” are o f equal value. What is
missing, or at least left indeterminate, is an explicit statement o f how we might know (as

but far enough away that we cannot be absolutely certain o f what it was and thus be held to unachievable
standards. There is nothing wrong with selecting this date; just don't pretend that the forest o f 500 years
ago is any more “healthy” or “representative” o f “forest-ness” than the one 10,000 years ago or the one
today. That is, the choice is based on preference, not on science or purely objective (in the sense o f
unmotivated) criteria.
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objective states) "diversity,” "productivity,” "capacity” "disturbances,” and "goods.”
Given the general commitment o f the Forest Service to objectivity and to science I might
hazard a guess that these signifiers would be filled by interrogating not the human
population, but the referent (the forest or the ecosystem). But I am mystified how one
might classify a condition as productive or a population as diverse without first having
decided upon a measure. Also, this definition makes things "for people” (i.e.. wants) an
equal, not a subordinate part o f health. We are back to the pre-1997 definition (#1)!

This pre-l 997 definition is, it seems to me. a very interesting definition precisely because
it defines (in the sense o f eliminates) very little. The only powerful qualifier or criteria is
to be derived from the last clause: "the capacity o f the forest to provide a sustaining flow
o f goods and services for people.” And this o f course is the crux o f the matter— this is
where things depart from the "objective” and the scientific.

So. where is the FS on the subject o f forest health? We have looked at Leopold’s
definition, as well as at a series o f deeply conflicting definitions produced by the USFS.
And indeed, we would have to agree with the authors o f the report with whom we began:
forest health is an ambiguous term that changes over time and place. We seem to be stuck
somewhere between health as an objective condition— a condition o f the (presumed) real
that has nothing to do with culture or language or human categories o f thought; health as
a subjective state— a condition determ ined entirely by culture, by people’s desires stated
in the form o f management objectives; and health as an ultimate norm, or even a moral
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good— Leopold's concept o f land health. We have the notion o f health as a measure o f
other things, and that o f health as a state or condition that makes other things possible. In
some instances a healthy forest is one that looks like historic and pre-historic forests (the
notion o f health as reflexive and reproductive, as identical with itself), in others it is
associated with its capacity to perpetuate itself in some form into the future, and in
another instance it has only to do with it's present “vigor."

The relationship between people’s needs and desires and forest health is also left
indeterminate: Are they equal? Do needs and desires take precedence? Does forest health
take precedence? I suppose the only thing we might venture to say about forest health is
that neither we (the public) nor the FS seems to have a definitive, conclusive, stable idea
of what it is. (It may be that the FS, like the medical community, is internally divided—
between those who would have science rule (and objective health prevail) and those who
want to keep the focus on human wants and needs. As o f now, neither side has “won.") In
spite o f this, as we shall see. the FS has gone on to identify a number o f indicators o f
health, developed measures for these indicators, and assigned a value to each measure all
so that we might objectively determine the health o f a forest.

Unpacking each definition only reveals more ambiguity; behind each term there are more
terms, each o f which is circulated in its own complex economy o f signs. It is not clear
that looking toward the forest itself (if such a thing is even possible) will yield any greater
clarity or definition because seeing anything at all depends upon our having previously
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determ ined sight categories. Then too, the assignment o f one term to an "observed”
condition or an experience is (initially) an arbitrary choice, a choice that is then
submitted, so to speak, to the society at large for confirmation. If the controversy over the
FS' conception o f forest health and its interpretation o f the data is any indicator, a
significant portion o f the public does not agree with how the FS has filled its signifier; it
is unclear whether these people do not see the same things the FS does when it looks to
the forest, or whether, having seen the same things, they do not interpret their meaning in
the same way.

Bevond (or before) the definitions
Having inquired into definitions o f the objective (health) we have yet to see how the FS
defines the object19 (the forest, or the ecosystem) that is supposed to be made healthy.
The FS' original "unit" o f concern or focus was for the single resource, be it trees, or
water quality, recreation opportunities, wildlife or fish. Regardless o f the particular
object, it was generally treated as an isolated, decontextualized entity, state, or process; in
other words, the concept was reified or treated as "real.” The FS dealt with parts, rather
than wholes. The reductive approach worked well in terms o f simplifying things at the
conceptual and modeling level; it was somewhat less successful at actually producing the
array o f specific goods and services thus reductively identified; and so far, completely
unsuccessful at producing/ reproducing/sustaining/restoring the more complex
biophysical conditions and processes upon which the production or maintenance o f goods
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and services was dependent. The FS has retreated from the single-resource approach to
land and resource management, acknowledging that

the days have ended when the forest may be viewed only as trees and trees viewed
only as timber. The soil and water, the grasses and the shrubs, the fish and
wildlife, and the beauty that is the forest must become integral part o f resource
managers' thinking and actions (Sen. Humphry 1976,122 Congressional Record
3618-19).

The ecosystem concept now dominates forest management and it is the health o f the
ecosystem (or the forest understood as an ecosystem as Sen. Hum phry's points out) that is
the focus. So what is an ecosystem?

The English ecologist Tanslev. the acknowledged progenitor o f the term, said that an
ecosystem includes "not only the organism-complex, but the whole complex o f physical
factors forming what we call our environment" (Tanslev, 1935. in Kimmins 1987, 25).
Odum proposed a more com plex definition: "any unit that includes all the organisms (i.e.,
the community) in a given area interacting with the physical environm ent so (hat a flo w o f
energy leads (o a clearly defined trophic structure, biotic diversity, and material cycles
(i.e.. exchange o f materials between living and non-living parts within the system) is an

191 am using “object” in a non-technicai sense: I mean only that it is the thing that we are looking into, the
object o f our enquiry or o f our activities (not as in goal, or as opposed to “subject”—just the “topic” o f
concern, if you will, or the thing toward which we are directing our attention.
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ecological system or an ecosystem"’ (emphasis added, Odum 1971, in Kimmins 1987, 26).
The Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team defines an ecosystem as "a unit
comprising interacting organisms considered together with their environm ent (e.g.,
marsh, watershed, and lake systems)” (Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team
(FEMAT) 1993. IX -10). The authors o f Ecosystem Management: Principles and
Applications define an ecosystem as “all the organisms in a given place interacting with
their nonliving environment” (USDA FS/Everett 1994. 369). The USFS ' HQ wreb site
"People's Glossary o f Ecosystem M anagement Terms” defines an ecosystem as "an
arrangement o f living and non-living things and the forces that move among them. Living
things include plants and animals. Non-living parts o f ecosystems may be rocks and
minerals. Weather and wildfire are two o f the forces that act within ecosystems" (USDA
FS HQ 2001. www.fs.fed.us/land/em term s. html). With the exception o f O dum 's
definition, which includes a very specific normative component that drastically narrows
the list o f "possible ecosystems." these definitions eliminate nothing. An ecosystem is
everything, including one might say. the non-systematic. Ecosystem advocates are quick
to point out that this concept also includes humans and human artifacts, such as cities or
farms. One could even, if one wanted to add yet another layer o f complexity and push the
concept to its logical extremes, include human symbolic or cultural systems. In other
words, an ecosystem would not ju st be about spatial or physical phenomena or relations
but also about conceptual and cognitive noumena and networks. But I will leave that
aside for a moment.
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In light o f the FS’ reconceptualization o f the unit o f concern in forest management, it
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to identify any event, process, function, state, or
entity o f any intensity, frequency, extent, or duration as unhealthy based upon some
objective criteria o f what a healthy ecosystem is. Any ecosystem, as it is, no matter what
it is. is healthy by default i f one is going to subscribe to the notion o f an objective health
that exists independently o f human ideas o f it. I say this, because ill-health is generally
considered to be some deviation from a norm, to (as we shall see in the section on human
health) indicate some departure from a predetermined “identity.” If the definition o f an
ecosystem establishes no norm or identity-, no particular ontological qualities or
characteristics, functions or structures, it becomes difficult to subsequently determine a
"deviation" or "derangem ent” that might constitute a departure from "health.” An
ecosystem thus defined provides no motive whatsoever to seek out data on historic or
prehistoric conditions: there is no reason to look for "historic ranges o f variability;” no
reason to establish limits or baselines or trends; no indicators to identify; nothing to
measure; indeed, no (objective) scale by which to assign a meaning or value to any
measure taken. Unless, o f course, one already has some specific (or perhaps only vague)
idea o f what one wants an ecosystem to do, be. or have; that is, unless the human
component o f the ecosystem has an expectation. But that, o f course, is an altogether
different thing.

But we will carry on. and do as the FS has apparently done and simply ignore the
inconsistencies that are cropping up in the discourse on forest health, and see where we
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might get if we. 1) accept that forest health is an objective condition o f the forest as
seems to be strongly indicated (in different w ays...) by the two present USFS definitions
of it; 2) accept that an ecosystem is “a unit comprising interacting organism s considered
together with their environment;” and 3) accept that human needs and desires do play a
role in forest health, not at the level o f determining what it is but rather in determining
how we will promote, use, or allow that health to be compromised in order to serve our
own interests (Def. 2). These assumptions, which I think are not inconsistent with those
made by the FS. lead to particular practices. The first is that the FS is overwhelmingly
committed to a scientific exposition o f the objective condition o f health— scientists
interrogate the referent, the forest, in search o f indicators, and the second is that in
keeping with their "health as natural science" model, they tend to treat the public's
contribution as "not-knowledge.” but as myth, opinion, or stories that bear little
resemblance to the reality that foresters must deal with (except implementation
strategies). In this category o f “public" I include those who may know forests or
ecosystems in sometimes non-scientific or “other-scientific" ways (environmentalists,
nature writers and historians, environmental philosophers and ethicists, loggers, miners,
etc.). as well as those who deal not with forests but with knowledge itself, or with human
systems like the economy, the culture or politics, with art or aesthetics, etc..

Because the present definition o f forest health is understood as an ecological or
biophysical phenomenon. FS researchers head afield to “interrogate the referent” when it
comes time to identify the sources o f disease and the criteria by which we might judge the

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

69
status o f health. (Incidentally, this not-so-subtle-shift from a discursive focus on health to
a practical search for disease occurs in medicine as w ell.. .it seems that it is easier to
"identify" disease and derangement than to identify health.) The bulk o f USFS literature
on forest health is devoted either to the exposition o f current conditions (generally agreed
to be "unhealthy”) supported by lengthy, detailed evidentiary chains that purport to
dem onstrate the lack o f health (Science Report on Forest Health o f the U.S., Colorado
Forest Health Report, Blue Mountains Forest Health Report, California Forest Health,) ;
to the development o f technical manuals designed to standardize the criteria, the research
techniques, and the interpretation o f data (e.g.. Forest Health Monitoring: Field Methods
Guide (National 1999)): or to the articulation o f forest-health policy initiatives (Science
Report on Forest Health o f the U.S., USDA Strategic Plan (2000 Revision)). Almost
without variation the discussion o f forest health is framed in terms o f fire, weather,
animal damage, insects and diseases, and the field research is conducted with an objective
"to determine the status, trend, and condition o f forest resources” with respect to these
five criteria (USDA FS (Blue M ountains...) 1991, USDA FS /D alel996). However, the
definition o f an ecosystem gives us no objective grounds for naming any o f these
phenom ena as unhealthy; and even though the two USFS definitions o f forest/ecosystem
health do provide some limited grounds (on the basis o f how fire, insects, etc. may affect
resiliency, productivity, renewal, robustness, etc.) they cannot do so without the further
addition or incorporation o f explicit value judgem ents about what it means to be
productive, resilient, robust, or renewed; and without the support o f an ecosystem
"identity ." these value judgem ents will have to be acknow ledged as referring to human
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constructs not "found” qualities o f ecosystems. Furthermore, the value o f the status,
trend, and present condition is almost inevitably judged by reference to the past; the
"benchm ark” for the norm in all instances is “pre-European settlement.” Once again, the
choice o f this particular point in (pre)history as the standard o f ecosystem health is not
one that is necessitated by either the definition o f an ecosystem or that o f health.

One gets the sense that the criteria like the measures themselves are established by fiat;
we are provided no sustained, in depth discussion o f the justification for their use nor
offered any explanation o f why or how these are essentially related to health, are signals
thereof, or are healthy or unhealthy in and o f themselves. To establish these connections,
these explanatory and justificatory frameworks, one would need to go beyond science, to
the realm o f narrative (Lyotard 1984). The Forest Service’s lack o f sustained enquiry into
the choice o f these indicators becomes particularly poignant when we are told by these
same researchers in these same publications that these same “diseases.” "catastrophic
events.” and “dysfunctional processes” are also absolutely critical to maintaining forest
health— or even are healthy them selves....( USDA FS 1991 Blue M ountains .... II-1:
USDA FS 1998 Colorado F orest.... 22; USDA FS 1992 Forest H ealth...)). Nonetheless,
research scientists proceed to measure biodiversity; the quality o f water, air. and soil;
determine the presence or absence, decline or increase, frequency, intensity, duration,
density, etc. o f organisms, chemicals, structures, interactions, or processes. W henever
possible, the scientists reconstruct as best they can the historical presence, intensity, and
frequency o f each known phenomenon in the hopes o f establishing an historical range o f

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71
variability by which to interpret the meaning o f present conditions. However, with the
exception o f fire which can be traced back quite far, the oldest records available on
insects and diseases in the Blue Mountains o f the Pacific Northwest, for example, date to
the 1870s and are considerably less than comprehensive (e.g., USDA FS 1991,
throu g h o u t). We do not exactly have a “thick description” (in terms o f scientific data) o f
the historical forest, much less o f the pre-historicai (before stories) or mythical (before
written record) forest that would enable us to reconstruct a rich and com plex picture upon
which to base a judgem ent o f ecosystem health today vis a vis the past in the Western
U.S..

The numbers indicate that researchers in forestry “do science." They d o n 't do
anthropology or ethnography (except in the most limited way. as in the protection o f
cultural artifacts), they don’t do philosophy or even ethics, they don’t do literary analysis.
In keeping with the expanded, holistic notion o f an ecosystem and the commitment to an
"interdisciplinary” approach to managing them. Forest Service offices are now staffed by
an impressive array o f highly educated and very competent scientists and technicians in
diverse fields: hvdrologists, geologists, silviculturists, economists, wildlife biologists
and/or ecologists, botanists, ecosystem analysts, systems analysts, GIS technicians, fish
biologists, foresters, endangered and threatened species specialists, pathologists,
entomologists, fire specialists, water quality specialists, etc.. There is also the occasional
sociologist (usually o f the social science persuasion), archeologist, and lawyer, along with
public relations officers, recreation managers, and law enforcem ent personnel. The Blue
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M ountains Forest Health Report (1991) is com piled by a team o f research specialists: a
forest entomologist, forest pathologist, silviculturist, watershed specialist, ecologist,
w ildlife biologist, and a fire and fuels specialist. The Forest Ecosystem Management: An
Ecological, Economic, and Social Assessment (1993) is compiled by over 600 scientists
and technical experts from a variety o f (...scientific) disciplines (this number includes
support personnel). O f the 600. there were six named contributors who were not (which
num ber varies depending on whether you believe economics and sociology to be sciences
or humanities) scientists or technicians. (The FS, incidentally, counts sociology and
econom ics as sciences, not as humanities, as we can see from the language o f the
National Forest Management Act (see next paragraph).)

Even at the level o f policy and management, the com mitment to science and scientific
knowledge and the faith in the expertise and em inence o f scientists is evident. The
Strategic Plan 2000 “includes consideration o f science-based information from recent
resource based assessments” along with ideas, suggestions and other information (USDA
FS 2000). Goal 3 o f the Strategic Plan is to “develop and use the best scientific
information available to deliver technical and com m unity assistance and to support
ecological, economic, and social sustainability (USDA FS 2000). The National Forest
M anagement Act o f 1976 (16 USCA 1660(6)) calls for the “integrated consideration o f
physical, biological, economic, and other sciences'’ in developing and maintaining forest
plans (NFMA 1976, 16 USC 1604(b)). A 1994 report entitled Ecosystem Management:
Principles and Applications, was compiled by 113 scientists and offered a “scientific
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evaluation o f the effects o f Forest Service management practices” (USDA FS 1994, Vol.
I: Executive Summary, 1). Ecosystem management is “based on sound science” and
adaptive management (“the proactive approach o f the FS to restore and maintain healthy
ecosystems") is a “science-driven management experiment” that “applies scientific
principles and methods to improve resource m anagem ent....as new scientific findings and
social changes demand”(USDA FS 1994. Vol. II, 368; USDA FS/Dahms and Geils •
1997). In a statement praising the Science Report on Forest Ecosystem Health in the U.S.
(1997), Congressman Don Young (R-AK) says that it “marks the beginning o f a more
scientific, fact-based approach to some serious forest problems.” This three-step approach
requires "understanding the science" and “examining the science” (produced and
validated by a "pre-eminent group o f forest scientists”) so that members o f the
Congressional committee can "develop fact-based forestry laws that use the best scientific
information" (and indeed, this language is incorporated in the recently finalized Planning
Rules o f the Code o f Federal Regulations ...). The scientific approach not only provides
“better information” but also reduces the chance that "emotionally-based rhetoric will
form the basis o f our forest management laws.” Young aims “to move away from rhetoric
and towards fact-based forestry laws that allow management to improve the
environm ent." Young goes on to add that “management using scientific information, not
opinion, not rhetoric, and not a special interest agenda is what our forestry law m ust
encourage" and thanks the Speaker (Gingrich) for his “call...to build a case for change
based on sound, quality SCIENCE” (R. Don Young, Press Release/Statement, 12-1396(7). in Press Packet). Congressm an R. Smith (R-OR) praises the R ep o rt’s authors and
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those who have come to testify in congressional hearings on its behalf, as "highly
regarded forest scientists” and "highly credible forestry experts” whose “conclusions are
powerful” (R. Smith, News Release in Press Packet, 4-9-97).

Thus we see that forest and ecosystem health are almost invariably cast in scientific
(biological, chemical, ecological (narrowly construed)) terms. The FS appears to assume
that biology and ecology, despite being logoi, are “a-cultural” and that even management
and policy are understood as quasi-scientific and technical endeavors. Forestry schools
offer science degrees and are invariably located in the science section o f the university
system rather than the humanities* section. And finally, we note that the FS' use o f
science is not limited to interrogation o f the referent; it is also the preferred methodology
when attempting to gain some insight into people's needs and desires. Inquiries into
social values and economic concerns tend to take a social science (recall N FM A 's
mandate) approach, rather than, say a qualitative ethnographic or anthropological, or even
a philosophical or linguistic, approach. As ’’sciences,” econom ics and sociology take
tastes and preferences as givens and therefore subject to disinterested investigation and
quantification via surveys, items bought and sold, travel costs expended, and other
"revealed” preferences. The information— to even be considered as information— must
be o f the sort that can be formulated into quantifiable objectives (USDA FS/Everett 1994.
11) and reduced or formalized into some sort o f a “data base” in which information is
most often (though not always) presented in numerical form.
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In short, the invocation o f science and scientists is meant to reassure us that the FS is
giving us "inform ation,” hard data, facts, not rhetoric or opinion; and that furthermore,
these scientists are disinterested and have knowledge, they are not victims o f emotions or
interests that might lead them into error or into the realm o f unsubstantiated myth. It is for
this reason that the definition o f forest health (as a scientifically formulated goal) is so
important to the agency and why ambiguity o f the definitions so severely deconstructs
and undermines the agency’s self-promoted mythology as simply “doing good science.”

Concluding remarks
So. we have inquired into forestry’s object (the ecosystem), (one of) it's objective(s)
(forest health), and the preferred method and theoretical framework (science) by which
both object and objective might be known. And in doing so we have encountered
unexpected difficulties. The object or focus o f concern, the ecosystem, the thing we want
to be heaithy. appears to lack any sort o f “identity” because its all inclusive nature
normalizes (or "ecosystematizes") everything; it is not a “self-defining unit o f analysis”
(Binkley 1998. 31). Neither o f the definitions that the USFS uses provides objective
grounds for assigning any particular value (health or disease) to any one state, process,
function, organism, relationship, interaction, or assemblage. The concept o f ecosystem
health then cannot be derived from the ecosystem itself—either as a concept or as a
referent. Despite FS efforts to define it as an objective, biophysical phenomena (with an
unclear a posteriori relationship to human needs and d esires...), health may ultimately be
an inherently and ineluctably subjective a priori judgm ent that is then read back onto or
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mapped out on the biophysical world, and continually reevaluated for validity' and
consistency with our empirical observations, our experiences, and/or our ideas thereof.
Thus, specific arrangements or relationships, patterns or processes, functions, states,
trends, or conditions (resiliency, renewal, robustness, productivity, etc.) are defined not
discovered as healthy. In an effort to ground these criteria in something other than mere
human choice, we select some (pre)historic ecosystem (pre-settlement, not pre-Jurassic.
for example) as our model ecosystem and say “that ecosystem is healthy, that is the
measure, because it does. has. or is this or that and we like (for whatever reason) this or

that."

This step, the move from description to prescription, the application o f value judgements
is concealed by the FS definition and moved to w hat appears to be a later stage: first we
(the scientists o f the FS) will determine the (objective) state o f health o f the ecosystem by
using science, and then you (the public) can tell us what you want and need.20 But if we
agree that the FS definitions o f an ecosystem lead to no necessary specific conditions, and
if we further agree, based on this, that a determination o f health involves value judgments
at the very outset, then we must also rethink the role o f science. If an ecosystem is what
the USFS says it is (and we suggested above that it might be even more complex and
manifold) then science may not be the best (or at the very least, the only) tool for knowing
it. Even the most committed scientists admit that science is ill-equipped to deal well with
large complex wholes (by “whole" here I do not mean some mystical, prediscursive.
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essentialist, reified "One,” I mean in the sense o f everything, all the details in their
infinite, heterogeneous multiplicity); its methods and theoretical frameworks are better
suited to reduction, to analyzing isolated variables under controlled conditions. The
whole point o f reductionist science is to ignore all "accidents” o f tim e and place, to
abstract from the situation, from the particularity o f actually existing phenom ena, to find
the laws that govern all o f (abstract) nature. But we don’t live in abstract, well-behaved,
clearly defined "ecosystem s;” we live in an infinitely varied, constantly becoming flux
that escapes our words (our definitions) even as we speak them .

And finally, if we accept the suggestion that the FS' attempt to define health by reference
to an "objective" biophysical "real” conceals implicit value-judgements. we will also
have to admit that the role o f science is somewhat different. Again, by its own contention,
the realm o f science is the realm o f what is. not the realm o f what should be; as a
normative declaration, ecosystem "health” is a prescriptive, not a descriptive concept, and
it is not necessarily grounded in any one biophysical condition (there is no obligatory
connection between sign and referent). Note too, that the problem is even more complex:
the determination o f "what is”— the establishment o f something as som ething, as being—
is ultimately grounded in linguistics: something doesn't exist until we say/think it does.
And further, remember that science itself is inescapably linguistic, and is subject to the

;o The FS is not alone in its efforts to overcome the fact-value distinction: both J. B. Callicott and late E. O.
Wilson (cf Consilience) struggle with and purport to make this same move without resorting to human
values.
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variations and permutations, does and will continue to play a critical role in framing both
the ecosystem concept and the forest health discourse. There is no question o f not using
science; rather, the more pressing questions are which (and whose) sciences do we use,
what are their limits, and how can we make up for those by accessing other knowledge
frameworks.

Kierkegaard might argue, that ecosystems, like humans and like life itself, consist in the
accidents, the details, the contradictions, the situation, the myriad ever-changing
particulars o f lived existence, many o f which are not "law ” abiding. If one abstracts from
the heterogeneous multiplicity o f the situation, one abstracts from life itself. Flannery
O 'C onnor once said o f fiction, o f stories, that

When you can state the theme o f a story, when you can separate it from the story
itself, then you can be sure the story is not a very good one. The meaning o f a
story has to be embodied in it. has to be made concrete in it. A story is a way to
say something that can't be said any other way, and it takes every word in the
story to say what the meaning is. You tell a story because a statement would be
inadequate. ... The meaning o f fiction is not abstract meaning but experienced
m eaning,... (O 'Connor. 147).

■' I would not go so far as Latour and Woolgar do in their highly controversial book Laboratory Life: The
S ocial Construction o f Scientific Facts (Beverly Hills, 1979) to say that science is nothing other than a
power struggle with no reference to the outside world, but rather that it is a culturally determined practice,
and a language, that is designed to help us make sense o f what is out there.
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A judgement o f health— for both humans and for ecosystems— will depend very much
on all the particulars o f the circumstances, it depends as much on the past and the present
as on what we expect o f ourselves or that ecosystem in the future. To tell the whole story,
we have to keep all the parts. In Chapter Four, we will look at how changing conceptions
of human identity have lead to changes in what it means to be healthy, and how these
have in turn, affected medical practice and theory. In Chapter Five, we will revisit the
forest health debate armed with knowledge gleaned from our exam ination o f the human
health debate.
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Chapter Four
Medicine
Thank g o d m ost o f (hem get better on their ow n...!
-Overheard in the doctor's lounge

Medicine, and by association, human health and disease, is currently considered to be the
domain o f physicians and other health professionals trained in scientific methodology and
in the techniques o f bioscience (Cassell 1997). The hegemony o f the “biom edical" model
o f health is not a long standing tradition— it dates from about 200 years ago to the advent
o f modem medicine and the professionalization o f physicians and health care workers
(see Foucault's The Birth o f the Clinic. C assell's Doctoring, Porter’s Health,
Civilization, and the State)— but it has been and continues to be the dominant force in the
determination o f what it means to be healthy and in the character o f health care. Today
the biomedical model o f health (and along with it. physician authority as the sole arbiter
o f health ) is being challenged by Health M aintenance Organizations, hospital bureaucrats
and administrators, insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, and government
agencies. For the most part, these organizations and institutions challenge only the
exclusivity o f the physicians' control o f diagnosis and patient care, not the structures o f
knowledge on which that control is predicated or the concept o f health that it reifies.
Perhaps the most formidable challenges to both physician authority and the dominance o f
medical science in health care, however, are coming from two unlikely sources: patients
and physicians themselves. Patients are questioning the categories p f thought by which
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physicians and the m odem medical community as a whole construct disease and health,
and formulate options for treatment— treatments that tend most often to address the
disease (as a biological entity or process) not the illness (the disease as it manifests itself
in situ, in the person) (Wright 1982, Engel 1979, Cassell 1997). That is, patients (or more
generally, the public) are questioning the institutionalization o f the disease-oriented
ideology o f modem biomedicine to the exclusion o f other experientially derived
narratives o f health and illness. As we shall see, physicians too, increasingly dissatisfied
with the objectivity requirements and technical nature o f their profession and the
limitations that it imposes, are also seeking alternative conceptual models that perm it o f a
wider range o f patient-physician interactions (e.g., more person directed relationships),
diagnostic techniques (e.g.. the incorporation o f patient narratives, for example, in
explaining etiology and vectors o f disease), and treatment options (e.g.. exploring
palliative care options as opposed to focussing on "cures'’ that treat "derangements o f
biological function"). What we discover upon closer examination, is that at bottom, our
ideas o f health and illness are intimately tied to our ideas o f ourselves; that is, to our
identity (Could it be that our notions o f forest health are also tied up with our identity?).

The praxis o f modem western medicine has generated dozens o f sophisticated "m eta
medical" discourses in philosophy, sociology, history, anthropology, ethics, business,
politics, geography, biology, economics, and law. The motive for developing these m eta
discourses is the premise that the concept o f health (especially as it is being reinterpreted
in today's society), and the related ones o f disease and illness, have buried within them
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legal, biological, aesthetic, social, political, philosophical, historical, psychological,
economic, and moral assumptions that are more or less problematic in contemporary
culture. Perhaps the most telling example o f the multi-faceted nature o f “health” is the
World Health Organization’s definition in which health is defined as “a state o f complete
physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence o f disease or
infirmity" (WHO 1976 ). Contrast this with the president o f the American Association of
Physicians plea for a very narrow understanding o f medicine’s boundaries, and by
association, for a very narrow understanding o f health and illness in the medical model:
"the central goal o f medicine may be defined as the relief o f pain, the prevention o f
disability, and the postponement o f death by the application o f the theoretical knowledge
incorporated in medical science to individual patients” (Seldin (JAM A), in Henderson
1997. 251). And further, illness and disease are to be viewed only as “deranged
biomedical function.” while “health is not synonymous with happiness or tranquility or a
noble life or citizenship”— all the things that the WHO definition seems to imply that it
is (Seldin in Henderson 1997, 251, 252). Curiously, while Seldin is quick to define the
parameters o f medicine and those o f disease, he refuses to offer a positive definition of
health. As we shall see, he does not disagree with the W H O 's definition o f health, but
instead argues that the only aspects o f health with which medicine should be concerned
are disease and infirmity, both o f which he understands as strictly biophysical conditions.
These two radically opposed definitions capture the essence o f the debate over health, and
health care, in late twentieth-century America. They represent what Will W right in The
Social Logic o f Health terms the basic dilem m a between whether “health is a concept
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that can be defined objectively and technically by medical scientists or whether it is a
concept that refers finally and decisively to a quality o f human experience that cannot be
reduced to physiological processes” (W right 1982, 12). Each formulation leads to entirely
different sorts o f knowledges and practices. And as we shall see, understandings o f
human health are neither unambiguous nor uncontested; even when we do try to stick
with the narrower biomedical model proposed by Seldin the ambiguity inherent in the
terms themselves fosters internal contradictions and prevents com plete control.

I will first examine the biophysical model o f health and its use o f the ‘‘conceptual
framework and tools o f biomedical science” (Seldin 1997. 251). This is the "medicine as
a natural science" approach to health, disease, and health care or "health management.” I
will then lay out the alternative "biopsvchosocial” (Engel 1979. Cassell 1997) model o f
health and o f health care. Generally, this is the “medicine as social science” (note that
biology is included, but it's sociocultural roots or commitments are examined and
questioned) approach to health and health care.22 Again, as with the forest health debate, I
will examine how the different definitions o f health lead to potential contradictions, how
these definitions support or necessitate the use o f particular types o f knowledge—
among them science, and how the different understandings o f health affect and/or are
affected by how we identify ourselves as selves. Thus, once again, I will look at the object

:: Social science as it is used here includes research done using a quantitative approach that favors surveys,
but incorporates a stronger qualitative component that favors ethnographic and anthropological approaches
that produce thick descriptions in the form o f narratives. In other words, many o f the social science
methodologies used in medical sociology tend toward those used in the humanities. One could say. then,
that science in this instance is interpreted somewhat along the lines o f its “original” Latin sense o f “to
know" by whatever method knowledge might be produced.
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(be it body or person), the objective (health), and the knowledge framework(s) within
which we produce and reproduce both object and objective.

Medicine as natural science/Health as a biological condition
Within medicine there is a bifurcation between physicians who see themselves "narrowly
as biomedical scientists” and physicians who see “the social problems o f their community
as part o f the legitimate scope o f their medical practice” (Henderson et al. 1997. 244). In
his presidential address to the American Association o f Physicians in 1981, Donald W.
Seldin makes the case for the biological definition o f health and a concomitant narrowing
o f the duties o f physicians in accordance with this definition. As noted above, Seldin
argues that medicine is— or should be— a very narrow discipline whose goals are "the
relief o f pain, the prevention o f disability, and the postponement o f death by the
application o f the theoretical knowledge incorporated in medical science to the individual
patient" (Seldin in Henderson et al. 1997, 245). Seldin's stated intent is to forge a link
between medicine and the biomedical sciences in order that “basic sciences ... such as
biochemistry, physiology, cell biology are seen to furnish the theoretical framework o f
clinical medicine” (Seldin, 251). His goal is not only to achieve a higher level o f certainty
when it comes to diagnosing and treating biophysical illnesses, but also— and perhaps
most importantly— to remove medicine once and for all from the dangerous realm o f
social engineering. (He cites the use o f medicine— medical knowledge and physician
authority— by the Nazi regime in the service o f racial cleansing as the most profound
example o f what happens when medicine ventures beyond the bounds o f the strictly
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scientific into the realm o f politics and culture.) To Seldin, and for the many others who
agree with him, a retreat to objective science offers the only secure, defensible footing for
medical practice (Seldin in Henderson 1997; Cassell 1997). Ironically, for all his
insistence upon medicine as a scientific enterprise, he admits (w ithout further elaboration
on his meaning) that medicine is a “comparatively weak scientific discipline”— but one
whose "powerful instrumentality” is conclusively demonstrated in the successful
"mitigation o f biomedical derangements” (e.g., pain, disability, and prem ature death)
(Seldin. 245). The success o f medicine then, is wholly dependent upon a very narrow
construal o f health that effectively limits its application (and thus its criteria o f success or
failure) to biologic malfunction. Or, even if one wants to define health more broadly, as
does the WHO. then the only "pertinent question” for the physician is which aspects of
this more complex notion o f health fall under the purview o f medicine as a science
(Seldin. 252).

Seldin and others who subscribe to this narrower view o f m edicine's function and o f its
role in achieving health, do not like the World Health O rganization’s definition o f health
because it includes the possibility that everything from “personal maladjustm ents to
social conflicts" will suddenly fall under the purview o f medicine. Physicians will be
forced to consider not only the biophysical factors, but also the social, political,
economic, and cultural institutions and relations that affect or potentially affect a person’s
physical and mental health (Seldin. 252). This broad definition, Seldin argues— an
argument echoed by many others, including Foucault, (c f M adness and Civilization, The
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Birth o f the Clinic. Foucault, Health, and M edicine)— has the effect o f making everything
a matter o f health, and thus by extension, every aspect o f human existence becomes a
medical matter, and every social aberration or political deviation a pretext for medical
intervention. This phenomenon is what some have called the “m edicalization” o f
everyday life (Ben-Sira 1988, Shuval 1992, Seldin 1997, Wright 1982, Henderson et al.
1997, Cassell 1997). Those who advocate a strict biophysical interpretation o f health,
who limit scientific medicine’s application to the relief o f pain, the prevention o f
disability, and the postponement o f death— to biomedical derangements— fear that if
health is defined too broadly, then medicine will have too great an access to areas o f life
that are best left to legislators, judges, educators, psychologists, priests, and parents.
Simply put. for the supporters o f medicine as a natural science and health as a biophysical
phenomena, beyond the narrow bounds o f biology (which is itself highly complex),
medicine and physicians are out their depths. Any attempt to "m edicalize" those aspects
o f human experience that fall beyond biology (giving due notice to those who would
argue that there is nothing that is not explainable by biology...) tends to result in an
“enormous hypertrophy o f personnel and facilities, massive financial expenditures, and
... frustration and disillusionment when medical intervention fails to eventuate in
tranquility, quiescence, and happiness (Seldin, 245). For Seldin the only purview o f a
properly scientific medicine is the narrowly biophysical; these other aspects o f health—
the social, economic, political, cultural, mental, etc.— even one might say, health itself,
do not fall under the auspices o f biomedical science and must be dealt with by other
conceptual frameworks, institutions, and practices.
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There is considerable merit in Seldin’s argument and the subtleties o f his concerns are
not really in conflict with the W H O ’s definition. He is committed to the project o f
scientific medicine, and he is aware that his science works best when applied to clearly
identified and well delimited, isolated things or conditions that have already been defined
by other discourses or cultural traditions as derangements or dysfunctions. He pointedly
refuses to ally medicine with the pursuit o f health, and instead is clear that the goal o f
medicine is to treat only what appear to be objectively identifiable ’‘deranged” conditions
with clear and unambiguous biological causes or roots. Medicine, as a science, can and
should deal only with those biophysical things that it can clearly and unambiguously
identify and define: those things that it can see and quantify: that it can manipulate and
test repeatedly in controlled clinical or laboratory settings (Balshem in Henderson et al.
1997. 39. and Cassell 1997). According to this view, the practice o f medicine, when
applied to patients must limit its interventions to alleviating pain .preventing disability,
and postponing death— but only insofar as these are biophysical conditions that have been
identified by the patient and the cultural milieu as undesirable: and then, only in so far as
they are manifested in the body. Naturally, despite even this very narrow
conceptualization o f the role o f medicine and the physician, there is considerable
disagreement about exactly what may or may not be done in pursuit o f these seemingly
incontestable goals. The bottom line is that there may in fact be more to human health
than biology. Seldin is silent on this point. But if there are, then those things are beyond
the purview o f medical science and beyond the expertise o f physicians.
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The whole point o f a narrow biophysical definition o f disease (and perhaps by silent
association, health) is to carve out some sort o f a territory within which the knowledge
and the techniques o f medical science can be effective, and in which professional health
care workers can enjoy a sense o f expertise and the prestige that comes along with it—
not necessarily to produce all-round healthy people (Ben-Sira 1988, 1, Seldin in
Henderson et al. 1997. 251-2). Under ideal circumstances, m odem Western medicine
would thus focus exclusively on the body, as separate from the person, and concentrate on
mapping its individual functions and structures. Medicine, as biomedicine, would confine
itself to a search for the ultimate chemical and biophysical— bacteria, viruses, genetic
variations, injury, etc.— causes o f both health and disease, and would then develop
material or technical treatments that address that particular organic metabolic or structural
"derangem ent." It would be up to society to determine w hat health was. what disease was.
and what treatments would be acceptable. For the moment, we will accept the narrow
"objective" scientific approach to health— or more precisely, to disease, and see how
medical science fares within these narrow confines. (As mentioned above in the
discussion on forest health, almost invariably the discourse on health gives way to a
discussion o f diseases or deviations from the norm. It may be because health is simply too
ambiguous to "operationalize." We find it easier to speak o f deviations from the norm
than to define the norm.)

Even within the parameters o f this very narrow understanding o f disease— as some sort o f
biophysical or biochemical derangement— science has considerable difficulty establishing
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with com plete certainty the etiology o f an embodied disease. Isolated microorganisms in
controlled laboratory conditions behave well and predictably. Embodied things—
microorganisms in bodies— don’t. In his book How Scientists Explain Disease
(1999)Paul Thagard chronicles the somewhat serendipitous discovery o f an apparent
correlation between the presence o f a bacteria (Helicobacter pylori) and ulcers. His object
is to use the H. pylori case study to examine how science is used to change the beliefs o f
medical practitioners about diseases and their causes, but his account also offers some
insight into the limitations o f science and the apparently unavoidable presence o f
uncertainty when we are speaking o f large complex organisms with limitless interactions.
The discovery o f the correlation between H. pylori and some ulcers is significant because
for decades ulcers were assumed to be caused solely by psychosocial factors such as
stress or anxiety that produced chemical changes in the stomach which in turn caused the
eruption o f ulcers. In the absence o f any definitive evidence o f a biophysical material
cause, clinicians were forced to locate the ultimate causes o f most types o f ulcers in
psychological or environmental, i.e.. non-medical, factors. Biom edicine’s treatment o f
ulcers was thus limited to mitigating the symptoms and suggesting lifestyle changes
Thagard's account o f how the connection was discovered, how the hypothesis was (not
always successfully) tested and retested under both laboratory conditions and in clinical
trials illuminates both the strengths and weaknesses o f the biophysical model o f disease
(the theory that a biological entity or function can fully and exhaustively explain the
presence o f illness or disease in persons). Early on it became clear to the researchers that
there is not a necessary direct correlation between ulcers and the bacteria. The bacteria are
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not present in all cases o f ulceration; nor are ulcers always present w hen the bacteria are.
In other words, not all people that have the bacteria have ulcers and not all people that
have ulcers have the bacteria. To further complicate matters, differing levels o f bacterial
"infection" do not correspond to different “ intensities” o f ulceration. M oreover, treating
the bacteria does not guarantee that either the bacteria or the ulcers will disappear, even
though under controlled laboratory conditions, the bacteria does disappear when treated
with appropriate antibiotics. And in some cases, the bacteria continue to reappear even
after they have been eradicated. In the end, researchers have managed to persuade the
medical community that there is a correlation between some ulcers and H. pylori, and that
in some instances, eradicating the bacteria will indeed eradicate the ulcers, but neither
physicians nor researchers can speak with absolute certainty on a cause-effect
relationships between the bacteria and the disease. In this case, science has shed light
upon yet another vector o f disease (bacteria as a potential, sometime, cause (used
loosely) o f some ulcers...) without necessarily increasing our level o f certainty or
contributing to an increase in the health o f the person.

Similarly, because available technology permits us to visualize previously mvisible things
we tend to believe that if a certain microorganism (a pathogen) or condition
(pathophysiology or pathoanoatomy) is present, a disease will also be present. But in his
influential and provocative book D octoring (1997), Eric J. Cassell, a practicing physician
and Clinical Professor o f Public Health at Cornell University, presents evidence to the
effect that, for example, the presence o f blocked coronary arteries (atherosclerosis) does
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not necessarily mean that the person has coronary heart disease. As in the case o f H.
pylori, there is an observed correlation between the presence o f the one and the onset o f
the other, but blockages in and o f themselves are neither necessary nor sufficient to
account for disease. Furthermore, a patient who tests positive (based upon previously
determined criteria) for blocked arteries but who is otherwise asymptomatic, who then
undergoes various interventions and/or medical procedures (like angioplasty) to reduce
the blockages, does "no better than patients who are not so treated.” From this Cassell
concludes that there is "no good evidence that the outcome o f this chain o f events makes
a positive difference in the life o f .. . the patient” who underwent the procedure (Cassell
1999. 68). Cassell is making several points here, one o f which is about the nature o f the
relationship between medical technology and the practice o f medicine, but one o f which
is that the "relationship between what is considered good and bad in the test results and
what is best for the patient is, at the very least, obscure, and at the worst, ju st plain
wrong" (Cassell 1999, 68). One cannot infer from the empirically observed presence o f
an organism (previously agreed upon as pathological) or from a structure or process or
condition (also previously defined as abnormal or deviant) that a person - o r even his or
her body— is ill or unhealthy.

Medical literature is full o f case studies o f "the exceptions" to the rule, those patients in
whom diseases (as objective entities) fail to manifest themselves in expected ways or who
manifest biophysical symptoms with absolutely no identifiable biological cause or whose
conditions respond in unexpected ways to conventional treatments. (It is worth restating

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92
that there is a “rule,” that many people do respond as expected to therapies and
treatments, and are “healthier” as a result.) A patient complains o f pain or o f experiencing
certain symptoms, but neither the doctor nor the most sensitive diagnostic technology is
able to detect a material condition that can account for the pain or the symptoms. Because
no underlying biological condition can be detected (that is, the “tests come back
negative") the patient is assured that there is nothing wrong. Similarly, there are instances
in which coronary heart disease exists (the “tests come back positive”), but no underlying
material cause— such as blocked arteries— can be found (Cassell 1999, 69-71). Cassell
cites the case o f a diabetic who exhibits not only every single sign o f diabetes, but a host
of other physical "derangements” that have nothing to do with the diabetes and for which
the only cure seems to be her work (Cassell 1999. 53-4 ). The mechanisms o f disease in
humans tend to defy quantification and reduction; we d o n 't live life by the numbers that
medical science assures us are indicators o f normal functioning. The precision and
sensitiv ity o f our technology is such that it permits us to glimpse things we never sawbefore. but we are not yet sure o f the significance o f our observations: we d o n 't know
what these things mean. We can now detect, for example, an “abnormal” developmental
condition in horses called osteochondrosis (OCD). Its discovery caused a ruckus.
Suddenly every yearling had to be tested for this “defect.” Those found to possess it were
immediately deemed unsaleable, doomed no doubt to chronic lameness. The forecasted
mass lameness has not materialized. It seems that our technology outstripped our
knowledge; we have no idea how to interpret this sign, how to fill the signifier (or more
properly, what meaning to attach to the sign). For all we know, the “abnormality” is
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something that has always been there. That is, it may be “norm al.” The attempt to explain
the presence or absence o f health or disease in the human body (leaving aside for a
moment the human being) by recourse only to the presence or absence o f particular
microorganisms, genetic sequences, conditions, or structures has met brilliant, if limited
success. Think o f such diseases or conditions as post-traumatic stress syndrome, chronic
fatigue syndrome, for which no apparent biological or chemical cause can be found. The
strict bioscientification o f health and disease (or conversely, the m edicalization of
everyday life) is defied by the sheer number o f biological and non-biological contributing
factors and the complexity o f the interrelationships between these factors that constrain
and determine the possibility o f any one particular biophysical condition manifesting
itself in some given, predetermined wholly predictable way in any one unique body. If we
cannot hope for absolute success in applying scientific m ethodology to the benefit o f
something as well delineated and overly researched as the human body, one wonders
what hope we might have o f using that science to the benefit o f infinitely complex
ecosystems composed o f a countless numbers o f such bodies each occurring in a
particular circumstance— the nexus o f countless biotic and abiotic relations in time and
space.

We can assent, for the most part, to the marvels o f medical science at the close o f the
tw entieth century. But if patient dissatisfaction, declining physician morale, and the
accounts o f medical ethicists, historians, sociologists, and anthropologists are to be given
credence, we might be less optimistic o f medical sciences' contributions to improvements
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in human health as a quality o f life or its ability to deal with the person as a whole. It is
not even clear that it has done a good job o f alleviating pain, preventing disability, and
postponing death— or that these things are unqualified goods to be pursued at all costs
(Bill M oyer's Living With Dying, PBS, aired in Phoenix on 2-4-01). For all o f medical
sciences' attempts to pretend otherwise, diseases, disabilities, pain, death— in short,
biophysical derangements— are not objectively occurring phenomena, “objects that have
somehow entered the body and made the person sick” (Cassell 1997, 85)'.
Microorganisms behave predictably in controlled laboratory conditions; they behave
unexpectedly when introduced into living systems— that is, when in situ (one might speak
here o f "ecological validity”). A disability for one body (the loss o f a pinkie finger for a
concert pianist) is not necessarily a disability for another (the loss o f the same digit for a
longshoreman). And this doesn’t even begin to take into account the meaning o f this
"disability" for the person. Unfortunately for medical science, diseases are only diseases,
disabilities disabilities, and pain pain when they are manifested in a living organism or
system. Beyond the confines o f the human body, the small pox virus becomes an
endangered species, not a disease. Physicians don’t treat disembodied diseases; they treat
individual humans in whom biophysical conditions that we call diseases manifest
themselves in unexpected ways and with differing consequences (Cassell 1999, 24).
Uncertainty in medicine, like uncertainty in land management, is not simply a m atter o f a
lack o f knowledge, either at the personal level on the part o f the individual physician, or
at the professional level on the part o f the whole medical field or discourse. Improving
medicine, increasing survival rates or longevity are not simply matters o f improving or
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increasing scientific knowledge (see M cKeown cite below). We are not unhealthy and we
d o n 't die just because we lack good, scientific knowledge and advanced technology. The
science o f medicine can and should continue to concern itself with the molecular
biological causes o f disease and to search for treatments at the molecular biological level
(as well as at the macro level!); but the practice o f medicine deals not with “objective”
diseases or states o f health but with healthy or ill persons who constitute or construct
themselves, their health and their diseases in non-scientific ways.

Thus, even in dealing with one fairly well-delimited biological organism (which is not the
same as saying “person”) with which we are intimately familiar, we are unable to speak
with absolute certainty on the precise nature o f the biological components o f either health
or even the much smaller category' o f disease. We have spent billions upon billions o f
dollars and hours, days, years, lifetimes beyond count on investigating and articulating the
biology o f human health and disease; i.e.. on collecting data. The financial, political,
social, ethical, philosophical, scientific, technological, and intellectual resources brought
to bear on the problems o f human health far exceed those which have been or can be
applied to the study o f any other organism, much less to a community o f them. In the
West, we have committed ourselves to the scientific model o f disease and medicine for
nearly 200 years and this course o f study has yielded wondrous insights into molecular
biology that have contributed to astounding technical successes in medicine. But as many
historians o f medicine point out the success is limited, and the great advancements in
scientific knowledge and in technology have not contributed substantially to increases in
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longevity (some estimates put it at five additional years), to the reduction o f pain and
suffering (cf. Bill M oyer's PBS special on Living with Dying, Death and Dying, and
Cassell's Doctoring for narrative accounts of how the medical com munity seems unable
to deal effectively with pain and suffering) or to an increase in the quality o f .ife (there
are studies that indicate that most increases in the quality o f life and decreases in the
incidence o f epidemics are attributable to changes in social, economic, and political
organizations rather than to advances in medical science) (M cKeown et al 1975: Bunker
et al. in Wilkinson 1993. 30-31; Mackenbach et al. 1990 in W ilkinson 1993. 3 1).23 Let
me be precise here: historians, sociologists and physicians are not saying that scientific
medicine has been o f no value whatsoever. It has changed the lives o f millions o f people,
often, though not always, for the better: it has produced therapies that can alleviate pain:
it has engineered procedures that prevent or at least minimize disability; and it has (not
always happily) postponed death. What they are saying, however, is that neither the depth
of knowledge acquired in molecular biology nor the advancements in medical technology
correlate directly to equal advancements in human health. Many scientific advancements
seem to create as many problems as solutions (Australian scientists in search o f a way to
control rat fertility through genetic manipulation inadvertently created a virus that totally

McKeown et al (1975) present evidence to the effect that modem medical science played only a minor
role in the dramatic decline o f death rates (from infectious diseases) since the last century if for no other
reason than that immunizations were not yet developed or widely used. However, just because "medical
science cannot explain most o f the decline in mortality from the infections is not o f course evidence that
medical science is ineffective. ... estimates o f the current contribution o f modem medical care to the growth
o f life expectancy in the developed world do not suggest that it can explain very much o f the continuing
increase in life expectancy’’ In fact, the “most generous recent estim ate...suggests that the whole modem
medical effort adds no more than about five years’ difference to modem life expectancy (Bunker et al. in
Wilkinson. 30-31). Wilkinson and others conclude that the social and economic determinants o f health and
mortality remain substantially more powerful (Mackenbach et al. 1990 in Wilkinson, 31).
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compromises the rats' immune systems; bypass surgery, one o f the crown jew els o f
modem medicine, appears to have a strong correlation to substantially decreased
cognitive functions in post-operative patients; chemotherapy is sometimes successful in
slowing or stopping the advance o f cancer and other diseases, but almost invariably the
quality' o f the person's life is radically reduced, etc.). Achieving health in the human body
(or even just treating "biophysical malfunctions” as Seldin and other medical bioscientists
would have us do) is not ju st a matter o f gathering more data or developing more
sophisticated technologies. Every time we push back the frontiers o f ignorance at the
molecular level, we add yet another level o f complexity at the macro or experienced level
of health or illness; in many ways. then, science and scientific knowledge adds to
uncertainty rather than reducing it. As the old adage cautions us. in an age o f everincreasing specialization, we know ever more about ever less until we eventually know
everything there is to know about nothing at all. At some point one has to be able to put
all the minutiae back together again and make a decision about what to do based on the
bigger picture (the person)— a picture which is always incomplete and always changing.

At this point, it is important to point out three additional things. First. Seldin leaves his
key concepts— pain, disability, death— undefined and unexamined. By way o f
clarification, he offers us the terms "biomedical derangement” (or "disturbance”), and”
biophysical m alfunction.” but they too are left unexamined and undefined. We are left,
possibly intentionally, with the impression that their meanings are clear, their objectivity

firmly established, and their acceptability as basic criteria o f (or as contributors to or
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inhibitors of) health unproblematic and uncontested. The impression is that these are
scientifically verifiable conditions, or at least objective conditions to which scientific
criteria and methods can be applied, that carry with them no hint o f normativity or
subjectivity that would force medical science to retreat from its objectivity. This seems to
me a huge lapse. Each term signifies a departure from some previous, presumably normal
condition that is defined as good, or at least as not-bad, since we seek to prevent,
postpone, and alleviate the deviations and to restore the body to its former conditions.
Generally, we would probably all agree that having no pain is better than having pain,
having an able-body is better than having a disability, being alive better than being dead,
being biophysically functional or undisturbed better than its opposite. But in what
precisely does "malfunction” consist? What is a "disturbance” and who gets to define it?
At what point is death actually more desirable than life at any cost? And what constitutes
"life” or "living”? What are the costs o f pain reduction (decreased cognitive function,
limited mobility, etc.)? What exactly is a "disability”? None o f these questions is
answerable by recourse to science. Thus, the scientific model o f disease conceals a wealth
of value judgements and is in fact premised upon non-scientific norms that will sooner or
later require examination because their meanings and desirability will be contested.
Second. Seldin and other biomedical scientists (like foresters and natural scientists)
proceed as if science itself were not a cultural phenomena. They are quick to distance
themselves from definitions o f health that carry too much cultural baggage, but seem
unaware that their conceptual framework itself, along with the tendency to value it above
all others, arises out o f this same cultural environm ent. And finally, it is clear that even if
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we assent (with reservations) to a strictly biological interpretation o f “biophysical
derangements.” (disease, disability, death, etc.) we are still left without an account of
human health, scientific or otherwise, and with no way to explain physical manifestations
of''psychosom atic'’ illnesses or diseases. And if we additionally assent to Seldin’s and
other's claim that medicine is a narrow scientific discipline that is ill-equipped to deal
with the larger issue o f health, then we will also have to search elsewhere for a conceptual
framework in which to understand health and another practice by which to achieve it. It
would appear that if our enquiry is into health, then we must look elsewhere than medical
science, perhaps to other social and cultural frameworks and activities in which both the
body and the person are embedded and from which they derive their identity.

The social economy o f health

Even as the demands o f a medicine based in natural sciences drives its practitioners
toward ever greater scientification and specialization, there is a concomitant counter
movement— both from within and without the medical field— to reconceptualize the
objective, the object, the discourse and the practice as cultural entities and enterprises that
accept both ambiguity and uncertainty as part o f the process, and broadens the sorts o f
knowledges brought to bear in the search for solutions to intractable health problems.
Even as some physicians and researchers attempt to constrain medicine and medical
practice to a narrow, biological interpretation o f health (one defined primarily as freedom
from disease, disability, pain, or death) and to make doctors into scientists, others are
advocating the extension o f the concept o f health and the inclusion o f alternative forms o f
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know ledge— some o f them derived from patient narratives— that, while messy and not
easily quantifiable, are nonetheless critical when treating people and not just organisms or
diseases. In a system that treats the person holistically and not just the illness or the body,
patients' ideas o f illness and health are considered on a par with physicians’ (Henderson
et al. 1997. 3). Medicine conceived in this way treats both the biophysical body and the
person: health is still about achieving and maintaining certain biophysical structures,
functions, and processes but the overriding goal is to maintain the person, and this goal
opens the door to all manner o f different interpretations o f health. This, o f course, begins
to sound more like the WHO definition o f health.

According to the World Health Organization, “health is a state o f complete physical,
mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence o f disease or infirmity." Other
contemporary definitions o f health include all o f these aspects in some form or another,
but sometimes with significant differences. For example, Dr. Eric Cassell, Clinical
Professor o f Public Health at Cornell University M edical College, suggests that new
definitions o f health have arisen that em phasize the “ability o f persons to reach social,
emotional, and economic goals despite illness, impairment, and functional limitations”
(Cassell 1997. 18). These reconceptualizations are, he says, based upon an “ecological
theory" o f health in which illness is seen as “arising from disturbances in the biological,
psychological, and social relationships o f individuals with themselves and others”
(Cassell 1997. 18-19). The WHO definition and C assell's formulation are not exactly the
same: in fact, they are quite different in at ieast one key aspect: Cassell’s formulation
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implies that illness, impairment, and functional limitations are not “unhealthy” p er se
unless they interfere with one's social, emotional, and economic goals, w hereas the WHO
definition considers health to be a m atter not only o f freedom from disease/infirmity, but
also a state o f complete mental, physical and social well-being.) Despite the radical
differences, the one feature they do share is that health is not solely a m atter o f
biophysicality. and in at least one case, a person may be deemed healthy despite the
presence o f “illness, impairment, o r functional limitations.” Clearly, we are well beyond
the boundaries o f what biomedical science can hope to achieve, and well beyond the
conception o f health as a condition o f the body. Thus, we either must retreat from the
broader definition o f health, or we m ust accept that science alone is inadequate to the task
of achieving health, and maybe even to the task o f “alleviating pain, preventing disability,
and postponing death.” Since this broader definition o f health takes the person rather than
the body as its focus, and since people tend to experience themselves as persons rather
than only as bodies, advocates o f the “medicine as a social science/health as a
psychosocial phenomenon” view suggest that it is more reasonable to accept the
limitations o f scientific medicine (som e o f which are inherent, others o f which are due to
social, economic, ethical, and political institutions) and make up for its deficiencies in
promoting health by including other knowledge frameworks within the health discourse.
This broader approach is also supported by the earlier observation that the reductionist
approach to diagnosing and treating many chronic conditions (the “single disease - single
risk factor" approach that has fueled much o f scientific medical advancem ent in the past
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(W ilkinson 1993. 2)) is yielding somewhat less spectacular results (even with the
breakthroughs in bio- or gene-technology) in treating chronic, life-long conditions.

In the nineteenth century, scientific medicine was seen as an antidote to social ills caused
by industrialization (Henderson et al 1997, ix; Porter 1999), but it w as seen as a. social
science not just a biophysical one (Virchow, in Henderson et al. 1997, ix). Today, as we
saw above, many prefer to think o f medicine as a bioscience. But sociologists, etc. argue
that because "biomedicine is produced, learned, and practiced” in a cultural context we
must learn to "understand health, illness, and medical practice as both product and
producer o f larger social and cultural domains” (Henderson et al 1997, 6, 7). As we shall
see. the object or focus o f biomedicine (the person and even the body) is also "produced,
learned, and practiced” in a network o f cultural and biophysical interrelations. There are
several important points here. First, biology, like ecology or any other logos that is
produced in the pursuit o f scientia is a conceptual framework— a product o f the human
mind— used to make sense o f the sensory data that bombard us. Second, categories o f
illness, like those o f health, are also thought categories that change over time and space
(this is not to say that health and illness are only figments o f the mind, but that the
categories we use to designate and know o f them are o f the mind) (Henderson et al. 1997,
8). And third, health is an ineluctably complex and normative concept that brings into
play a variety o f critical frameworks -m an y o f which are non-scientific and whose
"information" is difficult, if not impossible to quantify and/or reconcile with modem
medical theory and practice. For medical sociologists, as well as for many physicians and
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patients, illness and health occur in particular people, not ju st bodies, people that live in
particular times and places that demand different sorts o f structures, functions, and
interactions o f the persons that live within them. With this way o f thinking, there is no
such thing as an objective disease or an objective health; one cannot think o f health or
disease in the abstract since in all cases they must be instantiated in the flesh o f a living
being in order to be manifest. Definitions o f health that arise out o f this new way o f
thinking emphasize “the ability o f persons to reach social, emotional, and economic goals
despite illness, impairment, and functional limitations” (Cassell 1997. 18). Health, then,
is not an "ideal state o f well-being, achieved through the complete elimination o f disease,
but ... a modus vivendi enabling imperfect men to achieve a rewarding and not too
painful existence while they cope with an imperfect world. In this light, health cannot be
defined in the absolute, because different persons expect such different things from life
(Dubos 1968. 88).24 In other words, health is understood as "ecological” or even
"ecosystemic" involving as it does an intricate and inextricable interaction between body,
mind, and environment, between the symbolic and the biophysical. Thus, for these people
medicine is not an objective practice with an objectively determined objective and a value
neutral, "formulaic” means o f achieving that objective, but a situated discourse and a
practice embedded within a complex biological and symbolic (cultural) matrix that
practices upon humans beings who are themselves em bedded within biological and
cultural matrices o f their own. Understanding disease, like understanding health, becomes
an interdisciplinary endeavor in which there is room for the specialist with highly esoteric

14 Dr. Donald Seldin (in Henderson et al 1997) rejects this broad idea o f health because it tends to equate
health with happiness.
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knowledge (be it o f philosophy, ethics, politics, psychology, or science), the generalist
who is better able to see the many parts that contribute to the whole, and the Iay-person
who brings to the table him- or herself and the unique knowledge o f w hat it is to be ill or
well. Achieving a healthy life— whatever that turns out to be— requires all forms o f
knowledge.

One significant reason for the recent shift in understandings o f health and the
disillusionment with modem medicine is the increasing prevalence o f chronic, life-long
"diseases" or "biological derangements” that cannot be cured, and whose symptoms can
only be "managed." In most instances, the biomedical approach works extraordinarily
well for acute cases o f injury or illness. But these cases make up only a fraction o f the
population who seeks medical attention or attempts self-care for some condition. A
person who experiences a chronic “derangement” is not dying o f a disease— at least not
any more than the rest o f us are dying o f anything— but is instead living with it and
through it. For this person, a state o f health is inextricably linked to the presence o f a
biological derangement; they coexist. This coexistence creates considerable difficulties
for the medical practitioner trained to treat the disease and not the person (Cassell 1997.
18). This one fact changes everything. The challenge is to develop conceptual
frameworks or knowledge systems that enable patients— as people— to come to terms
with their particular version o f health within their cultural context, and that enable the
physician and the patient together to develop a therapy or care regime that mitigates as
many undesirable symptoms (from the patient’s perspective) as possible without
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com prom ising the identity o f the person the patient believes him or herself to be. In this
instance, we are no longer treating the disease, but the person, a person who wishes to
retain some o f those basic features that they consider integral to their identity. If the
physician is no longer treating a disease, but looking to help a person achieve health (as
defined for example by the WHO) then a different approach may be needed.

In all cases, but particularly with respect to chronic health problems, the structural and
cultural attributes o f a society profoundly affect the practice o f medicine and perceptions
o f health and illness (Shuval 1992. 171). In a book compiled for use in a course taught to
first year medical students at the University o f North Carolina School o f Medicine, the
editors/authors (professors and practitioners from a wide range o f disciplines and
professions) are intent upon introducing future doctors to the cultural, ethical, linguistic,
philosophical, political, and economic roots o f the science o f medicine and our ideas of
health. The authors contend that
modem science presumes the pursuit o f knowledge can and should be conducted
with a minimal bias. Yet medical knowledge and practice, like all knowledge and
practice, are shaped by political, cultural, and economic forces, within which
doctors' ideas about disease— in fact, their very definitions o f disease— depend on
the role science plays in particular cultures, as w:ell as on the culture o f science. ...
[D iseases are not immutable; they are shaped by person, time, and place, and are
identified and endowed with significance only within social and cultural contexts
(Henderson et al. 1997, 3-4).
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Thus. Henderson et al.. see several ways in which the practice o f medicine is dictated and
constrained by the historical, social context in which the patient lives and the physician
practices. It is their belief (shared by many others) that medicine must become aware of
its own situatedness if it is to successfully treat not only embodied diseases, but situated
persons. To that end. the book is filled with case studies— employing a variety o f
theoretical and methodological techniques— , patient and physician narratives, and even
poetry all o f which demonstrate the ways in which lived health has transgressed the
bounds o f the narrow biophysical model that has dominated modem medicine for more
than a century.

I will look first at their contention that medical knowledge, even scientific medical
knowledge, is not unbiased or objective. In our society, we have learned to value
"objectivity" and thus tend to seek out "unbiased'’ knowledge; it is to science and
scientists that we attribute objectivity and neutrality (see Cassell’s discussion o f this on
pp. 43-53 for an elaboration). (I discuss some o f the critiques o f this notion o f objectivity
in science in the section "On Doing Science in the Shadow o f CP”). For our purposes, it
is more important to note that neither physicians nor patients experience themselves or
their health or diseases objectively and without bias. The medical community, and the
physicians and health care workers who people that community, has long struggled with
the imposed requirement o f distance and neutrality that they are told should govern the
patient-doctor relationship. The physician is thought to be more effective if he or she
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avoids personal entanglement with the patient as a person and concerns him or herself
only with the biophysical phenomena (Cassell 1997, 45-46). (This same logic is the
partial impetus behind the FS’ efforts to avoid “ranger capture” by regularly moving their
field personnel from forest to forest. It also has the effect o f maintaining loyalty to the
center— Washington. D.C.).) Not only is such “objectivity” now consider impossible, but
it is increasingly clear that it may not be desirable, and may even hinder the quality o f
care that a physician can deliver and may hinder patient recovery. There are a variety o f
diagnostic "tools” that become available to the physician if he or she permits him or
herself to acknowledge his or her own humanity, and to empathize— that is. to use his or
her own embodied humanity as a diagnostic tool (Cassell 1997, 45). For better or worse,
both physician and patient are situated beings. Thus, because the science o f medicine, the
scientists (physicians), and the objects (patients) are integrally informed by the political
and cultural milieu in which they occur, the diseases themselves will also be culturally
determined to some degree. In other words, not only is there a sociological com ponent to
the biological category o f disease, but disease itself as disease is a category o f thought
that does not exist outside o f the cultural system that invests it with meaning and
significance. To diagnose a condition o f “the real” (as in the body) as a disease or a
derangement one must have a framework o f thought that enables one to distinguish
between different conditions, to identify one such condition as a disease, disability,
derangement, or deviation and then one must have a normative framework that enables
one to ascribe to this newly identified condition a value or meaning. It is the meaning and
significance thus attributed to this condition that then determines the sorts o f actions that
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we might take either to eliminate it, mitigate its effects, ignore it, or celebrate it. What we
find when we view health and disease in this way is that '“the bodies we expect— and
hope— to have." like the people that we hope to be, the things we hope to do, "are
imagined within cultural parameters” that have a profound impact on what we define as
disease or deviation and what w'e expect medicine and health care providers to do
(Henderson et al. 1997, 9).

In yet another example o f the cultural nature o f disease and health, the authors present
numerous case studies, some conducted over the course o f two decades, which detail the
ways in which peoples’ lived histories— their material circumstances— determine not
only the nature and course o f their illness, but also determine the sorts o f knowledges that
they will bring to bear in coming to terms with that illness and the sorts o f therapies that
they will deem acceptable. People who become sick produce "narratives o f illness,"
"pathographies” (Ann Hunsaker Hawkins) that tell the story "about how and why they got
sick, how and why they think they will get better or not, and what they feel when in pain
or hope for in recovery'” (Henderson et al. 1997, 61). Generally, these narrative accounts
bear no resemblance to the accounts produced by doctors or by medical science. And in
many instances, researchers find that the narratives indicate a "resistance to medical
authority, [based on] an assertion o f the validity o f local knowledge and experience” that
stands over and against the medical knowledge o f the professional care giver (Henderson
et al. 1997. 12; Balshem in Henderson, 38-9). It is not that the patient does not understand
the medical terminology, it is that the patient does not believe or accept the scientific
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explanation o f disease especially if it runs counter to their experience o f the illness
(Balshem. 38). Patients may produce “indigenous etiologies” o f an illness often
accompanied and supported by “ indigenous models o f health and disease” (Mathews,
Lannin. and Mitchell in Henderson, 59, 44). (Forests, o f course, cannot produce
"indigenous etiologies” or “indigenous narratives o f health.”) Treating these patients, if at
all possible, can happen only when the physician learns to listen to and understand the
patients' account o f his or her condition, how that account will affect the person’s
acceptance or rejection o f the biomedical model o f their disease, and how that condition
affects his or her life and hopes for a future.

For example, a study begun in 1988 by the Department o f Surgery at the East Carolina
University School o f Medicine to determine the reasons w'hy black women tended to seek
medical help only in the advanced stages o f breast cancer, is illustrative o f this point.
Researchers found that the conceptual frameworks (stories) erected and employed by the
women did not include the possibility o f recourse to modem medicine either for
explanatory purposes or treatment options. The professional physician was the last resort.
Their stories were acts o f verbalization that functioned to organize the world and make
sense o f the new experience o f illness, as well as to incorporate this illness or condition
into their everyday lives. In other words, they were intent upon producing accounts o f
their condition that normalized it. These women are not concerned with what science tells
them about the pathology o f the cancer because such an account is irrelevant to their lived
experience and often to the decisions they will make about treatment.
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The act o f verbalization implies an attempt not only to conceptualize the
experience, but also to define it so that the real work o f understanding can begin.
... The narratives ... draw on multiple sources o f knowledge in order to come to
terms with a diagnosis o f advanced breast cancer— a biom edically-defm ed disease
entity that they [the narrators] often refuse to acknowledge or accept. The
narratives represent a debate over whose terms will be used to label and describe a
disease”(Matthews, Lannin, and Mitchell in Henderson et al., 44).

These women are not wrong (especially given the cost o f health care), any more than they
are stupid. This is how they choose to organize their world, to explain what is happening
to them, and to cope with impending impairment, disability, and/or death.

Similar narratives are produced by people who “su ffer’ from what in the past we called
"disabilities" or "retardation.” W hat appears today to be an argument over semantics
(differently-abled, impaired, disabled, challenged, special, etc.) is actually an attempt to
rethink what it might mean to be "norm al" or "healthy.” It could be that it is only within
the dominant social, economic, ethical, and political arrangements— postulated as
"normal"— that these peoples’ differences become disabilities, impairments, or
derangements. One could imagine other arrangements that might produce entirely
different types o f "disabilities" or illnesses. Take for example "deaf culture’s” resistance
to cochlear implants, technological devices that would enable the d eaf to hear the spoken
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word. In a PBS News Hour report, deaf students and professors at a university for the deaf
overwhelm ingly rejected the implants, citing them as threats not only to their culture, but
to their very identity. They do not experience themselves as disabled, or even as different,
but simply as they are, and they resent the implication that they need to be “fixed” in
order to better fit the norms established by a speaking society (PBS, The News Hour,
February' 19.2001).

It is not that people with various conditions are denying that they are different, and in
many cases people even state outright that they have a disability or a disease or some sort
of physical or mental limitation: that is. there is a real condition. But exactly what it is.
what causes it. what it means to have it, the value we assign to it, and the sorts o f things
we will do with and/or about it are all culturally negotiated.

Echoing the conclusions o f other researchers. Henderson et al. also note that “despite the
power o f the biomedical model o f disease and the increasing specificity o f molecular and
genetic knowledge, social factors have always influenced the occurrence and course o f
most diseases" (Henderson et al. 1997. 4). In this assertion they are supported by a not
inconsiderable body o f literature that investigates the correlation between advances in
biomedicine and advances in health. It is not a one-to-one correspondence (McKeown
1976. W ilkinson 1996, Porter 1999, Peterson 1997, Cassell 1997). Increases in
knowledge do not necessarily translate into increases in health. The lack o f correlation
between bioscientific advances and health lead medical historians, sociologists,
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anthropologists, and even doctors themselves to investigate other causal factors, to
propose other definitions o f health, and to seek out alternative treatments or therapies that
may treat something other than the biophysical organism. Generally, they have found that
"people's social and economically structured life processes remain the most powerful
influences on health in the modem world” (W ilkinson 1996,13). This insight, they
contend, “turns the exploration o f determinants o f health into a social science”
(W ilkinson 1996, 13). Medical science still plays an important role in so far as it can
address the biological pathways involved in the production o f disease and develop
appropriate treatments that attack those pathways. But many who favor the "psychosocial
pathway" understanding o f health claim that further advances in understandings o f health
will only be made as a result o f research into the social and economic organizations and
institutions that produce perceptions o f health, o f self, and the body, as well as producing
the material conditions thereof (W ilkinson, 13-14). In keeping with this
reconceptualization o f health, medical sociologists tend to focus "less on individuals'
biological state, behavior, and attitudes [and more] on issues o f social organization,
cultural assumptions, and political processes” in the belief that major gains to health are
more likely to occur because o f changes in social and political processes and institutions
than from advances in biotechnology and scientific medicine (Shuval 1992, 1).

Then too. the social and economic conditions o f people constrain the availability o f
treatment options and determine the likelihood that a person might choose to access them
(Henderson et al., 4). Biomedical technology has produced a wide array o f possible
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"cures" or therapies, some o f which are deemed socially unacceptable or at the very least
problematic (genetic engineering, cloning, the use o f tissue and cells from aborted
fetuses, the use o f animal organs for human transplants, the use o f artificial organs to
replace "defective'’ organic ones, etc.). Economics plays a critical role here as well: if the
cost o f the treatment or procedure is prohibitively high, it isn’t used, no matter how good
it is. or at least not by all o f those who may need it. Additionally, physicians, H M O ’s.
patient's, and hospital administrators question the therapeutic value o f many high-cost
medical interventions. Critics o f escalating costs associated with high-tech treatments and
interventions note that even though "spending on health care in the U.S. has long
outstripped that o f other industrialized nations. ... that spending has not resuited in
healthier populations" as measured by things like life expectancy, infant mortality, etc.
(Henderson et al.. 4: Wilkinson 1996). In fact, physicians themselves consider many o f
the procedures and tests to be o f limited or even dubious medical value, since we can do
nothing with the information learned from them (Cassell. Good 1995. pers com. C.
Carlson. M .D.).:5 In many instances, expensive diagnostic and monitoring equipment
does not significantly alter the course o f the disease, the patients’ life, or the physicians*
treatment. It simply imparts knowledge about a biophysical condition that may or may not
have any effect whatsoever on a person’s health.

The tests are nonetheless prescribed for several reasons, among them the “cover your ass” culture
fostered by a litigious public and to pay the hefty cost o f the machines.
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So what does all this mean and where are we? We have learned several things about the
"medicine as a social science/health as a cultural, psychological, biophysical phenomena'’
model. Under this model, science itself is a culturally determined (or at least informed)
enterprise; health and disease are biophysical conditions and cultural (or symbolic)
categories o f thought (that is, health and disease appear to be complex phenomena that
cannot be reduced to either culture or nature); and, the meaning and values o f various
health conditions are culturally negotiated. Additionally, the material circumstances—
economic, social, political, technological, etc.— have profound impacts on the presence,
course, quality, intensity, frequency, etc. o f health and/or diseases. Then too, insofar as
health or disease is a condition o f a particular person (not just a body)— one with a history
and with expectations of a future, a person who also has intimate knowledge o f what it
means to live as this well or ill person— the criteria by which we identify health and/or
disease/impairment/ derangement, etc. will have to be modified to include accounts other
than those proposed by medical science and disinterested physicians. And finally, we
must consider the value and meaning o f the sorts o f explanatory, diagnostic, and
therapeutic options proffered by medical science, and compare them with options made
available to people through other knowledge systems and health-care practices (Chinese
herbal medicine, homeopathy, Ayurvedic medicine, chiropractic, naturopathy,
aromatherapy, visualization, acupuncture and acupressure, etc.). Bioscience is illequipped to deal with any o f the non-biophysical aspects o f health, even if we limit
ourselves to the narrow definition o f health as a biophysical phenom ena for the simple
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reason that the biophysical state is intimately affected by and in turn affects the cultural
and symbolic networks within which a person constructs his or her body and identity.

The critical point o f departure in the “medicine as social science'’ paradigm then seems to
hinge on the reconceptualization o f the object or focus o f medicine. Essentially, the
broader understandings o f health put forth by the social science/psychosocial model
requires that we conceive o f the healthy person as a complex whole, not just as a healthy
body. We began with an examination o f an expanded idea o f health, and end by
confronting the question o f identity. W hat I mean is this: the object or focus o f modem
m edicine's gaze has been the body (or more properly, the disease in the body); the social
science view o f health shifts that focus from the body as object to the person as a
participating subject in an ongoing construction or experience o f health (Cassell 1997,
Peterson 1997. Wright 1982, Henderson et al. 1997. Foucault). This changes the level o f
analysis which has the effect o f producing “different pictures o f the determinants o f
health") W ilkinson 1996, 18; also cf. Foucault). Health so defined, encompasses the
entirety o f one's being and existence, both through time and across space— physical as
well as meta-phvsical. This shift necessitates, as one physician admits, a shift in the
criteria o f health and illness:

Patients are the ones who tell us that doctors do not com municate well, that they
do not really listen, that they seem insensitive to personal needs and individual
differences, that they often neglect the person in their zeal to pursue diagnostic
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and treatment procedures. ... These complaints, and others, bespeak the public's
aw areness o f the grave deficiencies in the medicai establishm ent’s knowledge o f
and ability to handle rationally the human experience o f being ill.
A primary contributor to this gap between the medical profession and the public it
is meant to serve is the fundamental difference between the patient’s criteria for
health and well-being and those of the physician, a difference which exists even
though culturally and intellectually both patient and physician share a cultural
inheritance which includes the biomedical model o f disease. For the patient, the
ultimate criteria are psychosocial, even when the complaint is physical. Patient's
criteria have to do with how one feels, how one functions, how one relates with
others: with the ability to love, to work, to struggle, to seek options and make
choices. The physician, in contrast, while ostensibly attentive to such concerns,
nonetheless is wont to consider such criteria as "merely subjective.” For the
physician, the real criteria for status and outcome o f health and disease are
physical measures, for whose determination increasingly elegant and sensitive
instruments are available (Engel 1979, 261).

In other words, "the interests o f patients can be very different from physicians'
judgements o f what is best for patients” (Henderson et al.,4). Essentially, then, what
patients are requiring o f doctors and medicine, is that they recognize that health and
illness are ineluctably subjective, social experiences and that the patient's criteria o f
health, their experiences thereof, their expectations for a future, in short, their identity,
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must som ehow be given due weight in the decision-making process— not as "ideas” or
“opinions” or "feelings” but as knowledge.

The issue o f illness or impairment and it’s relationship to identity has always been
problematic. Recall the euphemism for being ill: "I am not quite m yself today.” Or
Virginia W o o lf s provocative metaphor in which the experience o f being ill is likened to
being in an "undiscovered country.” The body, with which one’s identity is inextricably,
intimately bound (but not limited), is suddenly foreign, unfamiliar, strange (Henderson et
a L 61 ).One becomes a stranger to oneself when one is ill. Recall too, an even more
provocative label: the person who is sick is an invalid. Illness makes one invalid, as in not
valid, not sound. One cannot escape the connotative meanings: without force, strength, or
power, indefensible, weak, deficient, void (OED 1475, 76). Ideas o f health are also
intimately tied to ideas o f integrity; illness entails disintegration and the sense o f losing
control o f one's self can be^profoundly disturbing (Cassell, in Henderson et al.. 15). What
are we to make o f the meanings o f these terms when applied to humans? Each conveys a
sense o f deviation from some predetermined norm that is somehow coincident with one's
identity: that norm is assigned a higher value (as "good” or "better” or more “self-like”)
than the deviant state. While we might readily assent to the idea o f acute illness or injury
as a threat to or negation o f our identity (defined as healthy by default), this experience or
understanding o f illness as impending disintegration, as altered or negated identity
becomes problematic when we begin to look at long term— as in life long—conditions
that are defined by mainstream medicine as "deranged.” How can we justify (without
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becoming Nazis) calling invalid or unsound, deficient or void, the person whose whole
self—as a biophysical and a symbolic being— is this “not-healthy” condition? When
identity is intimately linked to health and health is defined by reference to a biophysical
or cultural norm, a departure from full health can signal a departure from identity and
from self.

Importantly, then, it is not only physicians or the medical establishment which is being
asked to come to (new) terms with health, but society and individuals as well. “From a
social perspective, illness entails 'deviance'— that is, discrepancies in behavior and
appearance from what is expected or 'norm al’ (Henderson et al.. 76). We are surrounded
by images o f what we ought to be. o f what our bodies and thoughts and behaviors ought
to look like, be or do: we construct ourselves and our ideas o f self and health using the
images supplied, we measure our health against the objective measures established for us
by society and by the medical community, as well as by those internal measures that we
establish for ourselves: who and what we hope to be now and in the future. Failure to
achieve the norm can sometimes be as destructive to the person as the disease or
derangement itself.

It is impossible to offer a pat and simple “definition” o f a person or o f an identity: what is
clear though is that being a person, having an identity is more than just having a body,
and that one's body is more than ju st an accident, a biophysical organism in which we
schlep around the planet, a housing unit for a soul or a mind. We have a body, but we also
have ideas o f that body: in the same way, we have an identity and we have ideas o f that
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identity-. The body and the identity (in large part inseparable— but not identical), like our
ideas o f each are the result o f a complex interaction between multiple discourses and
multiple biophysicalities. Control o f the terms o f the discourses on health (like medicine),
that shape and construct both body and identity are critical; patient narratives are often
ways o f resisting "colonization” o f the (sick) body by physicians and the medical
institution. It is an attempt to maintain some sort o f identity apart from that o f being a
"patient in a [sick] body,”especiaIIy when the disease or impairment is a life-long
condition (Arthur Frank, in Henderson et al., 62).

Concluding remarks
There is an inherent tension between the conceptual models that medical science
constructs to frame issues o f health and those that we as persons develop based upon
lived experiences thereof. The differences at the conceptual level (informed in part by
those at the level o f experience) lead to significant differences at the practical level and
are based upon different foci (the biophysical body vs. the biophysical and cultural
person). On the one hand, medicine interpreted as a science, seeks to closely limit the
definition o f health and disease to bodily phenomena because physicians recognize
immediately that medical science is ill-equipped to deal with the more amorphous,
ambiguous cultural aspects o f "well-being” (which looks suspiciously like "happiness”)
that are explicitly included in "ecological” theories o f health. These ecological theories o f
health are them selves founded upon ecological theories o f persons— i.e., persons as
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"ecosystem s" that are comprised not only o f biotic and abiotic elements but also o f
symbolic elements). The narrower the definition o f health, and the narrower the focus or
object o f health, the fewer the variables that go into “causing" any one particular
condition, and the greater the illusion o f physician certainty. Within its narrow bounds
m odem medicine has been undeniably successful: it has done remarkable things for the
human body. On the other hand, even as the successes o f m odem medicine mount, there
is a concom itant sense that advances in human health are not keeping pace; in other
words, the science o f medicine is advancing (along with the technologies), but health—
even biophysical health— is not. Bodies are (arguably) kept in better condition (often this
means treating or masking symptoms o f chronic diseases that cannot be cured) and life is
prolonged, but we would be disinclined, on the larger view o f health, to say that this
necessarily translates into healthier persons.

This sense that the biomedical model is somehow missing the boat is shared by the
patient population as well as by a growing number o f physicians: neither patients nor
doctors are able to abstract themselves from the particularity o f their "actually existing"
selves or to reduce themselves to parts and pieces that can be dealt with in isolation
(Cassell. Engel. Henderson). The bottom line is that the bodies we have and hope to have
are shaped by nature as well as by our culture; that the criteria by which we judge health
or disease are products o f culture; that the conceptual frameworks o f the sciences we
bring to bear in investigating disease and health are culturally determined; that the
incidence, frequency, and intensity o f illnesses (spread across a population) are the results
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o f social, economic, political, ethical, etc. arrangements; that because we live in our
bodies and because these bodies constrain (or conversely enable) our experience o f life as
actually living beings, our identity is deeply implicated in our ideas o f health or illness;
that because we identify ourselves with our bodies as well as with our and our culture's
ideas about them, health is a highly complex, qualitative, contingent, variable
biophysical-psychosocial experience that we make sense o f through symbolic or linguistic
frameworks. The limitation o f health to considerations o f “biophysical derangment" fits
well with the model o f medicine as a science. It does not however, fit well with the
human experience o f health or o f self or with a policy o f improving health generally. The
push to redefine health as a state o f existence that happens sometimes in the midst o f a
whole host o f "derangem ents” is rooted in an effort to assert the primacy o f the person as
a whole and not just a body. If one accepts the "ecosystemic” non-reductive version of
person then one must also accept the ecological version o f health. In other words, one
must retreat from an exclusive focus on the biomedical model o f health which then
necessitates a retreat from the exclusive use o f scientific methodology. Achieving or
negotiating the health o f persons, not just bodies, requires the inclusion o f other
discursive practices through which we make sense of and construct our social, political,
moral, economic, and religious selves.
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Chapter Five
Through the (Medical) Looking Glass

So w hat does all this have to do with forest health and with forestry (or ecosystem
management) in general? In this section, I “reread” forest health through the refocused
lens o f medical discourse. As with the management o f nature (or ecosystems), the
management o f the person (or human body) is hotly contested and has generated
countless counter-narratives and conceptual frameworks that privilege different types o f
knowledge and ways o f knowing. Again, the comparison is not meant to indicate some
essential connection based upon similarities between nature and body, but only to suggest
that the discursive traditions or conceptual frameworks designed to deal with each share
certain values as well as institutional, ontological, and epistemological commitments.
With this qualification in mind, critiques o f the modem medical discourse on health like
the discourse itself, may offer new insights into forestry praxes, some o f which may not
yet be readily apparent in the burgeoning field o f meta-forestry literature.

My enquiry into the discourse on health in the forestry and medical fields produced
unexpected complications— contradictions even— and took me in surprising directions.
The contradictions arise at different levels, the most striking being between ontology
(what is) and epistemology (how we know it). The problem o f language, and meaning, its
slipperiness and ambiguity, adds yet another layer o f complication to the entire enterprise;
the gap between sign and referent, signifier and signified, the symbolic and
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the real, mind and matter. And therein lies the real problem for both medicine and
forestry: in both cases we are trying to find the words, the concepts, that make sense (so
to sp eak ...) o f the experiences we have of/in the real so that we can intervene effectively
in whatever it is that is going on out there (or in the case o f the body, “ in there.”) What
makes both forestry and medicine so interesting and so incredibly com plex is that their
object ( forest or person) and their objective (health) straddle the divide between the real
and the symbolic: they partake o f both worlds simultaneously. W hat w e say about each is
absolutely critical because our words determine what we will do in or with each.

So what have we said about each? Simply put, forest managers wish to produce healthy
forests or ecosystems. They wish to use science as the predominant conceptual framework
for knowing both the object (forests) and the objective (forest health). Similarly,
physicians wish to produce healthy bodies, and science is the preferred conceptual
framework through which the object and the objective are identified and known.
However, both forestry and medicine are confronting challenges on multiple fronts:
challenges posed by new broader understandings o f their objects— ecosystems, rather
than just “cutting units.” trees, or particular wildlife species, persons, rather than ju st
bodies, organs, or tissues; challenges posed by the ineluctably normative, and thus
perhaps ultimately non-scientific, character o f “health;” challenges posed by com peting
theories o f knowledge (theories that include critiques o f science) and o f language that
have profoundly impacted conceptions o f self and other; and finally, challenges posed by
the dispersion o f knowledge throughout society via a variety o f technologies and media.
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The focus o f both forest management and medicine shifts from a well-delim ited, strictly
biophysical (albeit ideal and abstract) entity that dutifully follows the “ laws o f nature,” to
an ambiguous, unbounded, ’‘cybernetic organism” that exists (or is constituted) at the
always shifting nexus o f countless biophysical and symbolic networks. As we have seen,
there are several provocative complications that arise from this “ecosystem ic”
understanding o f self and forests, the first o f which is that a broadening o f the identity o f
the object or focus o f the practice necessitates a more ecological understanding o f health.
But health itself also appears to require the explicit establishment and articulation o f
norms, or prescriptions. And since, especially in the case o f forest ecosystems, absolutely
no structural, functional, or relational limitations are identified (that is, an ecosystem has
no identity from which it might be perceived to “deviate”), then the definition o f a healthy
forest becomes an almost exclusively symbolic enterprise that is then mapped back out on
the real and "tested.” Peoples' needs and desires are no longer adjuncts, qualifiers, or
secondary to some primary or a priori objective “health;” instead, these human desires articulated in terms like capability, productivity, renewal, robustness, resiliency— are the
essence o f forest health. These terms are prescriptive not descriptive. Thought o f in this
way. the definition o f forest health is looking more like those conceived under the “ social
science" version o f human health....and we have seen that if one accepts these
"ecological” definitions o f health as more in keeping with our experience thereof, then
one must also accede to the limitations o f the scientific methodology and approach and
accept as necessary the admission o f other knowledge frameworks. The exclusive reliance
on science (be it o f the social or the natural version) is also limited by the
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reconceptualization o f the object itself: scientific methodology does not deal well with
large complex wholes, nor with ambiguity at the level o f language or with the fuzziness
o f the “out there."’

The object
We begin with a reexamination o f the object or focus o f forest management in light o f a
similar refocusing which occurred in medicine. The USFS made a deliberate choice to
reconceptualize the unit o f concern to an ecosystem; the appearances and the failure to
achieve certain management goals, among other things, seem to warrant the change. Our
focus is now on "a unit comprising interacting organisms considered together with their
environment" (USDA FS/FEMAT 1993, IX-10); “all the organisms in a given place
interacting with their nonliving environm ent” (USDA FS 1994. Vol: II, 369); or. “an
arrangement o f living and non-living things and the forces that move among them"’
(USDA FS 2000. www.fs.fed.us/land/emterms. html). Clearly, at the level o f ontology,
we are given carte blanche, so to speak, in conceptualizing ecosystems; and herein lies the
problem. Basically, we have a unit o f concern that includes everything: all processes, all
structures, all things, all happenings or events. All is ecosystemic, even, we might venture
to speculate, the non-systemic, the chaotic and unpredictable, the pathogenic and
pathological, the much maligned disturbance and diseased.... As noted earlier, it is o f
course, hard to establish an identity if there is nothing with which something is nonidentical; there is no outside, no other, no difference, no defer-ence (as in delayed in time)
from which to get a perspective on the thing itself. And if there is no identity, there is no
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“normal state" from which something might deviate, no predetermined course from
which it might be deterred, no disturbance that is not essential to the system. In other
words, we would not be able to say o f an ecosystem that it is “not itself.”

But there are other potential interpretations that come along with this broad idea o f the
object. Land managers have candidly admitted that ecosystems include humans and
human artifacts— things like cities, farms, ranches, etc. But if ecosystems include humans
and human artifacts, we might venture to speculate that they will also include human
systems o f knowledge; cultural systems; social, economic, and political institutions and
systems; even symbolic and linguistic systems. This o f course complicates things
tremendously. Following this line o f thinking, everything becomes ecosystemic and we
run the risk o f the “ecologization" o f everyday life and thought. One could offer as
evidence o f this phenomenon the dispersion o f ecology throughout every facet o f Western
culture. The prefix “eco-" is affixed to every conceivable root, and the term “ecology"
seems sufficiently ambiguous that it can be conjoined to pretty much any sort o f endeavor
or discipline (see Ecology list on next page). Not only has the Forest Service lost control
o f the ecosystem signifier (or conversely, I suppose, one could say that it has actually
sought to gain control o f the world by virtue o f having left the ecosystem term undefined)
but it has lost control o f the discourse (and perhaps the practice?) o f ecology.
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Ecology list

deep ecology

ecological self

radical ecology

ecological consciousness

social ecology

ecological humanism

political ecology

ecological feminism

human ecology

ecological economics

landscape ecology

eco(logical) municipality

industrial ecology

ecological science

transpersonal ecology

ecological sensibility

evolutionary ecology

ecological literacy

natural ecology

ecological history

cultural ecology

ecochallenge

feminist ecology

ecosocialism

ecosystem ecology

ecology

population ecology

ecopolitics

community ecology

ecotopia

forest ecology

ecothon

plant ecology

ecotourism

plant ecophysiology

ecoterrorism

avian ecology

ecofeminism

(and all those other “ecological

ecophilosophy

sciences....)

ecocosm
ecofascism
ecocentrism

ecological physics

ecosophy

environmental ecology

ecosystem

ecology o f hope

ecotage

ecology o f mind

ecovillage

ecology o f spirit

ecopsychology

liberation ecologies

econom ics

ecological geology

ecocide

ecological chemistry

ecofreak

centralized ecological planning
global ecological zoning
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The ecologization o f everyday life takes the Forest Service well beyond the forest and
foresters well beyond the realm o f their present expertise. This notion sounds somewhat
farfetched but physicians and other individuals involved in the medical field have noted,
not always positively, what they call the increasing medicalization o f every day life
(Seldin. Cassell. Wright. Ben-Sira, etc.). By this they mean that there is a growing
tendency to interpret a host o f widely varied biophysical and psychosocial conditions as
medical conditions with medical solutions. If you doubt the veracity o f this
characterization, spend an evening cruising channels for commercials; you will be
astounded by the number o f advertisements for drugs that treat everything from shyness
and obesity to impotence and unhappiness. You are. o f course, advised to "Ask your
d o cto r..." But it goes beyond even this; the dispersion o f the medical discourse and
medical terminology throughout popular culture, via books, journals, popular magazines.
TV. the internet (index medicus. webmd. etc.), enables and encourages people to frame
perceived problems or conditions in medical terminology and to seek solutions w ithin the
medical field. This trend is supported in part by the tendency to attribute all facets o f
humanity to the gene and the genetic code, but also by the extension o f the meaning o f
health to all aspects o f being, as is done with the WHO definition o f health. The trend
toward medicalization is thus supported by two complementary, if contradictory moves:
the reduction o f all aspects o f human life to the body (in the ultimate form o f the gene, the
code) and the simultaneous extension o f the body (again in the form o f the gene) to all
aspects of life or personhood. Everything about the person is a matter for medicine. This.
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as Seldin sees it. is hugely problematic and is precisely why he argues against the broader
understanding o f health. But I am getting ahead o f myself.

There is one other point with respect to identity that I wish to investigate. In issues of
human health, the physician has the advantage (or some might call it a disadvantage) o f
being able to interrogate the referent and have it answer in a language the physician
understands. (We are speaking here not o f a strict interrogation o f the body, which can
answer only in the words we supply, and always with tremendous ambiguity, but o f the
interrogation o f the person in the body who can report experiences and feelings to which
the physician can relate because he or she is also embodied.) With respect to humans, we
can frame questions o f health in terms of identity and departures there from because a
person can tell the physician who they are. or who they believe themselves to be. or who
they wish to be. This o f course, does not always mean that there are clear solutions— in
fact, more often than not the patient's understandings o f his or her identity and the
patient's understanding o f the impacts o f various conditions upon that identity tend to
make health care immeasurably complex— but at least the physician as a human being
him or herself has some frame o f reference by which to evaluate the meanings o f the
signs. Foresters interrogating forests or ecosystems have no such luxury— unless we
invent or assign to the fo rest an identity o f our own making, or recognize a different mode
of responding or knowing. W hat we know o f the object o f concern is inferred; we have
experiences and sensations the meanings o f which we then interpret based upon a value
scale that we ourselves invent w ith reference to ourselves.
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Yei another possible outcome o f the ecologization o f everyday life, one that adds a whole
new dimension, we could conceive o f a situation in which foresters are forced into the
realm o f medicine, doctors into ecology, and both into society because there are people
whose identities are intimately informed by— even inextricably intertwined with— forests
or ecosystems. Not. actually, a very farfetched notion if one recalls that a person is a
physical, social, and psychological being and that a forest (or ecosystem) is a social,
symbolic, and physical ‘"unit'’ or “arrangem ent/’ What then to do when the identity o f a
person— who constitutes him- or herself through a myriad different, sometimes
conflicting, discursive practices— is threatened by particular land management practices?
It isn't just that his or her livelihood is threatened— the material circumstances, or that the
person's body is threatened (by air quality, holes in the ozone, water quality, etc.). or even
that his or her sense o f aesthetics or ethics is compromised: it is that the person's identity,
as a person, is compromised in some important way by that management activity. (This
"identification" with or essential “relationship” to the out there is reminiscent o f (though
not necessarily coincident with) the ontology o f some deep ecologists, ecofeminists, and
others who conceive o f identify as something that doesn’t stop at the skin or even at the
end o f culture, but extends all the way to the ends o f the universe). We can even retreat
from this metaphysical conception o f the self and instead think on more direct, material
terms: the logger, the miner, the hiker, the river guide, the naturalist, the farmer, the
watcher o f \a tu r e all constitute themselves in relation to some idea o f the “out there”—
some more essentially than others (recall Roderick N ash’s suggestion that American
identity is inextricably bound up with the landscape in his influential book Wilderness
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and the Am erican Mind). And if we accept that human health is as the WHO and others
argue it is. then human health is deeply implicated in forest health for the simple reason
that human identity is in some way, at some level, intimately tied to that o f the forest. The
obvious problem is that as humans we each tend to construct, to the extent we are able, a
unique identity, something that makes us non-identical with others, and this means that
our identities may be tied to radically different ideas o f what a forest is or does.

Understanding ecosystems broadly, like understanding persons broadly seems to be the
"right" thing to do. We sense that there is a problem when we abstract from the particular
material, historic, or symbolic circumstances or when we reduce a complex organism,
system, or situation to its simplest parts: we wish to deal, in so far as possible, in complex
wholes, because we tend to live in complex wholes. At the same time, our minds and our
language and our knowledge systems, to say nothing o f our social, economic, and
political institutions, do n 't seem well equipped to deal in undifferentiated, unmediated
"ecosystemic" wholes: we tend to break them down into manageable parts. Where do we
draw the lines, and more importantly, how do we justify having drawn them at that place
rather than another? These are the very difficult questions that science alone cannot
answer and these are precisely the questions that the USFS has implicitly answered for
itself, without benefit o f public input, and upon which the USFS has built its forest health
discourse.
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The objective
The USFS defines forest health in several different ways, as does the medical community.
We have noted that in both instances, but more so in forestry than in medicine, conflicts
arise when we move from our understandings o f the object to our definitions o f the
objective— health. Medical practitioners and philosophers are acutely aware that if they
are going to expand the concept o f what it.means to be human, then they are going to
have to expand the concept o f health (or vice versa...). They also realize that by doing so
they have catapulted themselves right out o f the deceptively transparent world o f natural
science and into the quagmire o f culture and the symbolic. Foresters have not fully
grasped the nature o f their dilemma, nor noticed (at least not publicly) that they have
glossed over some fundamental issues, like how one gets from an ecosystem to a healthy
ecosystem without committing inconceivable acts o f violence that while perhaps
necessary, are neither sanctioned nor legitimated by the ecosystem concept or by the thing
we are referring to when we use the word. Recall that, according to the USFS, forest
health is

a condition wherein a forest has the capacity across the landscape for renewal, for
recovery’ from a wide range o f disturbances, and for retention o f its ecological
resiliency while meeting current a n d future needs o f people for desired levels o f
values, uses, products, and services (emphasis added, USDA FS 1997).

Or if you prefer, forest health is
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a measure o f the robustness o f forest ecosystems. Aspects o f forest health include
biological diversity, soil, air, and water productivity, natural disturbances', and the
capacity o f the forest to provide a sustaining flo w o f goods and sendees fo r
people (emphasis added, USDA FS National HQ web site).

Now recall our definitions o f an ecosystem. It is impossible to get from an ecosystem to
ecosystem health without the intervention o f human desires. There is nothing in our
ecosystem concept that indicates it is essentially resilient, diverse, productive, or robust;
no indication that it must be able to recover or renew itself, that it must retain any
particular thing, that it must have some capacity, in and o f itself in order to be an
ecosystem; that is. in order to have an identity.

Lost or buried within the apparently objective signifiers o f health and disease are the
critical value judgem ents that define one thing or state or process as valuable and
desirable and healthful— as in contributing to or sustaining the identity o f a forest
ecosystem, and another as valueless (or destructive o f value), undesirable, and
unhealthful. One might wonder why "these things'’ (and not "those things") are
considered indicators o f health (or illness) and why one state, process, structure, or
function is healthy (and by association, desirable) and another not. By what criteria are
the criteria by which health is judged chosen? Devastation, catastrophe, deterioration,
disease, malaise, decline, pests, tragedy, mortality', morbidity, unproductive, infestation.
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vulnerability...all o f these terms are used frequently in the FS discourse on health and all
o f them c a m - a negative value; they are all meant to indicate undesirable occurrences or
states or organisms. Using these terms rather than others betrays an implied commitment
to some already identified preferred state or norm from which things have deviated. The
words are used deliberately, but without much explicit analysis o f why the USFS (or we
as a society) use them. Why for example, do we use these terms to refer to certain insects
(like bark beetles) and not to ponderosa pine trees? We speak o f pest infestation, even o f
Douglas fir infestation, but rarely if ever o f Ponderosa pine infestation. What is the
difference between a population that is flourishing and one that constitutes an infestation?
Why are some species considered pathogenic and others necessary and desirable? (Recall
the socially unacceptable metaphor employed by some environmentalists o f likening
humans to roaches or rats and our population as constituting an infestation...) And even
more perplexing, when does one become the other? Why are fires no longer the '''’enemy.'
but the ecological 'friend’ o f a healthy, vital forested ecosystem” (USDA FS 1991. IV -11)
and when does a "friendly” fire become an “enemy”? Why is a fire or wind event that
levels thousands o f acres o f forest, a water event that carries away tons o f soil and
reshapes the landscape, considered a catastrophe, a "disturbance,” rather than something
that just happens, one o f those “forces that moves among” the biotic and abiotic
"arrangements.” neither positive nor negative? Why do we speak o f catastrophic fires or
devastating winds or ravaging pests? Why are these events or states considered
destructive (abnormal) rather than “normal” or as part and parcel o f the ecosystem? ( c f
Holling (1992). and in Clark and Munn (1986)). (Cassell contends, for example, that “an
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illness is not an event, but pan o f a process" (1997, 37).) And why do we cast our own
actions against these events in terms o f prevention, protection, restoration?

At this point it is worth quoting at length a passage from the Blue M ountains Forest
Health Report because it speaks to exactly this issue.

It is important to note that not all damage or mortality resulting from insect
infestations is bad, nor is it always undesirable. Insects play a key role in
providing natural diversity in riparian areas and oid-growth stands through the
creation o f dead and dying woody material which serves to enhance site
productivity and promote species diversity and richness by providing new habitats
for animals. Insects also help to increase the standing dead tree com ponent o f
these stands which are important as habitat for snag-dependent wildlife species.
Similarly, streams and creeks are enhanced by the formation o f new pools, ripples,
and habitat for aquatic vertebrate and invertebrate species as insect-killed trees
eventually fall over into these water courses. The level o f insect-related tree
mortality which occurs under these circumstances is both acceptable and
desirable, and in fact is a good indicator (and progenitor) o f healthy riparian and
old growth ecosystems.

On the other hand, concern regarding insects arises when they increase to outbreak
numbers, or when stands have developed to a state in which they are predisposed
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to potentially catastrophic insect damage. Both situations significantly threaten
our ability to manage the resource in a way that is consistent with the Forest
Plans'5(USDA FS 1991,11-1).

The passage indicates that the Forest Service believes that forest health is in some
essential way connected to the presence o f disease and death, that is to “unhealth.” The
problem is that we move from the good, the desirable, the acceptable, the healthy level o f
disease to the bad. the catastrophic, the threatening, the outbreak, and the unhealthy
without benefit o f an objective mechanism or a marker that might enable us to distinguish
between the two. How do we know' when we cross the line?

Forest health in essence is defined by those conditions that make life (as we humans
know it) possible. That is. we would consider as “unhealthy” any forest (or ecosystem)
condition that presents a threat to the continued existence o f the human race; a judgem ent
o f "forest health55 is motivated solely by human self-interest, not that o f the forest itself.
Other conditions, conditions that exist beyond what scientists call ecological limits, may
or may not permit o f human existence, and would at the very least change our existence
in ways we cannot predict. Ecological limits are really knowledge (and perhaps desire?)
limits; when our conceptual system (the ecosystem) exceeds the boundaries we establish
for it. when it goes beyond the categorical restraints we posit (those things that make it
systematic), we can no longer hope to predict or control its trajectory because we cannot
think what is beyond thought. The reflexive and backward looking tenor o f “health” is

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137
indicative o f our fear o f the unknown that is the future, our resistance to mortality (be it
our own or that o f nature). It is an implicit rejection o f the irreducible ignorance that lies
at the limits o f knowledge, it is what drives the collection o f data, all o f which is always
already obsolete— markers o f a never to be returned to historical state— before it is even
turned into information or knowledge.

The comparison to ideas o f human health from the social science perspective is
instructive, even if it does not necessarily resolve anything. Recall that in one case being
healthy meant that one enjoyed a "state o f complete physical, mental, and social wellbeing" (not merely the absence o f disease or infirmity) and that in another, health was
conceived o f as the "ability ... to reach social, emotional, and economic goals despite
illness, impairment, or functional limitations." The health described in the first definition
is really more o f an ideal, and a highly subjective and ambiguous one at that. The second
definition, however, seems much more workable, and to coincide more closely with how
it is that we ourselves might experience health. Though considerably less ideal than the
one offered by the WHO. it is equally subjective (or situated) and highly ambiguous. As
noted above, what is most provocative about this idea o f health is that it does not by
definition exclude those things or conditions that we have traditionally learned to
consider as attributes or signs o f “ ill health." It normalizes all those aspects, states, or
qualities that we have learned to think o f as deviant; it suggests that disease, dysfunction,
and impairment are not signs o f ill health in and o f themselves, but are only considered as
detracting from health when they prevent a person from realizing some goal. This means
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that one cannot establish fully objective criteria for evaluating human health because the
impact o f particular diseases, impairments, or dysfunctions is differently assimilated by
each person depending upon their goals, their hopes and expectations, and how closely
these goals are tied to their identity. A discourse developed around this definition o f
health would have to confront the difficult questions about how it is that we continue to
live as healthy, goal driven people in the presence o f those conditions that we label as
sickness, disease, impairment, or derangement. Under this rubric, one gets to entertain,
for example, the presently politically incorrect thought that aging and death are pan of,
even the essence of. a “healthy" life; to ask the question. “W hen is dying the best way to
live?"

These questions are even more central— and their answers even less obvious— in the
discourse o f forest health because we are dealing with countless organisms that will live
either as "diseases” themselves or with disease, organisms that will age and die. and do so
in environments that will be disturbing and eventful. Unlike in the case o f human health
in which we are concerned not only with population health (the health o f the species), but
also with the health o f the individual, in forestry, too great a concern for the health o f the
individual can produce an unhealthy forest: “we have protected trees at the expense o f the
forest and its long term health" (USDA FS/Monnig and Bvler, 1992).26 Both the passage
from the Blue Mountains Report and the definition o f health offered on the USFS
National Headquarters web site (w'hich includes natural disturbances as healthy).
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internalize the contradiction, embrace the irreducible tension o f the either-or, construct
health in terms o f its no-longer opposite “unhealth.” W hat is most remarkable about these
passages and definitions is that, having made the statement, the Forest Service then
proceeds to identify, measure, analyze, and interpret baseline conditions o f forest health
as if they were somehow given. In other words, having said that insects, for example, can
be good, healthy, they then list them under the category o f “threats” to forest health as if
doing so did not require overcoming a tremendous cognitive gulf.

In spite o f Leopold’s wish to the contrary, we do not have a science o f forest health; “art"
intervenes at every stage in the process. The language we use to describe disease (like the
term “disease" itself), is not scientific, at least not in the objective, value neutral sense
that scientists generally prefer or require. Like health, our perception o f disease as disease
is always already colored by value judgm ents: decline, catastrophe, disturbance, etc. these
are not objective states: they are weighted concepts or categories o f thought that we use to
interpret designated external conditions, signifiers whose meanings and values are
constantly renegotiated within the social contexts and discursive networks within which
they are circulated and reified. The value o f the terms is relational, just as the conditions
signified are relational (i.e.. to say something is damaged presumes some prior condition
that was defined as undamaged). The criteria we use to distinguish between a pest and an
insect, a flourishing population and an infestation, a function and a catastrophe, a process

:b It is not politically correct, but one could conceivably argue that too much concern for individual human
health has in fact contributed toa decrease in population health (depending on how you define health, o f
course) and this in turn has led to decreases in individual health.
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and a disturbance are mutable, subject to change across time and space, and are rarely
exhausted by an exclusively scientific epistemology. Neither, however, are they reducible
to mere mental constructs. But he who gets to decide what to call the item (flourishing or
infestation) controls the discourse— at least temporarily!

The mere presence or absence o f a particular entity or phenomena is in and o f itself not
an indicator o f health or disease. Even a measurement o f the frequency or intensity o f an
event or an entity is not sufficient to differentiate between disease or health. Western
dw arf mistletoe and rust red stringy rot are not objectively speaking, diseases; they are
distinguishable differences from the not-mistletoe and the not-rust red stringy rot. but
they only become diseases when they get in the way o f what we want the forest to look
like or how we want an ecosystem to perform. Disease and/or health are time and place
specific, but are also fully dependent upon human desires: they are contingent, emergent,
relational, situated, particular, and premised upon some (often unstated) notion o f
teleology. An ecosystem is only unhealthy if it cannot reach some state or goal— one that
is not essential or integral to the ecosystem itself (or at least not in the way the FS has
presently defined an ecosystem ....) but only to the ideas and desires that humans have of
or for that ecosystem.

One begins to get the uncomfortable feeling that pursuing a program designed to promote
ecosystem health might require acts o f violence: we will be required to make value-laden
distinctions where none seem to exist at the ontological level— or the presumed level o f
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the real. We will have to exclude, to eradicate, to manipulate, to perform some sort o f
"-ectom y," in order to produce a “healthy” ecosystem. Health is an undeniably normative
term in both human medicine and forestry'; we choose those conditions or states or
functions that we like and we define them as healthy. The rest we define as aberrant,
deviant, unhealthy. This is what frightens doctors like Seldin who believe that if
conceived o f in this way. and extended to all aspects o f human life, health as a norm can
lead to medically sanctioned fascism; and it is what frightens humanists when they accuse
environm entalists o f eco-fascism (Zimmerman 1994). This is probably the impetus
behind appending the human needs and desires clause to the “objective” biophysical
clause in health definition. But if it is true that health is a normative (not just an
objective) concept from the outset, then it becomes a matter o f competing desires, or if
you prefer competing identities, from the very beginning; that is, it's turtles all the way
d o w n .2' Unless the Forest Service can produce an unambiguous and incontestable

definition o f an ecosystem and can irrevocably bind that definition (those words) to some
specific condition in the real that will sanction and validate that norm as an objectively
healthy state, then it, like the rest o f us. will be forced to play language games.
We have now encountered problems at multiple levels: it seems our object (the forest) as
presently defined, gives us no objective grounds for establishing “health.” Furthermore,
our definition o f health, despite grammatical gymnastics to make it appear otherwise, is
suspiciously dependent upon unexamined ideas (human ideas) o f what a forest ought to

■ I don't know the origins o f the anecdote, but as the story goes, “it’s turtles all the way down’’ is the
answer given by an Indian (?) woman to the query o f “what holds the world up?” She said the world sat on
the back o f a great turtle. And what does that turtle stand upon? Upon the back o f another turtle. And that
one11 It's turtles all the way down. The deeper you look, you just get more o f the same.
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be or do— that is. it begins to look as though we have framed forest health in terms o f
human desires, not appended them afterwards as qualifiers. Along the way we have also
encountered other intractable difficulties, those o f knowledge, language, and meaning. In
forestry, as in medicine, we have chosen the “out there” as our focus o f concern, yet we
can only know it through our logoi, our conceptual structures, which are, for better or
worse, linguistically bound and determined. As concrete actually existing beings we live
in "the flux,” "the real.” But as knowing beings, we live in the symbolic; we know o f
ourselves as selves and o f the real as the other by virtue o f concepts that enable us to
make sense o f the barrage o f sensory perceptions with which we are bombarded at every
moment; that is, by “the posterior reconstruction o f existence by the process o f
conceptualization” (Einstein 1994, 47). Science and the natural sciences in particular are
but one o f the conceptual structures that we use to make sense of. to interpret “our
interactions with the flux” not with the flux itself (Hayles in Soule 1995 , 53). This is a
critical point o f departure for those who do science in the shadow o f continental
philosophy; it is not clear, however, that forestry has fully understood or internalized the
impact o f this alternative conceptualization o f what we do when we do science.

On Doing Science in the Shadow o f CP
In a correspondence conducted in 1932 at the suggestion o f the League o f Nations
between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud, Freud defends the theoretical nature o f his
work (psychoanalysis) with this argument:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

143

It may perhaps seem to you as though our theories are a kind o f mythology and. in
the present case [an examination o f the causes o f war], not even an agreeable one.
But does not every science come in the end to a kind o f mythology like this?
Cannot the same be said today of your own Physics? (Freud, 15)

The question for us is. at least in part. "Can it be said o f science that it does, in the end.
come a kind o f mythology?'’ Or, alternatively, can it be said o f science that it does not
carry within it the terms or conditions o f its own legitimation? Does it require an outside
source, a narrative account, o f how and why it is that we accept its findings and methods
as knowledge? To these questions, scientists themselves as well as philosophers o f
science and more recently critical theorists, anthropologists, sociologists, and multiculturalists have responded yes. The works o f Thomas Kuhn. Albert Einstein. Karl
Popper. David Bohm. Stuart Kauffman. Paul Feverabend. W .V.O.Quine. Jean-Francois
Lyotard. Godei. Michael Polanyi. and Richard Rortv (to nam e but a very few) all engage
with this problem o f legitimation, and invariably it is adm itted that one must go beyond
or outside o f science itself, to culture or language or religion or some account o f
psychology or cognition or perception, to seek the explanation for science itself.

I will not here investigate to any depth the intricacies and subtleties o f the science
question. For my purposes. I am interested only in briefly stating the arguments that
support the contention that science is not an uncontested or unproblem atic methodology
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or framework that the FS or the medical establishment can use as an ultimate and
unassailable defense against criticism.

The “fate" o f science and the role o f scientific knowledge in a post modem world has
been thoroughly evaluated and critiqued (and those evaluations and critiques have
themselves been evaluated and critiqued...) by numerous scholars and practitioners in
numerous fields, including the sciences themselves. In addition to the “classic’' texts
mentioned above there are contemporary texts that engage with the problem o f science,
language, gender, race, power, knowledge, etc.: Levins and Lewontin in biology and
ecology: Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, and other feminists and ecofeminists in
biology and medicine: Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers in physics and chemistry. Tom
Sorrell. N. Kathryn Hayles. Evelyn Fox Keller, Will Wright. Robert Almeder, Larry
Laudin. A.F. Chalmers. J. M archessault et al., etc.. Therefore, I will sketch out only the
bare bones o f how some o f the insights o f CP into knowledge, language and the self
affect the modem scientific project as they apply to this particular project. For the most
pan. I am interested in only two specific points: first, how the redefinition o f the object
makes applying rigorous scientific methodology virtually impossible; and second, how
the new understanding o f the ultimately normative or prescriptive character o f the
objective (forest health) suggested above pushes back the point at which we may
legitimately invoke the name o f science in defense o f any one particular analysis or
evaluation o f forest conditions.
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As discussed above in Chapter Two, continental philosophy rejects the idea o f an all
knowing subject that can stand outside o f not only his or her own body, but outside o f his
or her own time and place, culture and history. Generally, the subject in continental
philosophy is inescapably embodied, historical, and situated: we are, at least in part, a
product o f our culture and our language. This subject is never fully present
(omnipresent)— either to or for him or herself, or to or for the flux— ; it is always
emergent, differed and deferred because it does not experience itself in the real (without
recourse to symbolic structures), but only experiences itself experiencing itself as a ‘‘self."
The same is true for how it relates to the real. Because presence is not perfect
(transparent), knowledge is not perfect (omniscient); like the knowing subject knowledge
is partial, contingent, fissured, fragmented, and mediated; it is historically and culturally
dependent, ju st as the knowing subject is. Knowledge— even scientific knowledge— is
inextricably bound to language, and to logos, to the organizing conceptual frameworks of
the human mind. But words are slippery; meaning is not fixed and cannot be controlled
because every discourse is fissured, open; there is no obligatory or temporally stable
connection between the words we use and the meanings conveyed, no necessary
connection between the images and meanings produced and circulated in the symbolic
and their referents in the real. '‘W hat we know" then, seems to tell us at least as much
about how our minds work (which we can’t know directly...), about how our sensory
organs work, about where and what we are in time and space, about our relations to other
humans, and about how our language works (grammar, syntax, logic) as about what is
"out there." Because we are embodied, however, we are saved from the "aristocratic
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illusion'' o f pure thought, o f abstraction, or radical constructivism; and, because we think,
we are (supposedly) saved from the "the plebian illusion o f naive realism, according to
which things ‘are* as they are perceived by us through our senses” (Einstein 1994, 21).
This latter "illusion,” however, "dominates the daily life o f men and o f animals; it is also
the point o f departure in all o f the sciences, especially o f the natural sciences (emphasis
added. Einstein 1994, 21). Despite the convenience o f this "short cut” (assumed
transparency), it is perhaps time to change this point o f departure.

We can say o f science that it yields invaluable, useful, and unique, if contingent and
partial, insights into what we think is "out there.” We test these (scientific) ideas o f the
real (hypotheses) not against the real itself but against our gathered experiences thereof.
We articulate our discoveries, our findings, in language that is inherently ambiguous and
ineluctably slippery. Not unexpectedly, many scientists are themselves keenly aware o f
the limitations o f their endeavor if for no other reason than science itself has discovered
them. Bertrand Russell, according to Einstein, articulates the inherent contradiction
nicely:

We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But
physics assures us that the greenness o f the grass, the hardness o f the stones, and
the coldness o f snow are not the greenness, hardness, and coldness that we know
in our own experience, but something very different. The observer, when he
seems to him self to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed,
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observ ing the effects o f the stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at war
with itself: when it most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into
subjectivity against its will. Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true,
shows that naive realism is false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is false;
therefore it is false (Russell quoted in Einstein 1994, 21-23).

Einstein also grapples with the problem s o f language— its slipperiness, its ambiguity, and
its apparent lack o f obligatory correspondence to some definitive referent— which for
better or worse is the primary vehicle by which we know o f ourselves and o f the out
there:

...the concepts which arise in our thoughts and in our linguistic expressions are
all— when viewed logically— the free creations o f thought which cannot
inductively be gained from sense experiences. This is not so easily noticed only
because we have the habit o f combining certain concepts and conceptual relations
(propositions) so definitely w ith certain sense experiences that we do not become
conscious o f the gulf—logically unbridgeable— which separates the world o f
sensory experiences from the world o f concepts and propositions (Einstein 1994.
24).

Concealing, or at least "forgetting,” this “unbridgeable g u lf’ is one o f the things that
science (and/or reports o f scientific discoveries in the media) does so well, and one o f the
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ways it does so is by defining its terms. But. recall if you will the Forest Health Science
Panel's refusal to define forest health because o f its inherent ambiguity and instability;
remember the prescriptive terms (masquerading as descriptive terms) that appeared in
USFS definitions o f health; recall too that we define terms by recourse to other terms, and
those by recourse to others and so on and so on— we thus never get out o f language or
escape ambiguity; and finally, recall that in one definition (the USDA FS N at’l HQ web
site) and in more than one text (USDA FS/Monnig and Byler 1992; USDA FS 1991.
Blue Mountains Report) health was inextricably linked to “unhealthy." Remember too.
the USFS definition o f an ecosystem: “an arrangement o f living and non-living things and
the forces that move among them." The signifier is so full— perfectly so. in fact— as to
signify nothing. It is perfectly meaningless. We are having trouble developing new
"habits o f combining certain concepts [ecosystems] and conceptual relations [forest
health]" ... "with certain sense experiences" and we are thus painfully “conscious o f the
gulf—logically unbridgeable— which separates the world o f sensory experiences from the
world o f concepts and propositions." This is as true o f medicine as it is o f forestry and it
bodes ill for the exclusive use o f science in either one.

The basic methods o f positivist/reductive science— testability (or falsifiability) based
upon repeatability and absolute control o f all variables— work well for isolated, welldefined. thoroughly controlled entities or conditions. Scientists adm it that they work
considerably less well with large, complex, multivariable, uncontrollable open entities or
processes. As Einstein puts it: “when the num ber o f factors com ing into play in a
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phenomenological complex is too large, scientific method in m ost cases fails us”
(Einstein 1994. 51). A person is just such a multi-factorial phenomenological complex— a
"com plex” which is complicated many times over by the addition o f a “noumenological”
complex. The definition of an ecosystem also fits Einstein’s description o f a too-large,
multi-factorial phenomenological complex that exceeds scientific method. Neither
persons nor ecosystems are well-defined, isolated entities that exist in controlled
conditions. Just as physicians are learning to incorporate other forms o f knowledge into
their diagnostic and therapeutic regimes, so foresters will likely have to do the same;
different discursive practices (as knowledge practices, not as mere opinion) account for
different variables in the complex.

And finally, it is commonly accepted that science deals as well as anything can with
questions o f what is (or what we think is), but is not at all well suited to dealing with
questions o f w hat should be (both Hume’s is-ought dichotomy and M oore's “naturalistic
fallacy"). The problem is, that since ecosystems, like persons, seem to come with no
definitive objectively “healthy” conditions, arrangements, processes, or functions— at
least not according to our definitions— then forest health, like human health, turns out to
be a normative, highly subjective, easily contested signifier that gets filled differently by
different persons with different agendas and a different set o f criteria. And this is
important: people fill the forest health signifier by referring to their sometimes different
experiences o f different ecosystems. Unlike persons (as patients), ecosystems do not get
to fill their own signifier, any more than they get to fill the “forest health” signifier.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

150

Patients get to speak, to at least contend with the physicians professional account, for the
right to define the terms o f own health. Such is not the case for ecosystems.

The debates over what constitutes forest health are keen, and in part, the debate centers on
the role o f science as well as whose science. One m an’s forest health is another m an's
forest disaster: The cover o f the Summer 1996 issue o f D efender's magazine sported the
provocative title “Lawless Logging: The ’Forest H ealth’ Scam” accompanied by an aerial
view o f a clearcut. The article claims that the FS is using its “phony” version o f “forest
health" as a means to log more heavily (Durbin 1996, 15-24). Then too. one m an’s good
science is another's bad science (“ Science and Community Knowledge” Forest Trust 21:
January 2000. "Rep. Charles Taylor's Bogus Forest Health Science Report." a “memo"
published by the Western Ancient Forest Campaign. April 9. 1997). Part o f the problem
stems from the fact that neither the questions asked nor the criteria chosen, the variables
excluded or included, or the interpretations o f collected data are obligatory (and are often
concealed). Change the values that drive the observations, alter the technology that
permits access— that enhances one’s sensory capacities or in turn makes one “blind” to
other possibilities— and the outcomes o f science change. Change the questions, propose
new criteria, select different variables, choose another interpretation: one gets different
answers.28 Awareness o f this prompted the Forest Health Science Panel to state at the
outset that “as with any analytical and scientific study, differences in grouping, averaging,
analyzing, and interpreting data lead to variations. Each condition, effect, and number

:s For example. Lee. R.G. (1994) reports that "FEMAT did not want or would not use any information that
would not support the long-term goal o f restoring forests to their pre-settlement conditions" (31).
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reported could be contested and refined" (FHSP 1997, Preface, 1). And it is, by other
scientists with other interests and by other interests with other knowledges. The
lim itations o f science and o f expertise in resolving these larger issues o f forests and forest
health is due in part to the complexity o f the real, in part to the "unbridgeable g u lf’
between our knowledge o f it and it itself, in part to the unbridgeable g ulf between our
sensory data and our concepts/ideas (that constitute knowledge) (Einstein), and in part to
the fact that we know o f forests and o f forest health through different conceptual
frameworks, many o f which are non-scientific.

The Forest Ecosystem M anagement Assessment Team, an interdisciplinary group o f
scientists and experts (weighted heavily toward the natural sciences) responsible for
preparing an ecological, economic, and social assessment o f EM for the Forest Service
notes that

in the past 5 years, four m ajor scientific task forces have attem pted to resolve
issues o f old-growth forests and endangered species protection. Yet. despite
unprecedented levels o f expertise and effort brought to bear on these issues, their
resolution seems as far away as ever. Moreover, despite the profound
consequences these issues hold for people, both in the region and elsewhere, only
limited attention has been given to their human aspects, at least in any explicit and
systematic fashion (FEM AT 1993. VII-3-4).
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Which brings us to one final point that m ust be touched upon before leaving this section:
the relationship between knowledge, expertise, and power. Knowledge is power, and in
our culture, scientific knowledge is still one o f the most powerful totems that one can
invoke in defense o f a point or a position, particularly when one wishes to give the
impression o f disinterestedness and objectivity. For example, when queried on the role he
envisions for the federal government in setting the environmental agenda in the October
11. 2000 presidential debate. G. W. Bush responded that he was perfectly willing to
endorse various environmentally friendly policies and practices “so long as they’re based
on science and they're reasonable." He went on to say that there “are a lot o f different
opinions [presumably about what we ought to do “about the environment”]. We need a
full accounting before we make decisions." Similarly, when Dr. Jane Henney.
Commissioner o f Food and Drugs, was asked to defend her decision to allow the use o f
RU-486 (the abortion pill or mifepristine) in the United States she responds that “the
approval o f mifepristine is the result o f the FDA’s careful evaluation o f the scientific
evidence related to the safe and effective use o f this drug. ... The FDA’s review and
approval of this drug has adhered strictly to our legal mandate and mission as a sciencebased public health regulatory agency” (http://www.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH
women/09/2 8/abortion .pill/index.html). In an interview on the ABC Evening News
with Peter Jennings she reiterates once m ore that the decision was based “purely on
science" and had nothing to do with politics (ABC, 9-28-00). The impression conveyed is
that the science is unassailable, that it’s findings are (or will be) unanimous and
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incontestable, and that the data will tell us unequivocally what to do. Science, therefore,
is a politically powerful instrument provided one can conceal its political and cultural
connections. Philosophers and sociologists contend that the some political and social
forces that operate outside o f the community o f scientists to reify it also operate within
the community o f researchers to effectively constrain research agendas (cf. Latour and
W oolgar (1979). Thagard (1999), Klee (1997), etc.).

Ultimately, the power o f scientific knowledge accrues to those who can use its tools and
speak its language. Science fosters a culture o f expertise, and this expertise tends to
exclude other sorts o f knowledges in an effort to maintain authority and to control the
terms o f the discourse.

It is perhaps even deeper than this, however, in a culture such as ours that venerates
science. Medical anthropologists and sociologists have noted that “members o f a
dominant culture are inclined to view their own ways as logical and natural, to see culture
as something that others have. In this case, we have science and knowledge, they have
traditions and myths” (Henderson 1997. 7). This attitude permeates both forest culture
and medical culture; scientific knowledge is naturalized or “canonized” in ways that
marginalize other conceptual frameworks, and effectively disempower those that use
them. In both medicine and forestry, the public is invited to the table (as patient or as
stake holder) but in neither case is it given a voice with which to speak— at least, not a
voice that can speak with the power o f scientific knowledge. Take for exam ple, a
sampling o f a text dealing specifically with the social aspects o f forest health issues in the
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USDA Forest Service’s Blue Mountains report. The authors state that “just how these
Forest Health questions [insects, diseases, fires] affect the public is a matter for
sociological inquiry. What are the attitudes, the beliefs, the values society holds toward
management o f these resources?...” (USDA FS 1991, iii). The authors go on to state that
the public suffers from “a general misunderstanding o f multiple-use concepts and
integrated resource planning” (USDA FS 1991,1-1), as well as “a general
misunderstanding o f how forest health relates to all forest resources” (USDA FS 19 9 1,12): and again "the general public does not understand forest ecosystem dynamics ... and
is further confused by the differing opinions o f experts” (USDA FS 1991.11-146). The
job o f the FS is to "disseminate information that will help to develop an
understanding...:” "to undertake a proactive campaign to share our understanding of
forest heal th. .

to engage in "community outreach and education” in order "to promote

an understanding...:” “to inform the p u b lic...;” to provide information to ‘our publics'
that “can serve to foster a better understanding...;” "to communicate to the public the
nature and scope o f the problem and the realities o f continuing forest ecosystem
decline..."(e.g.. USDA FS 1991, throughout). The implication is that while public
attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and perceptions o f forest health are a m atter for sociological
investigations and are incorrect (that is, as beliefs, attitudes and values they are subjective
and messy with little in the way o f knowledge content), the Forest Service itself is
immune to such subjective pressures and is in possession o f knowledge regarding forest
health and disease. The public is an appropriate curious object for sociological study; the
scientific Forest Service is not.
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The m ore esoteric the terminology, the more specialized the requisite knowledge, the
more narrowly delimited the object and the objective^ the more control one ought to be
able to exert over the discourse and the practice. The Forest Service’s efforts to articulate
a strictly biophysical (ecological) model o f health and the medical com m unities’ efforts to
narrowly define human health as bodily health, and their subsequent attempts to privilege
scientific discourse and methodology as the predominant conceptual framework could be
(and have been) interpreted as an effort to retain power (cf. Foucault M adness.... and
Birth o f the Clinic; Cassell 1997; Feverabend 1993, 130; Ben-Sira 1988; Shuval 1992;
Seldin 1997: etc.). However, as we have noted, both foresters and physicians are fighting
a battle that is increasingly harder to win, if for no other reason than that their objects
defy reduction and circumscription within the constraints o f a single, narrow conceptual
framework. There are, however, other reasons, and those we have noted above. We will
only mention one final factor that works against FS and the medical establishm ent's
efforts to control the terms: dispersion. We live in an age when knowledge— even the
most esoteric knowledge— is available through a variety o f discursive venues. As a
result, control o f the terms is more tenuous than ever. One can access health information,
even scientific medical information, directly from books and the world wide web. The
same is true for environmental knowledge. Interested parties have access to the
terminology, to the science(s), the critiques o f the science(s), and to other knowledge
frameworks that pose different questions, propose different categories, and privilege
different perspectives. The terms o f the discourses, like the discourses o f forest and
human health themselves, are produced and reproduced, read and reread in the public
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domain. If knowledge is power, and knowledge is dispersed, then power too is
dispersed— unless there is some other way to protect power— like a guild or some
authority that confers the label '‘expert.”

In closing. I would add that the same critique that is here leveled against science could
also be leveled against other disciplines, discursive frameworks, or institutions. The
humanities are no more immune to power struggles and tendencies toward reification by
virtue o f being humanities than the sciences are.29 The point o f this discussion on the
cultural roots o f science is not to lay grounds for its rejection but simply to say that those
who use science can no longer hide their findings behind the mask o f objectivity, and can
no longer assert authority based on some privileged access to the real that science
supposedly grants them.

The university system in the U.S. is conventionally divided into the humanities and the sciences. I have
reproduced that bifurcation here.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion

It was clear what the survey results said, but not what they meant.
-M artha Balshem
Cancer, Control, and Causality

After yo u have finished your true stories sometime, why don't you make up a story and
the people to go with it? Only then will you understand what happened and why.
-Norman MacLean
A River Runs Through It

The tit between forest health and human health, between forestry and medicine is not
exact, but it is instructive even in its differences. They are both social endeavors in the
usual, obvious material ways: funding constraints, organizational and knowledge
structures that create or constrain opportunities and dictate information flow and
com munication, political and legal restraints, technological limitations (or opportunities),
the weight o f public opinion, etc. Additionally, within forestry as in medicine, there is a
palpable and as yet unresolved tension between those who consider the object as “given."
a pre-discursive, value-neutral site o f investigation and activity (the body or the forest)
and those who see it as “constructed,” as value-laden and contested. Accordingly, these
two camps differentiate between the appropriate objectives and activities: those who see
forestry as a natural science with objectives that are “given” (as in the case o f “health” as
an objective condition o f the forest) and those who see it as a cultural endeavor that
includes scientific knowledge with explicitly culturally produced objectives. These
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aspects are important: but there are other more subtle differences and similarities that are
equally important and interesting, if considerably less tractable and amenable to solution

As individual humans, we expect to age, to become “infirm,” to die (even though as a
species we hope to persist). Most o f our life is spent coming to terms with the changes in
our physical and mental capacities and constructing narratives for assimilating and
normalizing those changes; i.e., we attem pt to sustain an identity in the face o f sometimes
dramatic flux. We have the advantage o f being a single organism that is (deceptively)
well-bounded (deceptive, because not only are we dependent upon our environm ent for
our very lives, but because we are a symbolic species whose limitless mental and/or
spiritual life appears to have a profound effect on our physical existence and on our
perceptions thereof). Ecosystems, or forests, are (obviously) not like humans: we expect
them to persist despite the loss o f particular species or individuals, structures, processes,
functions, or events. And herein lies the problem: how' does one establish a "norm .” a
"baseline condition” for such an am orphous, unbounded, infinitely complex, “out there"
(that is organic but is not an organism) that is not only constantly changing itself but
about which our ideas are also constantly changing in accordance with our changing
perspectives, our science, and our expectations? What is the “identity” o f this ecosystem
that we wish to sustain and does it (the identity, or “ecosystem”) exist independently o f
our thought categories? In the same way that our knowledge o f our bodies and our ideas
o f health and illness are constructed and described through cultural networks, through
narratives, so too are our knowledge o f the biophysical forest and our ideas o f forest
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health and disease. Forestry, like medicine, becomes an exercise not ju st in the collection
o f material data or in the manipulation o f physical features, but in a negotiation or quest
for meaning, for explanation— not in any essential or foundational sense, but rather in
the provisional and contingent sense o f Lyotard’s language games (Lyotard 1984, 9-10).
Foresters must also be able to build “stories” around, about, and with (and even before)
the data, stories that make sense of, that lend significance, to “facts” (the signs) and
thereby give the FS a purpose. In the same way, the stories that are necessary to legitimate
certain types o f knowledge (science) and power structures (the FS, for exam ple) and to
invest persons or managerial bodies with authority are not found within the knowledge,
the structure, or the persons and institutions themselves, but rather in narratives
constructed outside o f them (Lyotard 1984. 10. 30-1). The skills and the tools necessary
to build stories, to interpret data (as data and not noise), to invest signs with meaning are
found in the humanities.

Humans tend to measure health in terms o f what we hope to be able to do; that is,
judgements o f health tend to be cast against some hoped for future condition or ability
(recall the "old” subjective USFS definition (#1) o f health). To judge our present health
against our past health would doom most o f us to “unhealthy” lives in perpetuity (this
assumes, perhaps not correctly, that health is often associated with youth....!). For our
forests on the other hand, we look toward history— or prehistory— for our measure o f
health at the same time that we expect it to meet (not entirely clear) future needs and
desires. Current FS definitions o f health produce and reify a tension between a mythical.
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supposedly objective, past forest (our knowledge o f which is very far from perfect) and
unknown, subjective, future needs and desires. But in the same way that we are
apparently morally opposed to the possibility that advancements in medical knowledge
and techniques might enable us to produce a super-human race— a race o f physically (and
mentally) "perfect" beings, so too might we find ourselves opposed to such a “healthy”
forest that it would entail the extermination o f humans. The “pre-European” forest that
w e like to use as our "gold standard” o f health is pre-European, pre-contact, and perhaps
even "pre-lapsean” (i.e., Edenic). We live in a post-European, post-contact America; we
have lost our innocence. As humans, our ideas o f health are adaptive, progressive, and
highly situational or subjective; they have more to do with our hopes and dreams than
with our past. We go to great lengths to accommodate and normalize "differences.” It is
likely that our ideas o f forest health, despite the rhetoric and the claim to objectivity, are
also more firmly anchored in human desires and cultural constructs than is readily
apparent, and it is equally likely that a significant portion o f the population will go to
great lengths to protect those differences that for others represent “disease.”

In the same way that physicians are learning to “speak many languages” in order to
negotiate a meaning o f “health” that is acceptable to the individual patient, so too must
foresters learn to speak many languages in order to negotiate a meaning o f health that
takes into consideration the multiple and often conflicting identities that people assign to
forests. The language o f bioscience is as inadequate to address the totality' o f the human
being as the language o f the natural sciences is to address the totality o f the forest. For
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better or worse . the forest, like our bodies, are not only things out there, but things about
which we have ideas and emotions, and in which we have invested meanings. Our
understandings and experiences o f the objects in question in each field exceed the bounds
o f one knowledge system or practice; it is thus inevitable that our judgem ents o f health
will also exceed the bounds o f one praxis.

Like medicine, forestry must deal with the loss o f control o f the object, its objective, and
the terms o f its discourse on both. The loss is attributable at bottom to the inherent and
inescapable slipperiness o f language (which all the science and knowledge in the world
will not reduce), to the dispersion o f the medical and forestry discourses in the culture at
large and the concomitant production o f alternative discourses, and to the appropriation
and redeployment o f the terms o f the discourses in other frameworks that construct
different meanings and interpretations. Insofar as forestry and medicine are both language
based practices— praxes— they cannot escape these problems.

But the broader understandings— the “ecologization"— o f both the Forest Services' and
the medical com m unities' objects— ecosystems and persons— also im pose significant
limitations on the possibility that one organization, one theory or methodology, or one
praxis can fully control the knowledge that is produced about either one. The same holds
true for our judgem ents o f health: the more multi-faceted and complex the entity under
consideration, the more difficult it is to establish definitive, stable criteria for measuring
the health o f that entity. This does not mean that nothing can be done, that nothing can be
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said, but only that one must develop new (or maybe ju st other?) words, new categories
and habits o f thought that permit one to think and to speak across the multiple discursive
boundaries that constitute an “ecosystem.”

Foresters are not alone in this endeavor. Clifford Geertz, an anthropologist who tackles
the unenviable task o f rethinking anthropology— its justification, mission, and
assumptions— in an age in which the explanatory power o f the grand narrative o f human
progress has failed and along with it the authority that this conceptual framework grants
to the objective anthropologist, suggests that anthropology m ust move from “structure
and causality" toward “meaning and interpretation” (Geertz 1973.5). This modem day
anthropologist sees “man [a]s an animal suspended in webs o f significance he him self has
spun" and anthropology is thus no longer “an experimental science in search o f a law but
an interpretive one in search o f a meaning" (Geertz 1973.5). Foresters might consider
doing something similar: we can consider forests as real “things.” but things that are also
"suspended in webs o f significance.” Forestry would thus be not ju st “an experimental
science" in search o f structure, causality, and the laws o f nature, but also an interpretive
exercise in which foresters fully and directly engage in the difficult, never-ending task of
interpreting and assigning meaning to the myriad and conflicting sense data that we “get”
from these forests and ecosystems.

This means going beyond “adaptive management” to adaptive interpretation— to
adaptive knowledge systems and discursive networks that perm it o f multiple ontologies.
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epistemologies, and axiologies. Under this rubric, simply defining a term, or eradicating
the variables or accidents o f time and place, will no longer suffice. Ambiguity at the level
o f language is as inescapable as uncertainty at the level o f “the real:” it is not something
to be defined permanently away, but is the fundamental condition o f knowing (as an
ongoing action rather than a fa it accompli). Thus, in addition to trying to define its terms,
the Forest Service might do well to unpack them, to examine them not just in so far as
they are meant to point to some extralinguistic biophysical state, function, relationship, or
process, but also, and more importantly, to see how the same terms are deployed and
negotiated in the network o f signification that we call culture. As these networks shift—
and they do with each new speech or writing act— meaning slips, new values are
suggested and old associations revealed. Words are markers, nodes o f meaning—
constantly shifting nexi in a dispersed web o f information. In a postmodern world, one
informed by the precepts o f Continental philosophy, no single person or power structure
can ever completely control the terms o f its own discourse: something always escapes,
there is always a remainder, always an outside that disrupts the internal unity o f the
inside. Terms, especially in the natural science discourses, do refer outward but they are
also situated within a discourse which itself is situated within (and permeated by)
countless other discourses. In the post m odem world, it is no longer the case that
"undefined" terms or axioms— inevitable in any theory, scientific or otherwise— sit there
“quietly" and unobtrusively; instead they disrupt the theory (or theorem),— like an
irritating itch or sneezing fit (cf. G o d efs theorem).
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Traditional forestry education has done a fine job o f teaching potential foresters to
interrogate the referent (the forest, the species, etc.). It teaches them to do field research,
to collect and manipulate data, to use the technologies, and even to interpret that data in
some limited way; in short, forestry education teaches foresters to do science. It says little
if anything at all, o f the assumptions about knowledge, language, and self that are
concealed within the theories and methods o f science. It does even less to teach future
foresters to speak in other languages, to know in other ways, and to value these other
knowledges and discursive formations as legitimate. It is perhaps time for forestry to
become self-reflexive: to investigate the conditions o f its own possibility, the meanings o f
its terms, and the real complexity (symbolically speaking) o f its object. To do this, it will
need to step out o f itself and use the tools provided by other disciplines and other
persepctives. More than 300 years ago, John Locke suggested that there are three faults
that inhibit our thinking, the third o f which is committed by

those who readily and sincerely follow reason, but for w ant o f having that which
one may call large, sound, round-about sense have not the full view o f all that
relates to the question ... We are all short-sighted and often see but one side o f a
matter; our views are not extended to all that has a connection with it. From this
defect I think no man is free (Locke, 56).
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In attempting to free ourselves from this defect (or at least minimize it!) we may take
another page from the book o f medicine. Nearly two decades ago the University o f North
Carolina at Chapel Hill began to require a year-long course for all first-year medical
students taught by humanities scholars, social scientists, and practicing physicians. The
rationale for the expansion and for making the course a requirement was the recognition
on the part o f physicians and health care workers (to say nothing o f patients) that
medicine, for better or worse, was about more than just restoring biophysical health, and
furthermore that achieving health itself involved more than just treating the body in
isolation (Henderson et al. 1997, 1). But even more compelling was the realization on the
part o f practitioners that even the most "technical" medical sciences, like genetics or
molecular biology, are inextricably bound to politics and culture (Henderson, x).
Resistance to these courses on the part o f students is high: like the rest o f us, medical
students "seek certainty and avoid ambiguity." and professors find it difficult to make
"poetry compete with pathology" and “ social issues as important as anatomy"— to make
"soft, subjective" knowledge compete with “hard, objective science" (Henderson ix. 1).
But neither the ambiguity nor the uncertainty are caused by the inclusion o f these other
disciplines or ways o f knowing; it is rather, because doctors and patients (and scientists)
experience ambiguity and uncertainty, because knowledge is always incomplete, and
because the choices one makes about treatments cannot be based solely on the best
available science, that the inclusion o f non-scientific knowledges are essential.
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Thus, one way to better prepare future foresters for the inherently symbolic nature o f their
work is to broaden the curriculum so that forestry students take courses in the philosophy
o f science as well as in science; courses in political studies as well as in policy; in
linguistics, anthropology, literature, art, philosophy, and history as well as in social
science and economics. The social sciences are well represented in forestry; the
humanities, however, are largely absent.

At the level o f practice, the USFS might reconsider its exclusive com m itm ent (at least at
the level o f rhetoric) to a scientific explication o f forests and ecosystems. It might instead
"diversity " its rhetorical and knowledge “portfolio” and invest in other languages and
ways o f knowing that permit o f a wider access to its diverse and heterogeneous public(s).
It might consider, for example, hiring specialists in other fields— i.e., becom ing really
interdisciplinary by hiring philosophers, artists, and people versed in literature and
anthropology, etc.. But in an effort to avoid the problem o f excessive specialization in
which "the craft improves, [but] the craftsman [and perhaps his creation?] slips back” (de
Tocqueville), the USFS might consider hiring generalists— people who can speak many
languages and thus can communicate across discursive and conceptual boundaries.
Forestry does and should apply science; but forestry itself is not a science, either pure or
applied.

Ultimately, the contest over forest management is a contest over meaning: who dictates
the terms o f the discourse and who defines those terms. One cannot dism iss the terms o f
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the debate over forest health as mere rhetoric or scoff at the arguments over the
definitions as quibbling over semantics. The fact is that the person or group who comes
closest to ‘■controlling” (if only temporarily and tenuously) the language controls the
action in forests, if health, for example, is defined exclusively in scientific biophysical
terms, only those conversant in the applicable scientific discourses will have a say in the
way we conduct business on the forests [which will not stop the others from “squealing”].
Language, like knowledge, is power, and the argument over definition is a contest o f
power. Managers would prefer to see the terms expressed in managerial or administrative
language; policymakers prefer language that sustains their own interests and furthers their
agendas. Scientists prefer the debate to be expressed in clearly and rigorously defined
scientific terminology. Ethicists argue that the terms, be they political or scientific, are
ultimately value laden in a moral sense. Sociologists (of both the scientific and the
philosophical bent) insist upon the social character or use-value o f terms and the primacy
o f popular understandings and participation in crafting forest plans.

In all cases, the goal is to attempt to control the terms o f the debate so as to control the
decision making power. The average lay person, the “public” that the USFS is so keen on
bringing to the negotiation and planning table, while not naive is nonetheless unversed in
the academic, political, or scientific esoterica necessary to weigh in as a serious contender
for decision making and consequently can add little to the discussion in its current milieu.
The public is given a seat at the table, but given no words with which to speak.
Consequently, it speaks elsewhere— in the Congress, the courts, and the media— both the
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popular press and the minority activist press o f all complexions (environmental or
com modity oriented). By taking the speech outside o f the USFS forum (end-running
around the agency, or attempting to), it renders the USFS ineffective. Hence to be
effective, an agency must regain control o f the discourse and, in our democratic,
pluralistic and multi-cultural society, it cannot do this by Fiat or authority. It can,
therefore, only do it by enlarging the terms o f its own discourse— by expanding its
understanding o f forestry to match that extant in the culture — which entails becoming
self-reflective and self-reflexive and acknowledging the context o f its own discourse.

In closing, it is worth remembering D errida's insistence that deconstruction furnishes the
grounds upon which justice and democracy are founded: without the will to question our
own and others' implicit assumptions, to critically examine the value judgm ents
concealed within our concepts and conceptual frameworks, to look honestly at our
motives and agendas, we cannot make a claim to either justice or democracy. We have, in
essence, as members o f a species that considers itself concerned with matters o f justice,
of right and wrong, an obligation to question, to seek out and deconstruct those
conceptual frameworks that some would establish as unsurpassable a priori limits—
frameworks that silence the voices o f the Others. Deconstructing the Forest Service
discourse on forest health and decentering science as the arbiter o f the real does not lead
inevitably to nihilism or to unbridled relativism, nor does it leave the Forest Service
without a leg to stand on. On the contrary, as Derrida insists, the project o f deconstruction
demands from each o f us the utmost care and commitment: we must guard, to the best o f
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our ability, the interests o f the Other, in whatever form it takes. Ultimately, because we
must live in this world, we make a stand fo r something. But we must do so knowing full
well that we stand on shifting and uncertain ground and that in making that stand for one
thing and in acting on that stance, we irrevocably foreclose options, for someone or
som ething somewhere.
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